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1.1. IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES
1.1 Environmental policies and their unforeseen impacts on
markets
This dissertation examines the impact of environmental policies and their interplay on
markets, from an economic efficiency and environmental effectiveness point of view. This
is done by means of four case studies in which we evaluate the interaction of selected pol-
icy instruments within the Renewable Energy Directive, the Waste Framework Directive,
the 2015 Paris Agreement, the Nitrates Directive and the Belgian nuclear phase-out with
respect to the electricity and manure market. For each case study, a specific research ques-
tion was defined as well as three general research questions to summarize the case-specific
conclusions. We analyze the policy interactions and market effects by means of different
mathematical approaches to decision-support policy-market models. Our contribution to
the scientific literature is that we make, in each of the case studies, at least one vari-
able more endogenous in the model as compared to the current policy impact assessment
of those same case studies. This way we can identify whether it is useful or needed to
take further steps in policy impact assessment. In general, in this dissertation, we focus
on the aspects of environmental policy and technological change, environmental policy
uncertainty and investment, and conflict and policy incoherence between different policy
instruments applied to address different environmental issues. Through the research in
this dissertation, we aim to provide scientific evidence to support institutional and indi-
vidual decision-makers in the process of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the
selected policies.
In the remainder of this first chapter, we will elaborate on the background and relevance of
this dissertation, introduce the main objectives, and present the methodological framework
that is used. The final section of this chapter provides the outline for the dissertation.
1.1.1 Environmental policies and market effects
Governments develop public policies to guide actions towards achieving a desired outcome.
These policies have an effect whenever their implementation alters the inputs and incen-
tives for individual decisions and manipulates the costs and benefits that individual actors
face in nearly every facet of modern life. And, because the setting that these policies
seek to influence is typically a complex adaptive system, making a policy change can have
counter-intuitive results and cause side-effects or unintended consequences.
In this dissertation, we will focus on environmental policies1 and their unintentional effects
1Environmental policy focuses on problems arising from human impact on the environment, which retro-
2
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
on markets2, from an economic point of view.
In general, governmental policies can influence markets by changing the quantity of a
good available (supply) or the amount of funds that can be directed towards those goods
(demand). They can also make some forms of trade completely illegal, or illegal under
certain conditions. These decisions then impact on the choice that micro-economic actors
face and change their decision-making process (Ross, 2015). More specifically, when it
comes to environmental policy, governments get involved because of market failure, i.e.
an inefficient allocation of goods and services, in the form of forces beyond the control of
one person. Market failure can occur because of externalities3. Market failure includes
the free rider problem, where the private marginal cost of taking action to protect the
environment is greater than the private marginal benefit, but the social marginal cost is
less than the social marginal benefit; and the tragedy of the commons, where, without
government involvement, the commons are overused because no one person owns them,
and each individual has an incentive to utilize common resources as much as possible
(Rushefsky, 2002).
1.1.2 Environmental policy implementation
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2007), in their report on
‘Instrument Mixes for Environmental Policy’, states that an individual policy instrument
(or a combination of policy instruments) should only be implemented if there is a reason-
able expectation that it will add to the total welfare of the society. Practically speaking,
this means that (i) the marginal benefit from implementation must be larger than the
marginal cost (‘cost-benefit’ criterion), (ii) the marginal cost must be as low as possible
(‘cost-effectiveness’ criterion), and (iii) the marginal environmental benefit should be as
high as possible (‘environmental effectiveness’ criterion). However, in reality, it might be
difficult to fully measure up to all the dimensions of the welfare problem. Moreover, en-
vironmental policies must be carefully formulated so that the individual measures do not
undermine one another, or create a rigid cost-ineffective framework. Hence, they must
acts onto human society by having a (negative) impact on human values (Bührs and Bartlett, 1991). Strictly
speaking, the term ‘environment’ refers to the physical ecosystem, but it can also take into consideration
the social and economic dimension. In this dissertation, we define environmental policies as those policies
that manage the development, use, and protection of natural and physical resources in a way that enables
people to provide for their environmental well-being.
2We define ‘market’ as a medium that allows buyers and sellers of a specific good or service to interact
in order to facilitate an exchange. The value, cost and price of items traded are as per forces of supply
and demand in a market. The market may be a physical entity, or it may be virtual. It may be local or
global, perfect or imperfect (Investopedia, n.d., The Economic Times, n.d.).
3An externality is defined as the cost or benefit that affects a party who did not choose to incur that
cost or benefit (Buchanan and Wm. Craig Stubblebine, 1962). Governments then adopt policies that
‘internalize’ an externality, so that costs and benefits will affect mainly parties who choose to incur them.
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keep in mind environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency. For instance, when ad-
dressing a particular environmental problem, it is important to avoid transferring pollution
between different environmental media (i.e. ‘pollution swapping’) as this impacts on envi-
ronmental effectiveness (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2007).
Moreover, some policies have developed support schemes that take away all incentive for
players to respond to market dynamics (Albrecht and Laleman, 2014). In this dissertation,
we focus on three specific aspects of economic efficiency and environmental effectiveness:
(i) environmental policy and technological change, where technological change, i.e. innova-
tion, can reduce economic costs and/or increase environmental benefits; (ii) environmental
policy uncertainty and investment, where investment can further increase environmental
benefits and help achieve environmental goals, and (iii) conflict and policy incoherence be-
tween different policy instruments applied to address different environmental issues, which
can result in higher economic costs and an increase in pollution.
1.1.3 Environmental policy evaluation
Modeling the effect of these instruments on a specific market can help to evaluate and
clarify whether these instruments will enhance economic efficiency and/or environmental
effectiveness. The Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for the Common Agricultural
Policy (European Commission, 2015) explains that this type of research is relevant because
policy evaluation provides a sound analytical basis for future policy design by providing an
understanding about the efficiency and effectiveness of measures and interventions and the
achievement of the objectives set, thus supporting policy developments. More specifically,
it involves a judgment of interventions according to the results, impacts and needs they
aim to satisfy. It is a systematic tool which provides evidence for decision-making and
improves effectiveness, usefulness and efficiency. Evaluation contributes to transparency,
learning and accountability. Therefore, it allows lessons to be drawn for the future about
what works, in which circumstances and why (or why not) (European Commission, 2015).
Moreover, according to that same Monitoring and Evaluation Framework, the purpose of
carrying out policy evaluations is four-fold: (i) to contribute to the design of interventions,
i.e. policy performance, (ii) to assist in the efficient allocation of resources, i.e. policy
accountability, (iii) to improve the quality of interventions, i.e. policy efficiency, and




1.2 Dissertation relevance and focus
1.2.1 Relevance
In this dissertation, we look at four specific cases of how environmental policies can cause
unforeseen and undesirable impacts on markets in which they operate, with the aim to
determine the environmental effectiveness and/or economic efficiency of this policy-market
interaction. For each of the four cases, we model the market effects, that is, the interaction
of supply and demand within individual markets and specific actors, to better understand
human choices and resource allocation caused or influenced by policy instrument mixes
that target different environmental goals. Modeling the effect of these instruments on
a specific market, i.e. evaluating the impact of a policy on that market, can help to
clarify whether these instruments will enhance economic efficiency and/or environmental
effectiveness. This type of research is relevant because it evaluates policy performance,
accountability, efficiency and transparency, as stated by the European Commission (2015).
Moreover, this dissertation contributes to the existing scientific literature by adding a
‘dynamic’ element to the models we use, as compared to conventional approaches. In each
case study, we make at least one variable more endogenous in the models compared to the
current policy impact assessment of the case studies. This way, we can identify whether
it is useful or needed to take further steps in policy impact assessment. This ‘dynamic’
element will be explained in more detail in the different case studies and summarized in
the conclusion.
We focus on two markets that incorporate agricultural waste streams, i.e. manure and
organic biological waste, as goods that can be traded. The first market of interest is the
electricity market, where agricultural waste streams can be traded and converted, through
anaerobic digestion, into electricity, which in turn is a tradable good. The second market is
the manure market, where manure can be traded in raw and processed form. Furthermore,
we focus on four EU-level policies that promote environmental sustainability, and their
application at the regional – Flemish – level, and one specific policy at the national –
Belgian – level. These policies are:
 the 2009/28/EC Renewable Energy Directive (European Parliament and Coun-
cil of the European Union, 2009): at the Flemish level, this directive is translated
into the Energy Decree (‘Energiedecreet’), which states that, by 2020, 20.5% of the
electricity produced in Flanders should be generated by renewable energy sources
(Vlaams Gewest, 2009).
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 the (EG)2008/98 Waste Framework Directive (European Commisssion, 2008):
at the Flemish level, this directive is translated into the Materials Decree (‘Material-
endecreet’), which aims to improve the closing of materials cycles (Vlaams Gewest,
2011). In this cycle, the priorities are defined as follows: (i) waste prevention, (ii)
waste re-use, (iii) recycling and closing of cycles, (iv) other forms of useful waste
applications, such as energy recovery and the use of materials as an energy source,
and (v) disposal of waste, with deposits in landfills as the last option.
 the EU Climate and Energy Package 2020, Kyoto second commitment
period and 2015 Paris Agreement (European Commision, 2014): at the Flemish
level, the commitment has been made to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 15.7 %
as compared to the 2005 levels (Vlaams Gewest, n.d.).
 the 91/676/EEC Nitrates Directive (Council of the European Communities,
1991), which aims to reduce the concentration of nitrates in surface waters due to
agricultural activity to 50 mg.l−1 water. At Flemish level, this directive is translated
into the Manure Decree (‘Mestdecreet’) (Vlaamse Overheid, 2006).
 the nuclear phase-out, approved by Belgian Federal Government in 2003, which
prohibits the building of new nuclear power plants and limits the operating lives of
existing ones to forty years (Belgian Federal Government, 2003).
While the above-mentioned policies improve different facets of environmental protection,
they also, as a stand-alone policy or inter-playing policies, unwittingly affect certain as-
pects of the markets that are exposed to them. Figure 1.1 provides a graphical overview
of this policy interplay.
Figure 1.1: Graphical overview of the selected policy interplay.
Sources of the environmental issues resulting from agricultural waste (in pink) are pre-
sented alongside the policies designed to tackle these problems (in blue) in the area where
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they most frequently take place (i.e. water, ground or air). Arrows indicate where, in the
framework of this dissertation, the interplay between policies causes market effects4.
Sections 1.2.2 to 1.2.4 of this chapter describe in more detail how the policy interplays
identified in Figure 1.1 affect markets. At the same time, these specific cases also present
the backdrop to our analysis.
1.2.2 The Renewable Energy Directive, the Waste Framework Directive
and the electricity market
On the one hand, the Flemish Energy Decree (Vlaams Gewest, 2009), states that, by 2020,
20.5% of the electricity produced should come from renewable energy sources. In Flanders,
as in other European regions, this Decree and the associated support framework has
encouraged entrepreneurs to establish decentralized anaerobic digesters or biogas plants5
(De Geest et al., 2013).
On the other hand, the Flemish Materials Decree (Vlaams Gewest, 2011), which translates
the European Waste Framework Directive (European Commisssion, 2008) into Flemish
legislation, aims to improve the closing of materials cycle.
The interplay of these policies means that biomass and residual biomass streams are occu-
pying an increasingly important place in the transition from a fossil-based to a non-fossil-
based society as they have become an interesting raw material and, at the same time, an
attractive source of renewable energy. At the same time, as (residual) biomass streams are
becoming more interesting to the bio-based industry6 (as a source of carbohydrates, pro-
teins, fats and fiber), the use of a number of residual waste streams is shifting between the
different types of bio-based industries, depending on the economic added value (Openbare
Afvalstoffenmaatschappij, 2015).
Indeed, Mertens et al. (2016) state that, today, biogas plant owners all over Europe face
4As we do not focus on the reason behind the nuclear phase-out, i.e. toxic pollution from nuclear waste,
this frame is left uncolored. Moreover, as the management of nuclear waste is regulated by other policies,
we chose to place the nuclear phase-out frame outside of the main frame.
5Anaerobic digestion is a microbiological process for decomposition of organic matter, in the absence
of oxygen, common to many natural environments and largely applied today to produce biogas in airtight
reactor tanks, commonly called digesters. A wide range of micro-organisms are involved in the anaerobic
process which has two main end products: biogas and digestate. Biogas is a combustible gas consisting of
methane (CH4), carbon dioxide (CO2) and small amounts of other gases and trace elements. Digestate
is the decomposed substrate, rich in macro- and micro nutrients and therefore suitable for use as plant
fertilizer (Al Seadi et al., 2008).
6These are the industries, such as the food, feed and wood industries, which, as a result of their activities,
intrinsically depend on (residual) biomass streams for raw materials, as well as industries which have tra-
ditionally depended on fossil sources for their raw materials and are now increasingly turning to (residual)
biomass streams, e.g. as a more stable source of renewable energy (Openbare Afvalstoffenmaatschappij,
2015).
7
1.2. DISSERTATION RELEVANCE AND FOCUS
increased financial uncertainty, caused by high investment and operational costs (Gold and
Seuring, 2010), low electricity commodity prices (EurObserv’ER, 2014) and, most impor-
tantly, difficulties in obtaining a stable and affordable supply of biomass (Poeschl et al.,
2010). Indeed, feedstock costs can represent up to 40-50% of the total cost of electricity
produced (International Renewable Energy Agency, 2012). When comparing the 2012 and
2017 parameter documents by the Flemish Energy Agency (VEA) for determining the level
of green electricity certificates per renewable energy technology, it is clear that average
feedstock costs for agricultural anaerobic digesters have as good as doubled, from 11 to
21 e.ton−1 feedstock in 2012 and 2017 respectively (Vlaams Energieagentschap, 2012a,
2017). Additionally, the 2009 decision by the Flemish government that biogas plants could
profit from lifetime subsidies for the energy produced was repealed in 2012, making it even
harder for anaerobic digestion operators to maintain a profitable business (Mertens et al.,
2016)7.
Moreover, Albrecht and Laleman (2014) state that, in the electricity-market context of to-
day, incentive schemes focus on renewable energy sources which are sheltered from market
dynamics. As we will show in Chapters 2 and 3, green electricity certificates encourage
the production of maximum amounts of green electricity, without taking into account the
market dynamics of increased feedstock costs (due to increased competition) and flex-
ible electricity supply and demand. Therefore, in these two chapters (Chapters 2 and
3) we look in more depth at how, under these increasingly complex conditions, anaero-
bic digestion operators can potentially increase their profits and identify opportunities in
the electricity market, while operating under a mix of policy instruments that does not
necessarily encourage environmental effectiveness or economic efficiency.
1.2.3 The European Climate and Energy Package 2020, the nuclear
phase-out and the electricity market
On the one hand, the Kyoto Protocol is an international treaty that extends the 1992
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which commits
countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in Kyoto,
Japan, on 11 December 1997 and came into force on 16 February 2005. The Protocol’s
first commitment period started in 2008 and ended in 2012. A second commitment period
was agreed in 2012, in which 37 countries, including the EU, have binding targets. On
7According to VEA, policy reforms were deemed necessary because, while green energy subsidies were
granted for life, the calculation of the size of these subsidies was based on a support period of ten years.
From this point of view, it was logical to match the actual support period with the support period used




a lower institutional level, the European Climate and Energy Package 2020 (and the Re-
newable Energy Directive) state that, by 2020, at Member State level, 20% of the energy
produced should come from renewable sources while, at the same time, greenhouse gas
emissions should be reduced by 20% as compared to the 1990 level (European Commision,
2014, European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2009, European Par-
liament and Council of the European Union, 2009). This means that Europe is heading
for decarbonization of its energy, and hence, electricity sector.
On the other hand, in 2003, the Belgian Federal Government decided to prohibit the
building of new nuclear power plants and to limit the operating lives of existing ones to
40 years (Belgian Federal Government, 2003). However, nuclear power currently makes
up more than 30% of the total installed capacity for power generation in Belgium (Elia,
2016a). As it is expected that demand for electricity will increase and because nuclear
capacity will have to be replaced by gas and biomass power plants, CO2 emissions from
electricity production are predicted to increase by at least 10 million tons (around 60%) by
2030 8. It will therefore be difficult to adhere to the emission targets in the Kyoto Protocol
and the European Climate and Energy Package 2020 without nuclear power (Albrecht and
Laleman, 2015). In 2015, as security of supply came under heavy pressure, the government
decided to extend the long-term operation of the three oldest nuclear power plant units
from 2015 to 2025 (International Energy Agency, 2016). While the government has stated
its intention to go ahead with the foreseen shut-down of the remaining four plants in 2022-
2025, a number of studies have called for the reconsideration of this decision (International
Energy Agency, 2016, Groep GEMIX, 2009, D’haeseleer et al., 2007). In the meantime,
the uncertainty about the nuclear phase-out does not create a stable investment climate for
competitive market players to diversify the primary power generation sources (renewable
and non-renewable).
This uncertain investment climate does, of course, also influence investment decisions with
regard to renewable energy. In Chapter 4, we therefore analyze how uncertainty about a
nuclear phase-out coupled with the implementation of renewable energy subsidies affects
investment capacity and productivity decisions by electricity suppliers in Belgium.
8This calculation was made for the best-case scenario where the share of renewable energy amounts to
57% (Albrecht and Laleman, 2015).
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1.2.4 The Nitrates Directive, the 2015 Paris Agreement and the manure
market
The Nitrates Directive aims to protect water quality across Europe by preventing nitrates
from agricultural sources polluting ground and surface water and by promoting the use of
good farming practices. At the Flemish level, this directive is translated into the Manure
Decree (Vlaamse Overheid, 2006) which sets fertilization standards for agricultural lands.
Van der Straeten et al. (2010) define the manure market as a quota market where emissions
are tradable and rights are locally fixed. As manure emissions themselves are tradable,
manure transport and transport costs become important, as they create a spatial difference
in willingness to pay and influence the market price for manure disposal.
The Kyoto Protocol and, more recently, the 2015 Paris Agreement, aim to strengthen the
global response to the threat of climate change. At the European level, this means that
greenhouse gas emissions should be reduced by 20% as compared to the 1990 level. In
2014, the transport sector contributed 25.5% of the total EU-28 greenhouse gas emissions,
and 73% of this contribution was directly attributable to road transport. Emissions will,
therefore, need to fall by 67% by 2050 to meet the 60% greenhouse gas emission reduction
target in the 2011 Transport White Paper (European Commission, 2011). As the trans-
port sector is not included in the Emissions Trading Scheme (non-ETS sector)9, it is the
responsibility of Member States to reduce transport emissions through national policies
(European Environment Agency, 2016).
Additionally, to adhere to targets in the Water Framework and Nitrates Directive, in
Flanders, raw manure is currently transported from zones with high manure pressure to
zones with low pressure until fertilization standards are fulfilled, after which the manure
surplus is processed, resulting in a high level of transport, and hence, greenhouse gas
emissions. Thus, it could be stated that the intention to improve surface water quality
through the Nitrates Directive has been ineffective in environmental terms by elevating
greenhouse gas emissions from increased manure transport.
On the one hand, calls have been made to reduce the high manure pressure and associated
environmental effects, such as emissions from manure transport, by reducing, relocat-
ing and more evenly distributing livestock production (Werkgroep voor Rechtvaardige en
Verantwoorde Landbouw, 2013). On the other hand, based on scientific literature, pri-
9The ETS system covers the following sectors and gases with the focus on emissions that can be
measured, reported and verified with a high level of accuracy: (i) CO2 from power and heat generation,
energy-intensive industry sectors including oil refineries, steel works and production of iron, aluminium,
metals, cement, lime, glass, ceramics, pulp, paper, cardboard, acids and bulk organic chemicals, and
commercial aviation, (ii) N2O from production of nitric, adipic and glyoxylic acids and glyoxal, and (iii)
perfluorocarbons (PFCs) from aluminium production
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marily Life Cycle Assessment, one could argue that high livestock density increases ma-
nure processing and, therefore, reduces the environmental impact of manure management
(McAuliffe et al., 2016).
A number of analyses have been conducted on the topic of greenhouse gas emissions from
manure, mainly using attributional Life Cycle Assessment. They have reported conflicting
results regarding the optimal solution for manure management. Therefore, in Chapter 5 of
this dissertation, we offer an alternative perspective on the issue, comparing the optimal
economic and optimal environmental (as regards greenhouse gas emissions) organization
of the manure market.
To summarize, it is against this backdrop of differing concerns and objectives of environ-
mental policies and their impacts on markets (when it comes to the use of residual biomass
streams), that we have analyzed four specific cases and offer new insights by including, in
our analysis, market effects that have not previously been taken into account. We have
determined the environmental effectiveness and/or economic efficiency of the mix of pol-
icy instruments regarding the aspects of technological change, uncertainty and pollution
swapping, and offered suggestions on how to make improvements. In the following section,
the general research questions of this dissertation are explained, as well as the specific ones
that will be answered in each of the following chapters.
1.3 General and specific research questions
Overall, this dissertation attempts to provide an answer to the following three general
research questions.
1. How do environmental policies and their interplay affect markets?
2. Can the current policy assessment of these markets be improved by incorporating
additional modeling aspects as compared to the current policy assessment frame-
works?
3. How can environmental policies be improved to eliminate these aforementioned ef-
fects, i.e. effects of the policies themselves and the interplay they create?
While the first and third research questions are content-related, the second one targets
the methodological approach of the dissertation and is answered using the methodological
framework explained in Section 1.4. The content-related questions form an overarching
framework against which specific cases are studied. As there is no one solution that fits
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all, by looking at distinctive cases, we aim to come up with a number of recommendations
that are more broadly applicable.
For each of the four cases that were analyzed, case-specific research questions were then
developed. These questions do not refer to the distinct environmental policies that affect
the relevant market as such, they refer to the choices decision-makers can make, in or-
der to improve the functioning of markets from an economic efficiency or environmental
effectiveness point of view. The specific research questions are summarized below.
Which strategies can anaerobic digestion operators apply to improve their
economic performance and profitability?
In this case study, we focus on the Renewable Energy Directive and its interplay with the
Waste Framework Directive (see Section 1.2.2). The first general research question applied
to this case hence refers to these two policies, with a focus on green electricity certificates
as a policy instrument of the Renewable Energy Decree (which is the Flemish application
of the Renewable Energy Directive). As was mentioned in Section 1.2.2, biogas operators
are facing increased financial uncertainty, partly due to high feedstock costs, and, in this
chapter, we focus on how these operators can potentially increase biogas yield and, hence,
economic profit by adapting their operational management parameters. We develop a
single-firm optimization model10 that calculates how, with the same amount of feedstock,
a higher biogas yield could be attained. The focus of this chapter within the dissertation
lies on economic efficiency and environmental effectiveness through technological change
and innovation.
Do opportunities exist for anaerobic digestion in the day-ahead electricity
market and is the current policy instrument efficient at promoting flexible
power production through anaerobic digestion?
This case study is related to the previous one and, hence, equally set within the framework
of the Renewable Energy Directive and its interplay with the Waste Framework Directive
(see Section 1.2.2). In this setting, we look at the emerging market trend of increased
need for flexible power production, we calculate the potential economic benefits for biogas
operators and we analyze how the system of green electricity certificates affects the par-
ticipation in this flexible electricity market. Similar to the previous study, we focus on the
participation of one company in the electricity market and develop a second single-firm




optimization model, the main methodological difference being that, in the current case,
we let the model decide on the optimal costs and prices, while in the previous case these
values were fixed as parameters. As is the case for the previous chapter, the focus of this
chapter within the dissertation lies on economic efficiency and environmental effectiveness
through technological change and innovation.
How does uncertainty about a nuclear phase-out, coupled with the implemen-
tation of renewable energy subsidies and nuclear taxes, affect the strategic
decisions of electricity suppliers in Belgium?
This case study is set withing the interplay of the Renewable Energy Directive, the 2015
Paris Agreement (or summarized, the European Climate and Energy Package) and the
Belgian nuclear phase-out. We look at how the interplay between these policies affects
strategic decisions regarding investment capacity and productivity of electricity suppliers
in Belgium (see Section 1.2.3). We broaden the focus from biogas operators only to all the
players on the electricity market and model this problem as a multiple-firm optimization
(equilibrium) model. In this chapter, we focus on the impact of policy uncertainty on
economic efficiency and environmental effectiveness from an investment perspective and
on the conflict between environmental policies pursuing different goals.
Can spatial reallocation of livestock production in Belgium reduce the impact
of greenhouse gas emissions from manure management?
In this case study, we look at the interplay of the Nitrates Directive and the Paris Agree-
ment (see Section 1.2.4) applied to the manure market. We develop a multiple-firm opti-
mization (simulation) model to calculate and analyze the marginal spatial impact on CO2
emissions by decreasing the manure pressure in those areas with a high livestock density.
The focus of this chapter within the dissertation lies on the conflict between environmen-
tal policies pursuing different goals, resulting in pollution swapping. Pollution swapping
affects the economic efficiency as well as the environmental effectiveness of environmental
policies.
These specific questions are analyzed and discussed in separate chapters which are linked




To answer the methodological research question, we make use of decision-support models.
Walker et al. (2003) state that a common approach to decision support is to create a model
of the system of interest that defines the boundaries of the system and its structure, i.e.
the elements and the links, flows, and relationships among these elements. The system
model represents the cause-effect relationships characteristic of the system (Walker, 2000).
In this dissertation, we use mathematical optimization models, in which the relationships
among the various components of the system are expressed as functions.
More specifically, we develop these decision-support models within the framework pro-
posed by Ventosa et al. (2005). They classify the different mathematical approaches11 to
electricity market modeling12 into three main trends, i.e. optimization models, equilibrium
models and simulation models. An overview is provided in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2: Schematic representation of the electricity market modeling trends, adapted
from Ventosa et al. (2005).
Single-firm optimization models focus on the profit maximization problem for one of the
firms competing in the market. They take into account relevant operational constraints of
the generation system owned by the firm of interest as well as the price clearing process.
According to the manner in which this process is represented, Ventosa et al. (2005) classify
these models into two types: price modeled as an exogenous variable and price modeled as
a function of the demand supplied by the firm in question, i.e. as an endogenous variable.
11Although there are many other possible classifications based on more specific attributes – such as
degree of competition, time scope, uncertainty modeling, etc. – the different mathematical structures of
these three modeling trends establish a clearer division (Ventosa et al., 2005).
12We assume that the manure market can be modeled according to the same scheme, according to Van
der Straeten et al. (2011).
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The most straightforward type of single-firm optimization models represents the price
clearing process as exogenous to the firm’s optimization program, where the marginal
price is an input parameter for the optimization program. As the price is fixed, the
market revenue becomes a linear function of the firm’s production, which is the main
decision variable in this approach. A downside of this type of model is that it can only
properly represent markets under quasi-perfect competition conditions because it neglects
the influence of the firm’s decisions on the market clearing price (Ventosa et al., 2005).
Examples of these type of models can be found, amongst others, in Fleten et al. (2002),
Rajamaran et al. (2001) and Gross and Finlay (1996).
In contrast to the assumption of an exogenously determined price, another type of model
assumes that a firm’s production does have an influence on the price, meaning that the
price is endogenously determined by the model (Ventosa et al., 2005). Examples of this
type of modeling can be found in Baillo et al. (2001), Garcia et al. (1999) and Varian
(1992).
Equilibrium models represent the overall market behavior taking into consideration com-
petition between all participants. Two main types of equilibrium models can be distin-
guished. The most common type is based on Cournot competition, in which firms compete
in quantity strategies, whereas the most complex type is based on supply function equi-
librium, where firms compete in offer curve13 strategies. Although both approaches differ
with regard to the strategic variable (i.e. quantities versus offer curves), both are based on
the concept of Nash equilibrium. Firms are in Nash equilibrium when each firm’s strategy
is the best response to the strategies actually employed by its opponents (Policonomics,
2017a). Although the theoretical support for applying a Cournot equilibrium model to
electricity markets is controversial, the economic research community tends to agree that,
in the case of imperfect competition14, this is a suitable market model. From a method-
ological point of view, a Cournot equilibrium is easier to compute than a supply function
equilibrium because the mathematical structure of Cournot models consists of a set of al-
gebraic equations, while the mathematical structure of supply function equilibrium models
13An offer curve is an alternative way to describe an individual’s demand function in equilibrium models.
By summing up individuals’ demand behavior, the offer curve can be used to describe the market demand
function in these models (Walker, n.d.).
14Perfect competition expresses the idea of the combination of a wide range of firms, which freely enter or
leave the market and which considers prices as information. Perfect competitors cannot influence the levels
of market clearing prices and buyers cannot influence prices as they are numerous and disperse. Imperfect
competition, on the contrary, is a form of competition in which some of the rules of perfect competition are
not followed. Perfect competition markets are almost impossible to find in the real world as all markets
have some type of imperfection. This is the reason they are mostly considered only theoretically. The
most common forms of imperfect competition include monopolies and oligopolies. (Policonomics, 2017b).
In an oligopoly, a Nash equilibrium model is used to determine each firm’s strategy as the best response
to the strategies used by the other players in a realistic, imperfect market. These markets are discussed in
more detail in Section 4.1.4.
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consists of a set of differential equations. There are, however, a number of drawbacks to
the Cournot model. The most important relates to the fact that, under the Cournot ap-
proach, equilibrium prices are determined solely by the demand function, and are therefore
usually higher than those observed in reality (Ventosa et al., 2005). Examples of Cournot
equilibria in electricity markets can be found in Otero-Novas et al. (2000), Batlle et al.
(2000) and Borenstein and Bushnell (1999). The supply function equilibrium approach,
which was originally developed by Klemperer and Meyer (1989), who showed that, in the
absence of uncertainty and given the competitors’ strategic variables (quantities or prices),
each firm has no preference between expressing its decisions in terms of a quantity or a
price, because it faces a unique residual demand. On the contrary, when a firm faces a
range of possible residual demand curves, it expects, in general, a bigger profit express-
ing its decisions in terms of a supply function that indicates the price at which it offers
different quantities to the market. As calculating this type of equilibrium requires solv-
ing a set of differential equations, these models have considerable limitations concerning
their numerical tractability (Ventosa et al., 2005). Rudkevich et al. (1998), Bolle (1992)
and Green and Newbery (1992) are amongst those that have developed supply function
equilibrium models.
Finally, the third category of market models consists of simulation models, which are an
alternative to equilibrium models when the problem under consideration is too complex
to be addressed within a formal equilibrium framework. Indeed, as equilibrium models
are based on a formal definition of equilibrium which is mathematically expressed in the
form of a system of algebraic and/or differential equations, this imposes limitations on
the representation of competition between participants. In addition, the resulting set of
equations, if it has a solution, is frequently too hard to solve. According to Ventosa et al.
(2005), simulation models typically represent each agent’s strategic decision dynamics
with a set of sequential rules. The great advantage of a simulation approach lies in the
flexibility it provides to implement almost any kind of strategic behavior. However, this
freedom also requires that the assumptions embedded in the simulation are theoretically
justified. In many cases, simulation models are closely related to one of the families
of equilibrium models. However, static (equilibrium) models appear to neglect the fact
that market participants learn from past experience, improve their decision-making and
adapt to changes in the environment. Therefore, agent-based models can be used to
provide a more flexible framework to explore the influence that the repetitive interaction
of participants exerts on the evolution of markets, which is ignored by static models
(Ventosa et al., 2005). Within the research conducted with simulation models, Day and
Bunn (2001) propose a model to analyze the potential for Market Power in the England
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and Wales Pool. An example of an agent-based electricity market model can be found in
Bower and Bunn (2000).
In each chapter of this dissertation, we model the relevant market following a different type
of model. The choice of model was based on practical considerations that are explained in
the following section. It must, however, be noted that the application of supply function
equilibrium and agent-based models falls outside the scope of this dissertation.
1.5 Dissertation outline
Figure 1.3 depicts a schematic overview of this dissertation representing, for each chapter,
the relevant policies, markets and market models.
Figure 1.3: Schematic overview of the dissertation depicting policies and corresponding
markets and market models that will be addressed in the different chapters.
Chapters 2 and 3 both look at how anaerobic digestion operators participating in the
electricity market are affected by the interplay between the Renewable Energy Directive
and the Waste Framework Directive. As explained in Section 1.2.2, these directives have
increased interest in and, hence, competition for agricultural waste streams, resulting in
a substantial increase in feedstock cost and an overall uncertain financial climate. In this
context, we look at how anaerobic digestion operators can increase their profitability either
by changing feeding pattern strategies or by participating in a specific type of electricity
market, i.e. specific research questions 1 and 2 respectively. In both chapters we use
a single-firm optimization model. The difference in approach between the two chapters
lies in the assumptions on feedstock cost and electricity price. In Chapter 2, we assume
that the decision-maker, i.e. the anaerobic digestion operator, has no influence over the
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feedstock cost and electricity price. In other words, we assume that feedstock cost and
electricity price are exogenously fixed in the model. In Chapter 3, conversely, we assume
that the decision-maker can actively participate in the market and choose an optimal
feedstock cost and electricity price depending on his or her specific situation. Hence, in
this case we assume that feedstock cost and electricity price are endogenously determined
by the model.
In Chapter 4, we focus on the electricity market and seek to understand how investments
and production decisions by the different players are influenced by the interplay between
the 2015 Paris Agreement, the Renewable Energy Directive and the Belgian nuclear phase-
out (i.e. the third specific research question). We widen our perspective on the decision-
maker from one single biogas operator firm to all of the firms participating in the market
and their interactions.
A number of models have already looked into the effect of the nuclear phase-out. However,
they have not taken into account the effect of the probability of nuclear license extension or
the effect of strategic positions taken by firms when optimizing their decisions. Therefore,
we decided to model this problem using a Nash-Cournot equilibrium model, assuming
oligopolistic market conditions. As an addition to this analysis, in order to understand
how market assumptions influence the results, we modeled the same problem assuming
perfect market competition and monopolistic market conditions using a partial equilibrium
model.
In Chapter 5, we zoom in on the manure market and the interplay between the Nitrates
Directive and the 2015 Paris Agreement regarding the reduction in greenhouse gas emis-
sions (i.e. the fourth specific research question). The decision-makers in this case are
the Flemish farms who either produce manure, or accept manure as a fertilizer on their
agricultural land.
As in this case we are dealing with a high number of firms, i.e. the livestock and crop
farms in Flanders15, we decided to model this market using a multiple-firm partial equilib-
rium simulation model in which we inserted an attributional and consequential Life Cycle
Assessment to account for the environmental (carbon footprint) impacts caused by the
manure market.
The final chapter of the dissertation then formulates a general conclusion from our analysis;
it provides some policy recommendations and suggests possible extensions to the research.
15It needs to be clarified that, due to data and computational limitations, we do not model the interaction
between the individual farms as such but aggregate the interaction at the municipal level.
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Changing old habits: The case of feeding patterns in anaerobic digesters
Abstract: A non-linear programming model was developed to maximize the economic
profit from an anaerobic co-digester. The model consists of a combination of technical and
economic equations, linked through the biogas production variable. Five scenarios were
simulated. These differed with regard to substrate inlet mass flow rate, organic loading
rate and hydraulic retention time. The impact on biogas production was investigated
and an economic analysis was undertaken based on the concept of profitability and its
indicator Net Present Value. The model results indicate that varying the substrate inlet
mass flow rate and organic loading rate could have a positive impact on the profitability
of co-digesters in Flanders, increases in biogas yield from 2.8 to 7.5% were attained. This
impact can be achieved either by increasing the interval time between feedstock input, or
by feeding individual streams of feedstock separately into the system, while at the same
time reducing the hydraulic retention time.
This chapter is published as:
Willeghems, G., Buysse, J., 2016. Changing old habits: The case of feeding patterns in
anaerobic digesters. Renew. Energy 92, 212–221. doi:10.1016/j.renene.2016.01.081
2.1. INTRODUCTION
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Setting of the chapter within the dissertation
In this chapter, we look at the interplay between the Renewable Energy and Waste Frame-
work Directive, and the impact of this interplay on biogas operators participating in the
electricity market. More specifically, we evaluate the flexibility aspect of the current
Flemish Renewable Energy Decree regarding technological change. We use a single-firm
optimization model where feedstock cost and electricity price are exogenously determined.
2.1.2 Objectives of the work
The objective of this research study is to look for strategies and solutions that operators
of anaerobic digesters can apply to improve their economic performance and profitabil-
ity. More specifically, in this study, we focus on maximizing profit by optimizing biogas
production through optimizing substrate inlet mass flow rate, organic loading rate (OLR)
and hydraulic retention time (HRT).
Most research conducted so far has focused either on improving system stability and biogas
yield by investigating the microbiological parameters of anaerobic digestion (AD), such as
pH, changes in volatile fatty acid (VFA) and ammonia concentration at a laboratory scale,
or on economic parameters such as investment costs and subsidies for full-scale anaerobic
digesters. Our research is innovative in seeking to bridge the gap between the technical
and economic AD models by looking at operational system variables on the unit-process
level, namely substrate inlet mass flow rate, OLR and HRT for a real-life co-digester in
Flanders, and linking these to economic parameters.
2.1.3 Challenges of Anaerobic Digestion in Flanders
With an estimated average investment cost of 3,740 and an operational cost of 379 e.kW−1e
installed capacity (Vlaams Energieagentschap, 2017), the Flemish biogas sector represents
almost half a billion euros in investment over the past 5 years and an annual turnover
of around e50 million. Nevertheless, the sector is faced with loss-making businesses,
bankruptcy and deferred investments (De Geest et al., 2013). It is therefore important to
technically and economically optimize the processes involved in biogas production.
Construction and operation of a biogas plant is a combination of economic and technical
considerations. Obtaining the maximum biogas yield, through complete digestion of the
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substrate, requires a long HRT, and subsequently a larger digester size. In practice,
the choice of system design, or of applicable HRT, is always based on a compromise
between attaining the highest possible biogas yield, on the one hand, and ensuring that
the plant is economically justifiable on the other (Al Seadi et al., 2008). The industrial
viability of AD requires a suitable combination of physical and chemical process parameters
and low-cost substrates, hence the need for process optimization (Gueguim Kana et al.,
2012). Unfortunately, commercial AD processes often operate well below their optimal
performance due to a variety of factors, such as a too low OLR, basic design considerations
that try to determine the right balance between the construction practicalities of both
mixing and heat loss, and the mixing regime (Lindorfer et al., 2008, Ward et al., 2008).
Additionally, AD of single substrates presents some drawbacks linked to substrate char-
acteristics. Anaerobic co-digestion overcomes these drawbacks and improves the plant’s
economic viability (Mata-Alvarez et al., 2014). In what follows, referrals to the term AD
can be applied to mono- as well as co-digestion.
2.1.4 AD modeling
In addition to the numerous experiments conducted in the laboratory or in field studies
to optimize the AD process, several models have been developed to help understand,
simulate and predict the AD process. Modeling is always a goal-driven exercise, and
many alternative models have been proposed in the literature, depending on the aim, e.g.
process understanding, dynamic simulation, optimization, or control (Donoso-Bravo et al.,
2011). These models can be divided into two types of models, i.e. biochemical models and
economic-financial models.
AD is characterized by high complexity and non-linearity and the difficulties in collecting
large amounts of informative experimental data for modeling purposes (Donoso-Bravo
et al., 2011). The fact is that AD is itself a complicated, multi-stage, dynamic process that
requires the concerted efforts of several bacterial groups. The composition of such groups
varies in an unknown manner with changes in HRT, feedstock, temperature, reactor type,
and other operating conditions (Yu et al., 2013). An important variability exists in values
reported for the kinetic parameters, even when the same operational and environmental
conditions have been evaluated. One of the consequences thereof is a variety of approaches
to modeling and parameter identification (Donoso-Bravo et al., 2011). While complex
models like ADM1 (Batstone et al., 2002) are well suited for process simulation, they
are substantially limited when applied to process control and optimization (Stamatelatou
et al., 2009). Because these models demand a substantial quantity of specialized data, they
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are not accessible to farmers and other stakeholders with limited scientific knowledge on
the issue of anaerobic digestion. Therefore, a number of simple calculators were developed
to estimate the applicability of the AD process to a specific farm and provide information
to a farmer or decision maker (Kythreotou et al., 2014).
As demand for renewable, clean, local energy increases, so will the need for more accurate
and detailed economic information on the financial feasibility of anaerobic digesters (An-
derson et al., 2013). Economic-financial AD models have been developed and described
by Anderson et al. (2013), Gebrezgabher et al. (2010) and Walla and Schneeberger (2008),
amongst others. They looked at developing tools for assessing the financial feasibility of
farm-based anaerobic digesters, disposal of digestate in an economically and environmen-
tally sustainable manner, and optimal size for biogas plants. These and other previous
studies have generally found anaerobic digesters to be a poor investment for private firms,
without assistance (Klavon et al., 2013, Wang et al., 2011, White et al., 2011, Gebrezgab-
her et al., 2010, Bishop and Shumway, 2009, Lazarus and Rudstrom, 2007). It is therefore
in the interests of the sector to increase the profitability of commercial AD applications.
The goal of our research was to link together biochemical and economic-financial models,
by maximizing profit at the commercial AD level through optimizing biogas production.
Biogas operators are not typically involved in AD experiments at the microbiological level,
as they are processing large amounts of feedstock every day for their livelihoods. To maxi-
mize their profit, we have looked at strategies to increase biogas yield, and hence economic
profit, by proposing small adjustments in their daily operational management. We pro-
pose a new type of black-box optimization model, based on algebraic equations, which
takes into account the operational parameters of AD, as opposed to reaction mechanisms
and experimental measurements for a multitude of parameters, to monitor the operat-
ing conditions and performance of an AD treatment process at a small-scale commercial
facility.
2.2 Method
The aim of our research is to optimize (maximize) economic profit based on the biogas
yield of a mesophilic anaerobic farm-scale digester1 co-digesting three types of feedstock.
Our case is a theoretical, hypothetical one but is based on a case study of similar digesters
in Flanders (Raymaekers et al., 2014). Due to the complexity of the AD process, each
type of model has been developed for a different purpose (Kythreotou et al., 2014). We
1According to De Geest et al. (2016), farm-scale digesters have a CHP capacity of 200 kWe or less.
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do not focus on the biological or physico-chemical parameters of the process, or on the
kinetics of bacterial growth. Rather, the core modeling efforts focus on the operational
parameters, such as substrate inlet mass flow rate, OLR and HRT, to calculate substrate
degradation and biogas formation.
The model is based on the observation that different types of biomass have different speeds
of degradation and different bio-methanization potentials (BMP). In commercial biogas
reactors, AD is a continuous process, meaning that there is a daily in- and outflow of
biomass. The difference in degradation and BMP for the different input streams for co-
digestion implies that some of the biomass will have spent a relatively short time in the
reactor and therefore might not have achieved its full potential in gas production before
it is pumped out of the reactor. Currently, biogas operators can deal with this challenge,
either by installing a secondary, post-digestion reactor which will allow for additional gas
production of 5-15%, or by separating the digested biomass and recycling the fiber fraction
to extend the HRT for slowly decomposing materials (Jørgensen, 2009). However, these
adaptations imply a trade-off between additional cost and extra gas yield. Our model
simulates the in- and outflow of the biomass in a co-digester and identifies the optimal
quantity and ratio for each type of feedstock to be inserted at a certain time, as well as
the optimal HRT for each ‘batch’ of feedstock inserted at a certain time, with the aim
of increasing biogas yield without additional costs. We assume that co-digestion takes
place under optimal mixing conditions. Mixing in an anaerobic digester keeps the solids
in suspension and homogenizes the incoming feed with the active microbial community
within the digester content. Experimental investigations have shown that the mixing
mode and mixing intensity have direct effects on the biogas yield, even though there are
conflicting views on mixing design (Lindmark et al., 2014). In this study, however, we
do not take into account the possible effects of different mixing modalities on the biogas
yield.
2.2.1 Model description
To achieve our goal, we have developed a simplified AD single objective optimization non-
linear programming (NLP) model in GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS
Development Corporation, 2010)). The model is designed for a one-stage continuously
fed mesophilic AD system, in a continuous-flow stirred-tank reactor (CSTR), and aims to
maximize the profit from biogas production over a time period of 365 days.
The development of the model is centered around a first-order kinetic cumulative biogas




VS added) of each type of biomass i as a function of the ultimate methane yield Bmax(i)
(l CH4.kg
−1 volatile solids VS added), µ(i) (day−1) the first-order rate constant and resi-
dence time t (day). These values are typically determined using BMP assays. To be able
to use this function in our model, we needed to adapt the unit of Bmax(i) from ‘l CH4.kg
−1
VS added ’ to ‘m3 CH4.ton
−1 substrate added ’. This was done in two steps. Firstly, for
each substrate, we calculated the quantity of VS present in 1 ton of that particular sub-
strate, using total solids (TS) content to make the link between both. This calculation
provided us with the unit of ‘l CH4.ton
−1 substrate added ’. The data required for this
conversion can be found in Table 2.1 (Vlaamse Landmaatschappij, 2014a, El-Mashad and
Zhang, 2010, Forster-Carneiro et al., 2008, Linke and Mahnert, 2005, DairyNZ, n.d.). Sec-
ondly, to convert ‘l CH4.ton
−1 substrate added ’ to ‘m3 CH4.ton
−1 substrate added ’, we
divided the values by 1000 (assuming standard reference conditions of 15° C and 101.325
kPa). Equation 2.1 was used to calculate µ(i) where values were not provided.
Bt(i) = Bmax(i) ∗ [1− e(−µ(i)∗t)] (2.1)
Figure 2.1 shows how Equation 2.1, and more specifically Bmax, Bt and µ, should be
graphically interpreted.
Figure 2.1: Graphical interpretation of Equation 2.1.
Figure 2.2, then, provides a graphical representation of the main assumptions of the model.
The graphs are adapted from El-Mashad and Zhang (2010) and Linke and Mahnert (2005),
The graph on the left shows the cumulative yield function for organic biological waste
(OBW), manure and maize, as these are the three feedstocks that will be used to illus-
trate the model. The graph shows that the shapes of the cumulative yield curves differ
between feedstock types, due to different degradation rates µ(i), and, hence, that different
feedstocks have different ‘optimal’ HRTs, when considering the economics of commercial
anaerobic digesters. This implies that, during co-digestion, choices have to be made re-
garding biogas yield versus retention time. Our model tries to identify this optimal choice
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Figure 2.2: Graphical representation of the main assumptions of the model (adapted from
El-Mashad and Zhang (2010) and Linke and Mahnert (2005)).
based on the price of feedstock and electricity. The graph on the right shows the cumula-
tive methane yield function for manure. As gas production rate changes over the course of
the digestion, it is difficult to predict the specific methane yield (SMY) at a given point in
time without conducting numerous experiments. Therefore, using the cumulative methane
yield function, it is possible to estimate the SMY on a given day by subtracting the cu-
mulative yield for the previous days from the cumulative yield on the current day. In the
graph, an example is given for the SMY on day 3 of manure digestion. This reasoning is
translated in the model through equation 2.5, given below in the text.
The remainder of this section describes the actual model, in which the technical equations
(2.5 to 2.16) are linked with the economic ones (2.2 – 2.4, 2.18 - 2.20) through the calcula-
tion of biogas production. The model parameters and variables are represented by Greek
and Latin symbols respectively. The units are displayed within brackets and in italics.
Section 2.6 provides an overview of all the symbols used.
The objective function maximizes the total profit Π (e) for a period of one year2, i.e. the
time span for the model, and calculates this by subtracting the operational costs OC (e)
from the revenue R (e).
Π = R−OC (2.2)
Equations 2.3 and 2.4 provide the calculations for R and OC and are taken from the
aforementioned case-study of Flemish agricultural digesters (Raymaekers et al., 2014).
The revenue R (e) is calculated as follows,
2It should be noted that, while profit is a variable and should hence be represented by a Latin symbol,
it is common practice to represent profit by the symbol Π. This symbol should not be confused with π,








∗ [ηelec ∗ 〈(1− ϕelec) ∗ πelec + σGEC + ϕelec ∗ πelec,avoid〉
+ ηheat ∗ 〈(1− ϕheat) ∗ πheat + σCHC + ϕheat ∗ πheat,avoid〉]
(2.3)
and is based on the total biogas yield
∑
i,t′ Yt′(i) (m
3) and the revenue from electricity
and heat generated by the methane produced. To convert m3 CH4 to MWh electric power
we multiply the biogas yield with a conversion factor ε, which is set at 0.01 MWh.m−3
(Banks, 2009). Moreover, the revenue from biogas consists of four different elements.
The first element is the revenue from the sale of generated electricity πelec (e.MWh−1e ).
The second element is the revenue from the sale of heat πheat (e.MWh
−1
th ). Thirdly,
we take into account the subsidies generated by green power. These consist of green
electricity certificates σGEC (e.MWh−1e ) and CHP heat certificates σCHC (e.MWh
−1
th ).
The final element to be added is the expenses avoided, πelec,avoid and πheat,avoid, due to own
consumption of generated power (e.MWh−1e ) and heat (e.MWh
−1
th ), respectively. The
factors ϕelec and ϕheat refer to the relative amount of own electricity and heat consumption,
respectively. Furthermore, when methane is converted into electricity and heat through a
Combined Heat and Power (CHP), we assume this happens with a 35% efficiency (ηelec)
for electricity, and a 50% efficiency (ηheat) for heat (Banks, 2009).
The operational costs calculation comprises two parts and is calculated as follows
OC = 115, 846 + 110.37 ∗
∑
i,t′
qt′(i)− 691, 794. (2.4)
The first part (i.e. 115, 846, in e.year−1) relates to maintenance and human resource costs,
which are constant and independent of the quantity of feedstock. The second part of the
calculation (i.e. 110∗
∑
i,t′ qt′(i)−691, 794, in e.year−1) relates to the disposal cost of the
digestate and is, therefore, linearly dependent on the total amount of feedstock
∑
i,t′ qt′(i)
(ton feedstock) processed. This disposal cost includes the separation through centrifuge
of the digestate into a thin fraction, which is applied to the land, and a thick fraction,
which is processed by an external processor. The correlation was obtained through a
linear regression based on calculated digestate disposal costs as a function of ingoing
feedstock quantity. In this specific case, digestate disposal costs account for almost half
of the total operational costs. This equation is derived from data from the case study by
Raymaekers et al. (2014). In what follows, qt′(i) (ton feedstock.day
−1) is replaced by Qt′(i)
(m3 feedstock.day−1) by dividing qt′(i) by the feedstock density δ(i) (ton.m
−3).
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The total biogas yield
∑
i,tYt′(i) (m
3), then, is generated by the sum of the separate yields






Q′t′,t(i) ∗ βmax(i) ∗
[
(1− e(−µ(i)∗(t−t′)))− (1− e−µ(i)∗(t−(t′−1)))
])
,
for t ≥ t′.
(2.5)
In this calculation, Qt′(i) (m
3.day−1) represents the absolute quantity of an input i, in-
serted at a time t′ while Q′t′,t(i) represents the relative quantity of the originally inserted
Qt′(i) that still remains in the digester after a time t (day). Indeed, the insertion of new
input material into the digester implies that part of the older material is removed (as
reactor volume θ (m3) is a constant), hence equally removing part of the biogas poten-
tial of that original quantity Qt′(i). This assumption is translated into the calculation of
biogas yield Yt′(i) for each individual input i inserted at a time t
′. More specifically, the
constraint in Equation 2.5 is derived from the cumulative biogas yield reaction (Equation
2.1) described above, with βmax(i) (m
3 CH4.ton
−1 input added) the maximum methane
yield, and µ(i) (day−1) the first-order rate constant. For each day t after the insertion
of the original quantity Qt′(i) of feedstock (on day t
′), the model calculates how much of
that original feedstock Q′t′,t(i) remains in the reactor (relative to the original quantity) and
how much biogas the remaining quantity will produce that specific day. This reasoning
is clarified in the right-hand side of Figure 2.2 which indicates how the biogas yield for
a specific day is calculated, i.e. by subtracting the cumulative yield from the day before
from the cumulative yield of the current day. Equation 2.5 states that for all times t ≥ t′,
Yt′(i) equals the quantity Qt′(i), multiplied by the sum over time of the amount Q
′
t′,t(i),
which is, in turn, multiplied by the cumulative input-specific biogas yield equation. Equa-
tion 2.5 differs from the original reaction (Equation 2.1) in the way that it calculates the
daily discrete yield generated by each Q′t′,t(i), instead of cumulative yield, as explained in
Figure 2.2.
Equation 2.6 indicates that every Q′t′,t(i) is to be seen as a relative value, with a maximum
of 1.
Q′t′,t(i) ≤ 1, for t ≥ t′ (2.6)





i.e. the relative value of the same input, inserted at the same time t′, remaining in the
digester the previous day (t − 1), and on the sum of all inputs
∑
iQt(i) inserted at the







To ensure the stability of the operation, we added a number of additional constraints which
are defined based on knowledge of the AD process and on typically available substrate
characteristics. Firstly, in order to avoid an OLR which is too high and digester wash-out,
Equation 2.8 was inserted which prohibits the model from inserting more than a certain





Secondly, based on the study by Garćıa-Gen et al. (2014) on substrate blend optimization,
a number of other parameters were defined. These parameters are total Kjeldahl nitro-
gen (TKN, in g.l−1) (Equation 2.9), and salinity as Na+ concentration (g.l−1) (Equation
2.10) and K+ concentration (g.l−1) (Equation 2.11). The values for these parameters are
determined for each input, and, for each time t, the overall value is calculated in g.l−1.
For each parameter, a minimum γ and maximum Γ limit (g.l−1) can be fixed within the

































) < ΓK+ . (2.11)
Equation 2.12 limits the total quantity of inputs present in the digester at a time t to the
digester capacity θ.
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Then, Equation 2.13 states that after 60 days a specific input will have passed through the
system completely, hence, Q′ after 60 days equals 0. This constraint was inserted mainly
due to computational limitations.
Q′t′,t(i) = 0, for t ≥ 60 (2.13)
Moreover, Equation 2.14 sets the time period over which the model runs to 365 days.
Qt′(i) = 0, for t
′ ≥ 365 (2.14)
Finally, we were able to calculate the HRT (Equation 2.15) and OLR (Equation 2.16) of
all inputs inserted at time t′. The HRTt′ (day) was calculated as the quotient of the sum





The OLRt′ (kg VS.m
−3.d−1) was calculated as the quotient of total daily mass of volatile
solids (VS) in the feedstock and the digester capacity,
OLRt′ =
∑
i (Qt′(i) ∗ δ(i) ∗ TS(i) ∗ V S(i))
θ
. (2.16)
The total daily mass of VS was calculated, for each input, by multiplying Qt′(i) with the
density δ(i), the total solid content TS(i) and the volatile solid content V S(i) as a relative
fraction of TS(i). To calculate the total daily mass of VS, the sum of the absolute V S(i)
over all the inputs was taken and the unit was transformed from ton VS.m−3.d−1 to kg
VS.m−3.d−1.
Overall, the optimization problem can then be defined as the maximization of the profit Π









To complete the economic analysis, we calculate the comparative Net Present Value (NPV,
e) of the AD installation as an indicator of profitability to compare the different scenarios.
Equation 2.18 provides the formula for calculating the NPV,
NPV = −IC +
(∑
T
(RT −OCT )/(1 + r)T
)
(2.18)
where T represents the number of years, RT (e.year−1) and OCT (e.year−1) the respec-
tive revenue and operating costs for each year, r the discount rate (% ) and IC (e) the
initial capital investment cost of the installation.
The investment costs are dependent on the capacity of the digester and the CHP and are
calculated using Equation 2.19.
IC = 388, 500 + 184 ∗ θ + 64, 975 + CHPt ∗ (15, 648 ∗ CHP−0.5361t ) (2.19)
This equation was partly derived from the same case study by Raymaekers et al. (2014)
as Equations 2.3 and 2.4, and partly from the study of Szarka et al. (2013) and a survey
of CHP manufacturers in Germany in 2011 (Ruhnau et al., 2011). The first part of the
equation (i.e. 388, 500, in e) incorporates all investment costs related to the digestate
centrifuge, storage tank, hygienization, evaporation and air scrubber units, civil works,
permits and grid connection. The second part of the equation (i.e. 184.42 ∗ θ + 64, 975,
in e) is linearly dependent on the volume of the digester and incorporates all investment
costs relating to the digester itself3. These two parts are derived from Raymaekers et al.
(2014). The third part of the equation (i.e. CHPt ∗ (15, 648 ∗ CHP−0.5361t ), in e), is
derived from Szarka et al. (2013) and relates to the CHP installation, where CHP stands
for the daily engine capacity needed (kWe) to transform biogas into electric power and
heat. Increasing the capacity of CHP units decreases the specific prices, particularly for
units with an installed capacity between 30 and 500 kWe (Szarka et al., 2013, Ruhnau
et al., 2011).
3Although we assume the existence of scale advantages for digester investment costs, we used the
available data from the case study in which the scale of the operation was fixed later on, and therefore
used a linear function.
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∗ ε ∗ 1000/24 ∗ 0.35. (2.20)
This is done by multiplying the total daily methane yield
∑
i Yt(i) with ε∗1000 to transform
m3 CH4 into kW. This amount is then divided by 24 to calculate the hourly capacity
needed, followed by a multiplication with the electrical efficiency factor 0.35 to transform
kW into kWe. About 55% of the total investment cost relates to the purchase of the
digester and CHP.
2.2.2 Model parametrization and assumptions
The model can be adapted to different cases by changing parameters and assumptions. A
specific case is further developed to show the capacities and limitations of the model more
clearly and to highlight potentially interesting management strategies for that specific
case. We have chosen a Flemish case with three types of feedstock in the same ratio as
they are currently being digested in Flanders. These feedstocks comprise OBW, and more
specifically food waste, manure (cattle slurry) and silage maize as an energy crop, at a ratio
of 60%, 25% and 15% respectively (De Geest et al., 2013). Specific feedstock parameters
were adapted from the literature4 Economic numbers are based on data from the year
2014. (Vlaamse Landmaatschappij, 2014a, El-Mashad and Zhang, 2010, Forster-Carneiro
et al., 2008, Animal Sciences Group Wageningen University, 2006, Linke and Mahnert,
2005, DairyNZ, n.d.), and are summarized in Table 2.1.
In each scenario, the same amount of feedstock was used in order to keep the operational
costs constant, as these costs, in our case, are based solely on the amount of feedstock
used (Equation 2.4). As we use the same amount of feedstock we did not take into
account the transportation costs of biomass. However, when the model is used to compare
scenarios with different amounts of feedstock, it is important to include these, as biomass
exhibits high transportation costs per unit of energy ultimately generated. Moreover,
because different types of biomass have different biogas-generating properties, the design
of the supply logistics system can be the determinant factor for the economic viability
of energy generation from an AD plant (Neiva de Figueiredo and Mayerle, 2014). The
gate fee per ton of feedstock is listed in Table 2.1. Manure has a negative value, as AD
4βmax(i) was derived from Bmax(i) through the calculation explained in the second paragraph of Section
2.2.1. Regarding the calculation of µ in the case of OBW and manure, we used those scientific papers that
provided values for Bmax and Bt, at a given day t. We then inserted those values in Equation 2.1 and
were hence able to determine µ.
31
2.2. METHOD
















OBW 3333a 10b 0.51f 28c 86c 1.62c
Manure 1388.75a -17b 1g 14c 80c 0.69c
















OBW 0.33c 0.44c 353c 85d 0.06d
Manure 0.11c 0.36c 242c 27d 0.12d
Maize 0.01i 0.45i 502e 147d 0.03e
a model assumption, b personal communication with biogas AD operator, c El-Mashad and Zhang
(2010), d calculations based on collected data, e Linke and Mahnert (2005), f Forster-Carneiro et al.
(2008), g Vlaamse Landmaatschappij (2014a), h DairyNZ (n.d.), i Animal Sciences Group Wageningen
University (2006)
operators get paid for accepting manure. This is because the Flanders region has a very
high livestock density and, since the implementation of the Nitrates Directive, it has to
manage a manure surplus. Furthermore, the capacity of the digester was set at 1000 m3
and the model was run for a total of 365 days. The conclusions derived from this case
are not affected by the digester capacity or its shape, although the shape could also be
optimized (Markowski et al., 2014). For our calculations, α was varied to create different
levels of OLR. In order to make comparison possible between the different scenarios, we
added an additional constraint stating that all feedstock needed to be used completely
in each scenario. This is because if the total tonnage of incoming feedstock is equal for
each scenario, the operational costs are also constant for all scenarios. This allowed us
to see whether a higher biogas yield could be achieved, with exactly the same amount of
feedstock, merely by playing with the operational parameters. The quantities of feedstock
were chosen in a way that they did not, in any scenario, pose limitations or infeasibilities
with regard to determining the optimal HRT and substrate inlet mass flow rate. Moreover,
the total amount of feedstock available for the simulation was determined based on the
digester volume, realistic feedstock volumes that are fed on a yearly basis to such a digester,
and a realistic OLR for full scale digesters (Raymaekers et al., 2014). Feedstock quantities
have to be divided by their respective densities to obtain their volumes, as these form part
of the restrictions for our model. For each scenario, the OLR was also calculated to ensure
that it was kept within realistic limits (see Section 2.2.3 and Table 2.3) and restrictions
regarding minimum and maximum TKN, Na+ and K+ levels were adhered to, based on
the levels proposed by Garćıa-Gen et al. (2014) (see Table 2.3). Specific feedstock values
for TKN, Na+ and K+ were converted from g.kg TS−1 to g.l feedstock−1 using data on
TS content and density (see Table 2.1).
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With regard to the revenue calculation, in Flanders, πelec equals around 45 e.MWh−1e ,
πheat 45 e.MWh
−1
th , σGEC 93 e.MWh
−1
e , σCHC 31 e.MWh
−1
th , πelec,avoid 140 e.MWh
−1
e ,
and πheat,avoid 45 e.MWh−1e (Raymaekers et al., 2014). Moreover, we set ϕelec at 0.2
and ϕheat at 0.35. However, as determining the overall electricity price including subsidies
is a complex issue and very case-dependent, we assume a lump sum of 185 e.MWhe−1
produced. These numbers are based on data from the year 2014. We calculate the com-
parative NPV for a period of 10 years (T = 10) and a discount rate of 5% (r = 0.05).
As our model focuses on strategic options for increasing profit, and hence, improving biogas
yield, we do not take into account the time it takes to start up a new biogas installation
and develop the required microbial communities and assume the digester is operating in a
steady-state. After all, digester start-up may take months, as temperature, pressure, and
mixing all affect the efficiency of digester operation (Chynoweth and Isaacson, 1987) and
this type of research is outside the scope of our study.
2.2.3 Model scenarios
In this study, we have simulated three different main scenarios. Table 2.2 provides an
overview of these scenarios and a summary of their main characteristics.










































The first, default, scenario (scenario 1) simulates the conventional way co-digesters cur-
rently work, i.e., inserting volumes of different feedstock in the same ratio every day. The
second scenario (scenario 2-a and 2-b) keeps the ratio of the different feedstocks constant
but allows the model to maximize the cumulative biogas yield by choosing the optimal
time to insert these inputs (but always simultaneously and in a constant ratio) while the
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third scenario (scenario 3-a and 3-b) lets the model freely decide which volume of a cer-
tain feedstock to insert at which optimal time in order to obtain a maximum cumulative
biogas yield. Both the second and third scenarios have two sub-scenarios each, based
on variations in the OLR. These OLRs were based on results reported in the literature.
In a full-scale case study, Lindorfer et al. (2008) reported stable working conditions for
an anaerobic digester with an OLR of 4.25 kg VS m−3.d−1. Comino et al. (2010) even
reached an OLR of 7.78 kg VS m−3.d−1 before experiencing system breakdown. Moreover,
both studies reported an increase in biogas productivity as a consequence of increasing
the OLR.
For scenario 1, the magnitude of α was irrelevant, as we forced the model to insert inputs
in the same ratio every day for a period of one year to simulate real-life conditions. The
OLR that resulted from this simulation was 2.93 kg V S.m−3.d−1, which falls within the
normal, realistic range. For scenarios 2 and 3, we selected two values for α, namely 2.5 and
4%. These values are translated into an OLR of 3.39 and 5.43 kg V S.m−3.d−1 for scenario
2-a and 2-b respectively, and, from 2.75 to 3.07 and from 2.60 to 4.92 kg V S.m−3.d−1 for
scenario 3-a and 3-b respectively.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Technical results of scenarios
The outcome of the model simulation is presented below in Figure 2.3 and Table 2.3. The
results for all five sub-scenarios are provided and compared.
Figure 2.3 shows Qt′(i) as a function of the time t
′ and
∑
i Yt(i) as a function of the time
t.
To provide a better view on which quantities are inserted when, we opted to reduce the
scale of the vertical axis. As a result of this decision, the quantities of inputs inserted at
day 1 are not shown in the figure. The quantities and ratio of feedstocks on the first day
are the same for scenarios 1, 2-a and 2-b, i.e. 739, 157 and 105 m3 for OBW, manure
and maize respectively, due to the constraint of equal ratios. When we look at the initial
quantities inserted for the third, ‘free choice’ scenario, we can see that the model opts to
insert 100%, or 926 m3, of all available maize feedstock at the outset of the simulation,
as maize has the highest biogas potential of all three types of feedstock and inserting it
at the start will allow for the maximization of biogas production. Apart from maize, the
model opts to insert 74 m3 of OBW and no manure on the first day of the third scenario.
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Figure 2.3: Overview of input quantities Qi,t′ (m
3) in function of input timings t′ (days)
for different types of feedstock and of CH4 production
∑
i Yt(i) (m
3) in function of time
t (days) for the five sub-scenarios.
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Figure 2.3 also highlights the differences between the scenarios. The figure, combined with
Table 2.3 indicates that, when comparing scenarios 1 and 2, it would be technically, and,
hence, economically more advantageous to insert larger amounts of feedstock spread over
a greater time interval, instead of smaller ones every day, as a larger biogas production
implies a higher amount of electricity produced and sold. More specifically, in scenario
1, the total amount of feedstock inserted daily amount to 21.5 m3, while the daily total
amount of feedstock (on days feedstock is inserted) in scenario 2-a and 2-b equals 25 and
40 m3 respectively. The time interval for feedstock insertion ranges from inserting input
the very next day to leaving a maximum intermission of one day for scenario 2-a, and a
maximum of three days for scenario 2-b, apart from the longer period after the start, to
allow the large amounts of feedstock to reach their optimal biogas production, and the
period towards the end, where the last inputs are inserted around day 345. The latter
is, of course, the result of constraining the model’s running time to 365 days. Inserting
inputs later would not provide an optimal biogas yield, as time is limited. The increase in
biogas yield that can be achieved by adopting this approach is 2.8 to 3.3% depending on
the scenario (see Table 2.3).
Similar to the second scenario, the simulation in scenario 3 indicates that higher profits can
be attained if inputs are inserted in relatively higher quantities at greater time intervals.
These time intervals range from a maximum of one day for scenario 3-a to a maximum
of four days for scenario 3-b. The main difference, however, from scenario 2 is that the
different feedstocks are inserted separately in the digester, as a ‘batch’, rather than in equal
quantities, as typically happens in a co-digester. This is associated with the difference in
biogas potential for the different feedstocks. Figure 2.2 illustrates that manure reaches its
BMP before OBW and maize. Therefore, maize is inserted on the first day of digestion
to allow for it to get as close to its BMP as possible. Then OBW is inserted, followed
by manure, which reaches its BMP the quickest. Moreover, maize displays the highest
SMY, followed by OBW and manure (Table 2.1). Therefore, when looking at the biogas
yield, it does not make much sense to have a long HRT, as most of biogas production
would be achieved after 20-40 days. However, it makes more sense to increase organic
loading in the reactor, as this will increase the volumetric methane production (in m3
CH4.m
−3 digester.day−1, Banks and Heaven (2013)) while at the same time reducing the
HRT, because the amount of feedstock inserted must increase to satisfy the organic load.
This approach can result in an increase in biogas yield of 6.5 to 7.5% depending on the
scenario (see Table 2.3).
36


























































































































































































































































































































In conclusion, it can be derived from the simulation outcome that higher biogas production
results from batch feeding, and higher relative feedstock quantities, coupled with greater
time intervals, which coincide with higher levels of µ and OLR. In this way, anaerobic
digester plants can increase their profitability, based on the same total quantity of inputs,
simply by making a small change to their operational strategy.
2.3.2 Economic results of scenarios
Table 2.4 displays the economic outcome of the model simulations.
The operational costs are the same for all scenarios and amount to e35,102. The economic
profit increases by 3 to 8% compared to the conventional scenario, depending on the
scenario used. This increase is therefore solely due to the increase in biogas yield and
related revenue from electricity sales.
Furthermore, assuming operational conditions and costs remain unchanged over the pe-
riod, the comparative NPV was calculated. When it comes to the calculation of investment
cost, it is important to note that, for the same digester capacity, there are differences in
total biogas production between the scenarios, as well as variations in daily biogas pro-
duction within the scenarios (see Figure 2.3). In the case of pulse feeding (scenarios 2
and 3), additional CHP capacity is required, compared to continuous biogas production
(scenario 1), to handle the peaks in electricity production, otherwise the total amount
of electricity is reduced in proportion to the CHP-downtime5 (Szarka et al., 2013). We
therefore selected the appropriate CHP capacity for each scenario by using Equation 2.20
and taking the maximum daily CHPt value as the required capacity. We only looked at
the period of stable operation - we selected day 65 to 300 as benchmark values -, hence
excluding the start phase as it is not representative of the rest of the operational period.
The selected CHP values and corresponding investment costs are displayed in Table 2.4.
As higher NPV values imply greater economic benefits, the numbers in the table indicate
that, increases ranging from 4 up to 11%, as compared to the conventional scenario, could
be attained by applying the changes in operational management proposed by the model.
It is important to note that, as the OC in this study do not include all the costs incurred
by the biogas installation, such as the costs of the supply logistics system, the NPV is
used only to compare the different scenarios with one another. Neither the model nor the
study provides a judgment on whether the biogas plant in itself is profitable or not.
5It should be noted that, instead of additional CHP capacity, it is also possible to add additional biogas
storage capacity. The choice between CHP and storage capacity then depends of the cost comparison
between both for the specific case at hand.
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As a final step in the analysis of the results, we conduct a sensitivity analysis with regard
to the value for the discount rate r in order to understand how sensitive the NPV is to
variation in this value. We conduct the sensitivity analysis for a discount rate r of 10 and
15%.
The results of the analysis are presented in Table 2.5.
Table 2.5: Sensitivity analysis overview.





































1,680,441 4.4 1,166,380 4.8 799,438 5.3
scenario 3-a
free choice
1,766,878 9.8 1,235,241 10.9 855,753 12.7
scenario 3-b
free choice
1,788,084 11.1 1,250,878 12.3 867,415 14.2
The numbers in the table show that, for an increasing r, the comparative NPV decreases.
For the same value of r, however, the increases in NPV compared to the baseline scenario
(scenario 1), follow the same pattern as the one described in Table 2.4, i.e. increases
in comparative NPV for scenarios 2 and 3 as compared to the conventional scenario 1.
However, the percentage increases are larger for higher values of r. Overall, the analysis
indicates that the conclusion, i.e. that greater economic benefits could be attained by
applying the changes in operational management proposed by the model, stands.
2.4 Discussion
Although the analysis based on our NLP model yields useful insights into the optimal
performance of a biogas plant, it holds some limitations and is based on a number of
assumptions.
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Firstly, the performance of commercial biogas plants should ideally be improved by fo-
cusing on a number of different areas (see Section 2.1.3, Ward et al. (2008)). We have,
however, chosen to focus on only one specific aspect, i.e. the optimization of OLR and
HRT.
Secondly, the feedstocks chosen for the model have significantly different first-order kinetic
constants - as can be seen in Figure 2.2, leading to a significant difference in optimal HRT
for maximizing methane production. This means that varying the HRT can result in
significant biogas yield increases. However, if the kinetic constants for different feedstocks
in an AD are similar, there is one constant optimal HRT depending on the prices of
inputs and outputs. Varying the HRT and the feeding mix would not, in that case,
increase biogas yields. Moreover, biogas operators would need to have a clear idea about
the BMP and kinetic constants of the specific feedstock they are using. For instance,
Triolo et al. (2011) and Angelidaki et al. (2009) found that data on BMP may vary
between laboratories, as these data cannot usually be compared due to differences in
experimental design, equipment used and variations in temperature and experimental
conditions. Moreover, the inoculum to substrate ratio should be recognized as one of the
major parameters affecting the results of anaerobic assays (Raposo et al., 2011, Vedrenne
et al., 2008, Neves et al., 2004), as it is clearly shown that this ratio can affect not only
the biodegradability but also the CH4 production rate or hydrolysis rate, calculated from
first-order kinetics models (Raposo et al., 2011). A lower than optimal ratio can cause
inhibition, while a higher one can cause a BMP overestimation (Moset et al., 2015). For our
study, we assume an optimal ratio was used to determine the BMP, and as new feedstock
is inserted in much lower quantities than are already present in the digester, and hence
inoculated, we assume there will be no inhibition and biogas production will be similar to
the predictions from the BMP test.
Thirdly, we use a simplified cumulative biogas yield function and assume that the digester
has already reached an equilibrium state of digestion, implying that biogas production is
already taking place optimally. However, at the start of the model simulation, the digester
is filled with feedstock as if it is in start-up phase. This means there is a discrepancy be-
tween the assumptions. However, we assume this will not greatly affect the overall results.
Additionally, as indicated in Section 2.3.1, at the start of the third scenario, the digester is
90% filled with maize. We acknowledge that this is not a feasible operational start-up for
a biogas plant. However, starting the scenario 3 in a currently running operation should
be theoretically feasible because the most important restrictions for a stable AD operation
are satisfied in the model.
Fourthly, the model does not take microbiological AD parameters into account, but rather
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looks at operational parameters for profit optimization. Therefore, the model does not
provide details for microbiological reactions. This comment also applies to the cumulative
biogas yield function used as the basis for the model. The function describes the yield for
individual feedstocks, but does not take into account the synergetic effects a co-digestion
might have on the mixture. However, the improvement in methane production is mainly
a consequence of the increase in OLR, rather than those synergetic effects (Mata-Alvarez
et al., 2014). This is confirmed in our simulations. Therefore, we assume no negative
side-effects would take place.
Moreover, the analysis takes into account a variety of OLRs, some of which are close to
rates that have been reported, in the literature, to cause system breakdown. Therefore,
it needs to be kept in mind that some of the OLR rates used in our exercise might
be overestimated, resulting in an overestimation of digester performance and economic
outcomes. Nevertheless, Banks and Heaven (2013) studied the effect of increasing OLR in a
CSTR and found that the SMY for a substrate with constant VS content remains relatively
constant, as the loading is increased up to a certain OLR threshold level. Increasing loads
above this level would overreach the metabolic capacity of the digester, with a resulting
decline in SMY. According to that same study, little information is available for maximum
OLR, as this requires a large experimental effort and most commercial digesters work
within empirically established ranges.
Additionally, in the second and third scenarios, feedstock is not necessarily inserted every
day, as is the current common practice for commercial digesters, but a time lag of a couple
of days may exist, resulting in ‘pulse feeding’. De Vrieze et al. (2013) demonstrated that
stable operation can be maintained in anaerobic digestion when stronger pulse feeding pat-
terns are applied, albeit at the cost of increased daily operational variation. Furthermore,
changing feeding patterns can change the evenness, dynamics and richness of the bacterial
community. Also, the regular application of a limited pulse of organic material and/or
a variation in the substrate composition might promote higher functional stability (i.e.
stable methane production and a certain redundancy towards stress) and hence higher
tolerance to high levels of ammonium and organic overloading in anaerobic digestion.
Furthermore, there can be a potential variation in the composition of the biogas which
can impact the down-stream processes, mainly the engine performance. On the one hand,
the value and richness of the biogas depend on the amount of hydrocarbon components
present – in this case CH4 – and this amount varies depending on the type of feedstock used
(Banks, 2009). This is particularly important in the third scenario, as this is the scenario
where the relative feedstock input ratios change, and hence also the concentration of the
different compounds in the biogas. On the other hand, biogas contains impurities such as
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Sulphur and siloxanes which have to be removed through biological, physical, or chemical
techniques (Rasi et al., 2007). We assumed engines of small, farm-scale digesters are
sufficiently robust to deal with fluctuations in CH4 concentrations and we did not take
into account the possible need to invest in biogas purification units.
Finally, at this stage, the model only considers a single digester, without post-digestion in
a second digester. In practice, however, some digesters are equipped with a second or even
third digester where post-digestion can take place. This alters the outcome of the model,
as the feedstock would have more time to reach its biogas potential in the post-digesters.
As mentioned previously, post-digestion can increase biogas yield by 5-15% (Jørgensen,
2009).
2.5 Conclusion
This study presents an NLP model to optimize economic profit from an anaerobic farm-
scale co-digester through the maximization of biogas production. The model consists
of a combination of technical and economic equations. Five scenarios were simulated,
differing with regard to substrate inlet mass flow rate, OLR and HRT. The impact on
biogas production was investigated and an economic analysis was undertaken based on
the concept of profitability and one of its best knows indicators, the NPV.
Higher yields than in the conventional scenario were realized under scenarios with higher
OLRs and increased time intervals between points of feedstock insertion. Under these
scenarios, between 2.8 and 7.5% more biogas was produced than under the conventional
one. The results of the technical analysis were extended in the economic analyses where
those same scenarios resulted in economic profit and NPV increases of between 3.3 and
8.7, and 6.0 and 15.7% respectively. It can be concluded that varying substrate inlet mass
flow rate and OLR, either by increasing the time between feedstock inputs, or by feeding
individual streams of feedstock separately into the system, and at the same time reducing
HRT, can have a positive impact on the profitability of co-digesters.
The model simulations were carried out under a number of assumptions, including optimal
biogas production, looking solely at operational AD parameters, a variety of OLRs, some
of which were close to border values, fluctuations in these OLRs, and single stage digesters.
Moreover, the feedstock amount was fixed and all feedstock needed to be used completely
in each scenario.
The analysis yields useful insights into the performance of a small, farm-scale co-digester
and demonstrates the implications of making small adjustments to the operational man-
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agement of such a digester. However, it must be emphasized that this exercise is a theo-
retical optimization and that, even though the technical constraints are adhered to, model
verification would have to be conducted to validate the results.
The model and optimized feeding patterns could be adapted by commercial biogas oper-
ators, who, due to financial restrictions, might be limited to a certain quantity and type
of feedstock, and who could, without additional investments, see their biogas production
and profits increase. Even if adapting feeding patterns is more difficult to implement, it
is important to determine the kinetic behavior of the feedstock that is being used. Based
on this kinetic behavior, biogas operators should co-digest types of feedstock with similar
kinetic constants in order to maximize biogas production as opposed to feedstock with
dissimilar kinetic constants.
In further research, this model can be used as a base module in which techno-economic
optimization can be conducted by taking into account variability in feedstock availability
and prices, and adding additional modules such as a post-digester and an ammonia stripper
and scrubber. Another option would be to use this model as a base for flexible power
generation by steering biogas production through an adapted feeding regimen, in order
to link biogas production to electricity prices in the day-ahead or continuous intra-day
market (Szarka et al., 2013).
Within the framework of this dissertation, this chapter is related to the interplay between
the Renewable Energy Directive and the Waste Framework Directive. The current green
electricity certificates policy instrument provides incentives for biogas operators to produce
as much biogas as possible. This can most easily be achieved by digesting feedstock with
a high biogas potential. At the same time, these feedstock are high in demand by the
bio-based industry as well, resulting in high feedstock costs. In this chapter, we show that
increased biogas yields could, in theory, also be achieved through technological change by
adapting feeding patterns.
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limit for organic loading rate
OLR
%




γ minimum limit g.l−1
Γ maximum limit g.l−1
δ(i) feedstock density ton.m−1





ηheat conversion efficiency for heat %
θ reactor volume m3
µ(i) the first-order rate constant day−1
πelec sale of generated electricity e.MWh−1e




expenses avoided due to own
consumption of generated power
e.MWh−1e
πheat,avoid
expenses avoided due to own
consumption of generated heat
e.MWh−1th
σCHC CHP heat certificates e.MWh
−1
th
σGEC green electricity certificates e.MWh−1e
ϕelec




relative amount of own heat
consumption
%
K+ salinity from K+ concentration g.l−1
Na+ salinity from Na+ concentration g.l−1
r discount rate %
T
the number of years for NPV
calculations
years
TKN total Kjeldahl nitrogen g.l−1
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2.6. OVERVIEW OF MODEL PARAMETERS, VARIABLES AND INDEXES
Variable symbol Meaning Unit











Combined Heat and Power,
daily engine capacity needed
kWe
HRTt′ hydraulic retention time day
IC initial capital investment cost e
NPV comparative Net Present Value e
OC operational costs e
OCT operating costs for each year e.year
−1
OLRt′ organic loading rate kg VS.m
−3.d−1
Π total profit e
qt′(i)
amount of feedstock i, inserted
at a time t’
ton.day−1
Qt′(i)
amount of feedstock i, inserted
at a time t’
m3.day−1
Q′t′,t(i)




RT revenue for each year e.year
−1
Yt′(i) biogas yield m
3
Index Meaning
i type of feedstock
t days that Qt′(i) remains in the digester
t′ day of insertion
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Anaerobic digestion as a flexible power producer in the electricity market
Abstract: There is an increasing need for an alternative energy source within the elec-
tricity market to counterbalance the intermittent supply from renewable energy sources
as their share in the electricity market continues to grow. Anaerobic digestion could play
a role in fulfilling this need through participation in the day-ahead electricity market. We
investigate the potential for anaerobic digestion operators and the impact of the current
support policy framework on this potential. Firstly, we develop a linear model that max-
imizes profits solely from participation in the day-ahead market. Results from this model
are then inserted into a second, non-linear, optimization model that maximizes profits for
the complete anaerobic digestion system, taking into account the current policy framework
and a proposed alternative one. Our analysis indicates that there is a potential profit to
be made of a couple of euros per MWh produced for anaerobic digestion operators in the
day-ahead market. However, the current framework of public support is not conducive to
their participation. By allowing the same amount of support to be spread over a longer
period of time, the use of flexible electricity production in the anaerobic digestion sector
could be stimulated, and the profitability of this sector increased.
Willeghems, G., Meers, E. and Buysse, J.
3.1. INTRODUCTION
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Setting of the chapter within the dissertation
In this chapter, we continue to look at the interplay between the Renewable Energy and
Waste Framework Directive, and the impact of this interplay on biogas operators partic-
ipating in the electricity market, from a technological change perspective. We develop
another single-firm optimization model, the main difference with the previous model in
Chapter 2 being that feedstock cost and electricity price are endogenously determined in
the current model whereas they were exogenously fixed in the previous model.
3.1.2 Objectives of the work
The share of electricity produced from renewable energy (RE) sources continues to grow
in Flanders as it does elsewhere in the world. Currently, solar PV and wind account for
15% and 10% respectively of the total Belgian power generation capacity (Elia, 2016a).
The transformation to RE-based electricity systems is characterized by an increasing need
for an alternative energy source to counterbalance the intermittent energy generated by
sources such as wind and solar (Albrecht and Laleman, 2014, Szarka et al., 2013). Cur-
rently, this gap is filled by natural gas technologies. However, in view of the European
Renewable Energy Directive (European Parliament and Council of the European Union,
2009), natural gas technologies could be complemented by biogas, and, more specifically,
bio-methane produced by anaerobic digestion (AD).
In this chapter, we investigate the potential role AD could play as a balancing energy
producer in the electricity market in Flanders. Moreover, we analyze the effect of the
current public support framework on this potential role. More specifically, we analyze and
answer two research questions, i.e. whether opportunities for AD exist in the day-ahead
electricity market, and whether the current policy framework is efficient at promoting this
flexible power production for the day-ahead electricity market through anaerobic digestion.
In the remainder of this introduction, we describe the design of the electricity market and
the potential for the AD sector in this market. We also briefly explain the current AD
support mechanisms.
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3.1.3 Electricity market design
Electricity is a commodity with the characteristic that generation has to equal consumption
(plus grid losses) on an immediate basis. If this is not the case, the grid frequency starts
to deviate from its reference value, which may lead to the collapse of the system. The
electricity market design has been adapted to deal with this characteristic by creating
different types of electricity markets to balance supply and demand. These markets are
arranged in a sequential order, starting from years before the actual delivery and ending
after the actual delivery (KU Leuven Energy Institute, 2015). The final responsibility for
maintaining the instantaneous generation-consumption balance lies with the Transmission
System Operator (TSO), who is responsible for reliably and efficiently running high and
very-high voltage transmission systems. In Belgium, the role of TSO is undertaken by
Elia.
Figure 3.1 provides an overview of the existing electricity market models as a function of
the point in time when the electricity is supplied.
Figure 3.1: Overview of the various existing market models for the electricity market (KU
Leuven Energy Institute, 2015).
Generally speaking, electricity can be traded in different types of market.
 Market participants can submit a bid for production and demand on the electricity
stock market or on multilateral trading platforms. The market is cleared at a fixed
time period and a single market price is determined.
 In bilateral over-the-counter (OTC) trading, producers and consumers sign a trade
agreement by negotiating directly with each other. OTC trading can use the market
price, which is published on the power exchange market, as a reference.
 In the OTC market, market participants submit a bid for power generation or de-
mand on a market platform that is continuously cleared. One market player can
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bilaterally accept the bid of another player, resulting in a different price for each
exchange (KU Leuven Energy Institute, 2015).
More specifically, four types of market models can be distinguished.
The forward and future market
The forward and future market runs from years ahead until the day preceding the actual
delivery. This market consists of contracts that deliver/consume a certain amount of
electricity at a certain point in time at a price that has been agreed that day. Futures
are standardized contracts which, in turn, can be traded onwards on the power exchange
platforms. Forwards, on the other hand, are primarily bilaterally-traded OTCs and are
not standardized. Hence, they provide greater flexibility for the parties involved and are
usually not traded onwards (KU Leuven Energy Institute, 2015).
The day-ahead market
On the day-ahead market (DAM), electricity is traded one day before its actual delivery.
This is a very important market since the market zone has to be in equilibrium at the end
of the DAM, i.e. the foreseen generation in the market zone has to equal the predicted
demand in the zone plus the net export to other zones.
The DAM power exchange in the Belgian market is called the Belpex DAM and, in 2013,
the average Belgian DAM electricity price amounted to 47.45 e.MWh−1e with a total
traded volume of 17.1 TWh (i.e. 21% of Elia’s grid load) (KU Leuven Energy Institute,
2015).
The continuous intra-day market
On the continuous intra-day market (CIM), an organized OTC market, electricity is traded
on the day of actual delivery. The CIM allows the market participants to make adjustments
in their day-ahead nominations due to improved weather predictions, unforeseen power
interruptions, etc.
The Belgian CIM is called the EPEX SPOT BELGIUM and a total of around 0.6 TWh
was traded on this market in 2013 (i.e. 1.5% of Elia’s grid load) (KU Leuven Energy
Institute, 2015).
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The balancing market
Generally speaking, this market consists of two segments (KU Leuven Energy Institute,
2015).
 The acquisition and activation of the reserves, i.e. the reserve market, consists of four
types of reserves: (i) the primary reserves or ‘Frequency Containment Reserves’, (ii)
the secondary reserves or ‘Frequency Restoration Reserves’, (iii) the tertiary reserves
or ‘Replacement Reserves’, and (iv) the newest types of reserves such as R3 Dynamic
Profile (R3 DP) and R3 Aggregated Power Plant (R3 APP). These are tertiary
reserves but differ from the replacement reserves as the former involve distributed
energy resources (distributed generation, flexible load, small-scale storage), while the
latter are delivered by large centralized generation units and interruptible consumers.
 The balancing market for imbalance settlement takes place after the actual delivery
and can consist of ‘upward regulation’ or ‘downward regulation’.
3.1.4 The potential of the electricity market for the AD sector
As stated before, the share of electricity produced from RE sources continues to grow.
Substituting a centralized energy system based on large-scale, base load power plants with
a mixture of small-scale, decentralized RE with a high share of intermittent energy carriers,
poses challenges for the efficiency and security of energy supply (Hiroux and Saguan, 2010).
To tackle these problems it is not enough to substitute fossil energies with RE sources. A
successful energy transformation requires an expansion of the grid and storage capacities,
as well as an improvement in energy efficiency and savings (Hahn et al., 2014). Several
alternatives can support the transformation of the energy system into a more sustainable
one, such as demand-side management, electricity smart grids, energy conservation and
efficiency improvements or sustainable and flexible electricity supply (Lund et al., 2012).
In numerous studies for a pan-European energy system (Steinke et al., 2013, Schaber et al.,
2012, Heide et al., 2011), experts have analyzed the necessary balancing power in partly
or fully RE systems (Hahn et al., 2014). It is, however, important to note that ensuring
a secure power supply depends on several factors besides the share of fluctuating energy
sources, such as the development of more accurate weather forecasts and more efficient
electricity storage technologies, changes in market conditions for power products, the rate
and extent of the expansion of the power grid, load management (e.g., demand-controlled
electrical equipment connected via smart grids), political and regulative conditions and
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the improvement of renewable and fossil energy technologies, among others. These factors
can both reduce and raise the demand for balancing power (Szarka et al., 2013).
Energy storage and its characteristics have been comprehensively analyzed in the literature
(f.i. Beaudin et al. (2010), Ibrahim et al. (2008)) and storage capacity has and will, in the
future, become an important issue with the increasing share of intermittent energy sources
(Hahn et al., 2014). In this respect, bio-energy seems to be a very promising option to fulfill
most requirements and to be practically available for flexible energy supply, as well as to
offer system services in the very near future with partial implementation availability today
(Szarka et al., 2013). Biomass in the form of liquid, solid or gaseous energy carriers can be
converted in a way that can fulfill the requirements of the different power products within
the markets. The ability to store biomass and derived energy carriers is an almost unique
advantage compared to other fluctuating renewable sources. More specifically, biogas or
bio-methane driven power generation systems have the advantage that their power output
is flexible. They are principally suitable for a demand-driven electricity generation, due
to their necessary short start-up periods and high controllability (Hartmann et al., 2010).
Even more, a demand-driven biogas supply is vital for balancing power generation and
can basically be realized by biogas storing or flexible biogas production concepts, as well
as a combination of both.
There are two basic concepts for flexible power production from biogas and AD: (i) solely
technical solutions, where gas and heat produced can be stored and used on-demand, or (ii)
the development of new concepts to steer gas production via an adapted feeding regimen.
Both concepts, however, require additional combined heat and power (CHP) capacity to be
able to deliver the same amount of power during shorter production intervals (Szarka et al.,
2013). As the concept of adapted feed regimen is still in its infancy and likely not possible
to respond in the very short term, this chapter will focus on flexibility by means of gas
storage. Because of this storage possibility, an AD installation can flexibly convert biogas
to electricity and heat depending on the demand and, hence, the electricity price at specific
points in time. The CHP can then be used at a lower or higher capacity. To organize this
from a practical point of view, a type of automated regulator is installed at the biogas
installation. This controller consists of a control box and an instrument that is connected
to the digester and measures the available amount of biogas. In addition, the controller is
also connected to the CHP, to a secure internet connection and to the operating system of
the biogas plant itself. The regulator responds ‘smartly’ to the demand for electricity. This
means that, when it is economically interesting to produce less electricity, the controller
passes that signal to the CHP which then reduces its production. Conversely, when it is
economically interesting to produce more electricity, the central computer sends a signal
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to the regulator, which in turn instructs the CHP to temporarily increase its production.
Of course, cost is an important factor in deciding whether or not to invest in flexible
concepts. A distinction needs to be made between investment cost and operational cost.
After all, if flexibility is applied for only a couple of hours per year it will be difficult
to recover the high investment costs, even if operational costs are low. However, as the
need for flexibility increases, more expensive technologies with lower operational costs
will attract increasing interest (COGEN Vlaanderen, 2015). Moreover, market signals to
electricity producers are important for grid stability and the cost efficiency of electricity
provision since they provide incentives for demand-oriented and efficient electricity produc-
tion. Electricity from biogas as well as other RE technologies is not competitive at current
wholesale market prices and still requires subsidization (Hahn et al., 2014). Hochloff and
Braun (2014) state that biogas is more valuable if it is used to generate electricity at times
when the market needs it. Biogas plants with excess capacity can profitably exploit peak
power prices. It is shown that biogas plants can provide up and down regulation reserve
in tertiary reserve markets, in addition to power generation in volatile electricity markets.
However, the revenues from tertiary reserve are small for two reasons. Firstly, tertiary
reserve prices have declined in the last years because of market reforms (Haucap et al.,
2014), and secondly, the provision of control reserve with biogas plants is strongly limited
by the available fuel (Hochloff and Braun, 2014).
In Belgium, CHP, and hence, AD installations that are willing to run flexibly in response
to the foreseen need, can offer their services at the Belpex DAM. The advantage of the
DAM is that changes in CHP capacity can be planned well ahead of time. Other markets
that run on flexibility, such as the CIM and the balancing market (reserve market and
imbalance settlement), are less interesting for this reason (COGEN Vlaanderen, 2015).
Nevertheless, since August 2016, Next Kraftwerke Belgium has provided primary reserves
to Elia by networking the power generation of many small renewable generators through
its Virtual Power Plant (Next Kraftwerke Belgium, 2016).
Nowadays, most biogas plants are operated in power-led mode, i.e., the primary aim is
the continuous functioning and the production of base-load electricity to be fed into the
grid (Szarka et al., 2013). Electricity from biogas is, hence, not produced on-demand, due
to necessary additional investment in the biogas plant technology such as the expansion
of the biogas storage and CHP capacity, and missing economic incentives. It is, however,
important to remember that promising technologies should receive the necessary incentives
to be able to enter the market (Szarka et al., 2013).
Therefore, in this chapter, we will investigate the potential of flexible power production
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through AD. We will focus on the DAM and on the concept of flexibility through biogas
storage for the reasons stated above. Moreover, the chapter consists of two consecutive
research questions and two analyses. The first research question of this chapter is whether
opportunities exist for AD in the DAM. As mentioned before, we assume flexibility is
created by means of biogas storage. To answer this question, we develop a linear model
that maximizes profits from electricity sales through the DAM (see Section 3.2). This
model only simulates decisions regarding flexible power production, and, hence, it does
not take into account the impact of different policy support mechanisms on the AD sector.
This policy impact is analyzed in the second part of the chapter, where we will investigate
whether the current policy framework is efficient at promoting flexible power production
through AD. To answer this question, as a second step in the methodology, we develop
a non-linear model that maximizes profits from electricity sales through the DAM and
compares different types of policies, based on their impact on operational decisions (see
Section 3.3). The outcome of this chapter is then to better understand how we can
stimulate AD operators to enter the DAM by means of the right policy incentives.
As it is important to know which policies currently exist and how they work, in the next
section, the existing policy framework for AD support will be discussed.
3.1.5 Current support mechanisms for anaerobic digestion
Different types of support mechanisms exist across Europe, each having a different effect
on the design and business models of AD installations. In Flanders, the main support
mechanism consists of green electricity certificates (GECs). In this section we discuss
these GECs in more detail and make a brief comparison with the situation in Germany,
where support is offered for flexibility in power generation.
Under the current support mechanism framework, the concepts of ‘financial gap’ (‘on-
rendabele top’ in Dutch) and ‘banding factor’ (‘bandingsfactor’ in Dutch) hold a central
position. The financial gap for an investment is defined as the size of the production-
dependent income necessary to bring the net present value of an investment to zero. In
addition to this notion, the banding factor determines the amount of certificates one can
obtain per unit of generated green electricity and/or achieved unit of primary energy sav-
ing. It is subject to adjustments as a consequence of investment cost, fuel prices, and
electricity price (Vlaams Energieagentschap, 2017).
AD installations in Flanders produce electricity and heat through a CHP, and receive
GECs and, in cases where the heat produced is consumed in a useful way, CHP heat
certificates (CHCs) in return. The amount of support depends on the starting date of the
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installation and on whether or not the operator has received an ‘ecology premium’ (‘ecolo-
giepremie’ in Dutch) for the construction of the installation (i.e. investment support).
Generally speaking, the amount of support per MWh electricity produced is equal to the
product of the banding factor with the price of one GEC. The maximum value for this
banding factor has been set at 1, signifying that the support per MWh of electricity pro-
duced equals one GEC. The Flemish Energy Agency VEA (Vlaams Energieagentschap)
defines several representative project categories for green electricity and qualitative cogen-
eration. In this chapter, we focus specifically on the project category GS category 5, i.e.
new AD installations with a maximum capacity of 5 MWe for the digestion of primarily
manure and/or agricultural and horticultural related streams (Vlaams Energieagentschap,
2017). For ‘new’ installations (constructed after 01/01/2013) this means they receive 93
e.MWh−1e ; for ‘older’ installations (constructed before 01/01/2013) this amount can be
up to 110 e.MWh−1e . The income from CHCs is set at 35 e.MWh
−1
th . Assuming that an
AD installation will always run at full load, the GECs are paid for a period of 10 years1.
However, if AD installations participate in the DAM, this implies that they would produce
electricity flexibly and, hence, run at partial load. Bearing in mind that GECs are valid
for 10 year period only, this means that these installations would lose support (as they are
not running at full load during these 10 years). Seeing the amount of support per MWhe
produced is almost the double of the electricity market price (93 e.MWh−1e versus 47.5
e.MWh−1e , the GEC support provides an incentive for them to constantly run at full load.
An extension of the GEC eligibility period is possible only if it can be proven that external
factors are responsible for the loss of full load hours and that the installation was run
according to the diligence principle (‘goede huisvader principe’ in Dutch). If this is the
case, the eligibility period is extended to the remaining quantity of the certificates (i.e. the
number of certificates at a predetermined number of full load hours, minus the amount of
certificates already issued) (De Geest et al., 2014). Moreover, the non-profit organization
Biogas-e is of the opinion that the extension procedure is complicated and unclear, and
that the conditions are strict. The procedure is initiated late, resulting in uncertainty
about support after 10 years. They argue that efforts should be made to simplify and
speed up the procedure (De Geest et al., 2014).
In Germany, operators of RE systems can choose between a fixed feed-in tariff and a slid-
ing market premium on a monthly basis. Operators who select the market premium are
responsible for trading electricity themselves. In the market schedule, power producers
are paid the difference between the feed-in tariff to which they would be entitled and the
1On the contrary, installations running solely on organic waste from kitchens and gardens (‘GFT’ in
Dutch) have been granted a support period of 20 years.
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average market value of the generated electricity. An additional management premium is
disbursed to cover the additional expenses incurred by direct market participation. Opera-
tors of new and existing installations who can directly sell 100% of the electricity produced
can apply for an additional flexibility premium if their installations are configured in such
a way that they can be used during periods of peak demand. An additionally installed
or excess capacity of at least 20% of the original capacity is necessary to be deemed eli-
gible for this premium. The flexibility premium is disbursed over and above the market
and management premium for a period of 10 years (Hahn et al., 2014). Hochloff and
Braun (2014), in their study on optimizing biogas plants with excess power unit and stor-
age capacity, found that earnings from biogas plants in electricity markets are increased
with additional storage capacity. The results of a cost-benefit analysis for installing ex-
cess capacity, however, are still negative unless the flexibility premium is also taken into
account.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Sections 3.2 and 3.3 present the
models used for answering both research questions, Sections 3.4 and 3.5 analyze the results
of the respective models, and Section 3.6 offers a general conclusion of the analysis. Section
3.7 provides an overview of the model parameters, variables and indexes used in this
chapter.
3.2 Method for the DAM-specific model
3.2.1 Model description
The first model in this chapter is a linear optimization model that was developed in GAMS
(General Algebraic Modeling System, GAMS Development Corporation (2010)) with the
objective to maximize the profit from electricity sales on the DAM. The model allows
AD operators to make price predictions based on recurring patterns in electricity pricing.
These patterns are primarily created by differences in electricity demand between day
and night, weekdays and weekend, and winter and summer. In order to identify these
patterns, historical price data were analyzed. These data, consisting of hourly electricity
prices and traded volumes on the DAM, running from November 2006 to May 2014, were
collected via Belpex (Belpex, n.d.), resulting in a total of 65,846 data points i. We based
our calculations on the DAM segment and not the CIM as, currently, the biggest market
in terms of traded volumes is the DAM and, in this market, changes in CHP capacity can
be planned well ahead of time (see Section 3.1.3).
As electricity prices change hourly in the DAM, the historical data provide information
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for each hour h (1-24) of each day d (Monday to Sunday) of each month m (January to
December) for each year of available data. As we assume that not all AD operators follow
the evolution in the DAM closely, we optimize the electricity production for one ‘reference
year’, resulting in 2016 ‘optimal electricity production points’ (one for every hour of every
day of every month of the reference year). The optimal electricity production pph,d,m
(MWhe) for each point is then the optimal choice, taking into account the historical prices
πi (e.MWh−1e ) for that hour of that day of that month for each year of available data. The
idea behind this reasoning is that an AD operator, without knowing the evolution of the
‘real time’ electricity price on the DAM, can have an idea about the optimal hourly power
production, based on historical data. Of course, the actual optimal power production at
a certain hour of a certain day of a certain month might be higher or lower than the
optimum calculated by our model. The optima could be refined if other data, relating to
the weather for instance, are taken into account for each historical data point. Figure 3.2
illustrates the basic concept behind the model.
Figure 3.2: Basic concept of the DAM market model.
The optimal electricity production pattern pph,d,m for one reference year (graph below
right) is determined based on historical electricity price data (graphs above right) which
are inserted in a model that takes into account a constant biogas production and the
possibility of biogas storage (scheme left below). More specifically, historical data for
several years are used to determine the optimal electricity production pph,d,m for one
reference year. In Figure 3.2, the example of electricity prices for the years 2007 and 2008
is presented. In reality, we have included many more data points (from 2006 to 2014).
Based on all the data points i for all the years, the model then calculates the optimal
amount of biogas to be converted into electricity. This optimal amount of biogas at hour
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i, then, is the sum of the constant reference production τ with the amount of biogas stored
from the previous hour si−1 minus the amount of biogas to be stored at the current hour
si.
The optimal electricity production pph,d,m for every hour, day and month of the reference
year is calculated based on historical patterns. To be able to calculate pph,d,m, dummy
parameters were inserted. These parameters link corresponding hours of corresponding
days of corresponding months with one another. This way, the model will know for
every point i of the database to which hour, day, and month it corresponds. Then,
for the different years in the data set, corresponding hours of days and months are put
next to each other and an optimal production is determined for these price values. The
calculation is repeated for each data point and, finally, the model determines the optimal
power generation for each hour of every day and month for the ‘reference year’. Table 3.1
provides an example of the use of these dummy parameters.
Table 3.1: Example of the use of dummy parameters.
dummy hour αh,i Hour 1 Hour 2 Hour 3 Hour 4 Hour 5
data point 1 1
data point 2 1
data point 3 1
data point 4 1












data point 1 1
data point 25 1
data point 97 1
data point 121 1













data point 1038 1
data point 2075 1
data point 3111 1
data point 3120 1
data point 4152 1
The model can then calculate and maximize the potential profit from DAM participation.
The profit is estimated for the whole period for which data is available, taking each of the
65,846 data points into account in the analysis.
Instead of performing a scenario analysis where we would conduct an ‘absolute’ calculation
and compare the profit made through participation in the DAM with the profit made in
a business-as-usual scenario (i.e. fixed electricity production at a fixed electricity price),
we opted for a ‘relative’ calculation. More specifically, this means that, first of all, we do
not take into account the revenue and/or costs that would be incurred in both situations
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in the same amounts (i.e. participation in DAM and business-as-usual), such as feedstock
cost, installation cost of an anaerobic digester or basic CHP, costs relating to digestate
processing, etc. We only take into account the additional revenue and costs relating to
participation in the DAM. On the one hand, the additional revenue is due to electricity
sales at higher prices. On the other hand, additional costs are related to excess CHP
capacity and external biogas storage2. Moreover, we do not take into account potential
profits made from useful heat production (heat sales and revenue from certificates), nor
the potential losses should heat need to be purchased from other sources due to CHP
down-regulation (as down-regulation means less electricity but also less heat production).
Secondly, we simplify the system to be modeled and assume a constant biogas production τ
that results in an electricity production of 1 MWhe. This also implies that each additional
hour of storage equals one additional MWe of electricity that can be used (si−1) or stored
for future use (si).
These assumptions and relationships were then translated into mathematical equations.
Parameters and variables are represented by Greek and Latin symbols respectively, and
units are displayed within brackets, in italics. Section 3.7 provides an overview of all the
symbols used.The objective function maximizes the additional profit ∆Π3 (e) due to DAM
participation, where ∆Π is determined by subtracting the additional cost ∆C (e) from
the additional revenue ∆R (e),
∆Π = ∆R− ∆C. (3.1)






(pph,d,m ∗ αh,i ∗ δd,i ∗ µm,i) ∗ πi
 (3.2)
where the revenue for the total time period under consideration is the sum over all data
points i of the multiplication of (optimal) electricity production pph,d,m (MWhe) at each
hour in the reference year with the electricity price πi (e.MWh−1e ) at each hour of the
historical time period. To be able to link ‘optimal reference year production’ to historical
price data, we use the dummy parameters described in 3.1, i.e. dummy hour αh,i, dummy
day δd,i and dummy month µm,i.
2We assume that internal biogas storage in the overhead space of the digester does not require additional
investments.
3It should be noted that, while profit is a variable and should hence be represented by a Latin symbol,
it is common practice to represent profit by the symbol Π. This symbol should not be confused with π,
which represents the parameter price.
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The additional cost ∆C is specified by the following equation,
∆C = (CHP ∗ ιCHP + κ ∗ ικ) ∗
∑
i
1/(24 ∗ 365) (3.3)
where the total cost is determined by the capacity of the CHP (MWe) and its related
investment cost ιCHP (e.MW−1e .year
−1), as well as the optional storage investment cost
ικ (e.year−1), related to the storage size κ. As our historical data is provided on an hourly
basis and our cost data on a yearly basis, we need to link these two in such a way that
we calculate the cost for the number of years corresponding to 65,846 hours. Therefore,
we divide the amount of hours in our data set (i.e.
∑
i 1), by the amount of hours in one
year (i.e. 24 ∗ 365).
After defining the objective function, a number of restrictions are added to the model.




pph,d,m ∗ αh,i ∗ δd,i ∗ µm,i = τ + si−1 − si (3.4)
This equation restricts the hourly optimal electricity production pph,d,m to the sum of
the constant reference production from the digester, τ (MWhe), with a possible addition
of stored biogas from the previous period si−1 (MWhe) (e.g. when electricity prices are
high), minus the possible extraction of biogas produced in the current period for storage
si (MWhe) (e.g. when electricity prices are low).
The second restriction of the model (Equation 3.5) indicates the relationship between
optimal electricity production pph,d,m and optimal CHP capacity.
pph,d,m < τ ∗ CHP (3.5)
Indeed, the optimal electricity production, relative to the reference production τ , cannot
exceed the product of the reference production with the optimal CHP capacity (which is
calculated relative to the reference CHP capacity of 1).
Finally, we can summarize the optimization problem as the profit maximization by the
individual AD operator, subject to the constraints described in the above-mentioned equa-
tions:
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3.2.2 Model parametrization and assumptions
As a starting point of the optimization exercise, an overall CHP cost of 131,000 e.year−1
and, in the case of external storage, an additional cost of 15,900 e.year−1 are selected,
based on the data provided in Hochloff and Braun (2014). The yearly CHP cost entails
depreciation of investment costs and maintenance costs. The amount of internal storage
was fixed at 5 hours, i.e. 5 MWe, and the amount of external storage at 12, i.e. 12 MWe
4
The reference production τ was set at 1 MWhe.
3.2.3 Model scenarios
We conducted the optimization exercise for a total of 22 scenarios. The first half (scenarios
1-11) are calculated for the internal storage assumption, while the second half (scenarios
12-22) are calculated for the external storage assumption. For each of the storage assump-
tions, we conducted a sensitivity analysis regarding the excess CHP cost, where this cost
was increased or decreased by 10% of the base CHP cost, five times each, i.e. by 13,100
e.year−1 per time.
The results of this analysis can be found in Section 3.4.
3.3 Method for the policy model
3.3.1 Model description
The second model in this chapter is a non-linear optimization model, also developed in
GAMS (GAMS Development Corporation, 2010), with the objective to maximize overall
profits from an AD system. The difference from the DAM model is that the former only
takes into account profits from participating in the DAM, while the current model takes
into account the revenue and costs relating to the entire AD system.
First of all, we define excess CHP capacity ECCHP (MWe) in the following manner:
4The amount of internal storage is based on personal communication with an AD operator in Hungary,
while the amount of external storage is based on Hochloff and Braun (2014).
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where the excess capacity is the fraction of the CHP capacity CHP and the optimal
monthly electricity production ppm
5. In Equation 3.7, CHPppm/674 is a measure for the excess
capacity created to enable participation in the DAM. The monthly electricity production
is divided by 6746 to calculate the hourly electricity production, as CHP capacity is a
measure of how much electricity can be generated on an hourly basis.
From Equation 3.7 it is clear that the excess CHP capacity increases either by increasing
the CHP capacity relative to the (fixed) electricity production ppm, or by decreasing the
electricity production relative to the (fixed) CHP capacity.
The equations constituting the policy model are explained below. The objective of the
model is to maximize profit Π (e),
Π = R− C (3.8)
where profit Π equals the overall revenue R (e) minus the overall costs C (e).




























(qm ∗ ϕdig,thick ∗ πdig)/(1 + r)(m/12)
)
(3.9)
5Please note that, in the DAM-specific model, the optimal electricity production pph,d,m was calculated
on an hourly basis, whereas, in the current model, the optimal electricity production ppm is calculated on
a monthly basis.
6There are in fact 720 hours in a month of 30 days. However, according to Vlaams Energieagentschap
(2017), the CHP is running for 92% of the time and down for maintenance for the remaining hours.
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where the first term is related to sum, over the total amount of months m, of the monthly
income from electricity production ppm (MWhe), subtracting the relative amount of own
electricity consumption ϕelec and multiplying the remaining production with the electric-
ity price pm,elec (e.MWh−1e ). The second term is related to the sales of heat, where the
total heat production hpm is subtracted by the relative amount of own heat consumption
ϕheat, and then multiplied with the price for heat πm,heat. The third and fourth terms are
associated with the green electricity σGEC,m and CHP heat σCHC,m certificates respec-
tively. The third term also takes into account the relative portion of generated electricity
used for own consumption and ineligible for certificates ϕelec,GEC . The fifth and sixth
terms represent the avoided purchase of electricity due to own electricity consumption at
a price πm,elec,avoid and the avoided purchase of heat due to own heat consumption at a
price πm,heat,avoid respectively. Finally, the last term describes the revenue from sales of
the thick fraction of the digestate produced, where
∑
m qm (ton) refers to the total amount
of feedstock digested, ϕdig,thick the fraction of digestate that ends up in the thick fraction
after separation, and πdig the price (e.ton−1) that is received for this thick fraction. The
total revenue is then discounted over the time period at a certain interest rate r (%). As
the calculations are made on a monthly basis, we have to divide the number of months m
by 12 to obtain results that are discounted on a yearly basis.
The total cost is composed of the following terms,
















(qm ∗ ϕdig,thin ∗ χdig,spread)/(1 + r)(m/12)
)
(3.10)
where the first term describes the unitary marginal investment costs ιCHP for the CHP
(e.MW−1e ), and ικ in the case of external storage κ (e.m
−3). The second term of the
equation describes the operational cost, which is the product of the unitary marginal
operational cost χopex (e.MW−1e ) and the CHP capacity. Next, we take into account
the feedstock costs pm,FS (e.ton−1 feedstock). The total injection, then, is the product
of the unitary marginal injection cost χinject of electricity on the grid (e.MWh−1e ) and
ppm. This amount does not, however, take into account electricity generated for own
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consumption. Finally, we include the cost incurred for spreading the thin fraction of the
digestate ϕdig,thin on the land χdig,spread (e.ton−1). The total cost is equally discounted
over the same time period at the same interest rate r.
Equation 3.11 calculates the electricity generated by the bio-methane,
ppm = qm ∗Mm ∗ ε ∗ ηelec (3.11)
with qm the monthly feedstock input (ton), Mm the monthly methane yield (m
3 CH4.ton
−1
feedstock, ε the conversion factor (0.01 MWh.m−3 CH4) (Banks, 2009) and ηelec the effi-
ciency of methane conversion into electricity (% ).
Similarly, Equation 3.12 calculates the heat generated by the bio-methane,
hpm = qm ∗Mm ∗ ε ∗ ηheat (3.12)
with ηheat the efficiency of methane conversion into heat (% ).
Finally, we also identify a number of constraints in the model which are related to the
inputs (Equations 3.13) and the outputs (Equation 3.14) of the AD system. First of all,
Equation 3.13 states that the sum of the monthly feedstock quantity qm cannot exceed a
certain quantity ωm. This quantity is usually fixed in the permit for the digester.
∑
i
qi,m < ωm (3.13)
Equation 3.14 limits the monthly electricity production to the capacity of the CHP.
ppm < CHP ∗ 674 (3.14)
As ppm relates to monthly electricity production, while CHP refers to the amount of elec-
tricity that can maximally be produced on an hourly basis, we have to multiply, similarly
to Equation 3.7, the CHP capacity with 674 to account for the number of hours in a
month.
The optimization problem can then be defined as the profit maximization by the individual
AD operator, subject to the constraints described in the above-mentioned equations:
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3.3.2 Model parametrization and assumptions
Most of the parameter values in this model are based on the Flemish Energy Agency’s
‘Report on financial gaps for projects with a starting date from January 1, 2017’, for
the GS category 5 (Vlaams Energieagentschap, 2017) (see also Section 3.1.5). For each
RE project category7, the Flemish Energy Agency calculates the support dependence (i.e.
financial gap and banding factor). It does this by defining, for each category, a ‘reference
installation’ of which the parameters are based on market surveys, precise reference values,
or estimates and assumptions. The reference digester on which we base our calculations has
a CHP capacity of 2.4 MWe, for an ηelec and ηelec of 42.5 and 53% respectively. Moreover,
the VEA report states a specific investment cost ιCHP of 3,740 e.kW−1e . This cost entails
the investment cost for storage, pre-treatment and anaerobic digestion of feedstock, biogas
pre-treatment, the CHP installation, digestate post-treatment, development costs and
other costs, such as connection costs. The investment costs for external storage are taken
from Hochloff and Braun (2014). The operational costs χopex are set at 379 e.kW−1e . They
comprise of maintenance costs, costs for replacing parts, insurance costs, administrative
costs, personnel costs, consumables, start-up costs, any other fuel costs and additional
operating expenses. The relative amount of own electricity consumption ϕelec is set at
14.4% and the relative portion of gross generated electricity used for own consumption
and ineligible for certificates ϕelec,GEC is set at 3.4%. The injection cost χinject is set at
2.62 e.MWh−1. We set πm,elec,avoid at 140 e.MWh−1e , as the sum of the average DAM
price and σGEC,m. Given that the heat released from the CHP engine is used in the
digestion process as the best available technique related to the processing of manure and
organic biological waste, the market value of the useful heat is not taken into account,
i.e. πm,heat is zero. The values of σGEC,m and σCHC,m are set at 93 e.MWh−1e and
35 e.MWh−1th respectively. In the current policy framework, both σGEC,m and σCHC,m
become zero after 10 years, i.e. 120 months. Under the alternative framework that we
propose, the same total amount of GECs are granted, only here σGEC,m becomes zero after
20 years. This means that AD operators can choose when they take up their certificates.
As we only isolate the influence of GECs, we assume that σCHC,m becomes zero after 120
7These categories range from solar panels, wind turbines, and biogas installations to biomass and CHP
installations, and within each category, subcategories are discerned based on the electricity generation
capacity of the engine.
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months. The interest rate r is set at 7%.
Additionally, the VEA report identifies three types of feedstock: (i) maize, with a share
of 7.5% of the total feedstock volume and a price πmaize
8 of 39 e.ton−1; (ii) manure, with
a share of 25% of the total feedstock volume and a price πmanure of -5.5 e.ton−1; and (iii)
organic biological waste (OBW), with a share of 67.5% of the total feedstock volume and
a price πOBW of 29.1 e.ton−1. The average feedstock cost then becomes 21.2 e.ton−1
feedstock mixture. These numbers for cost, as well as the numbers regarding economic
cost and prices in the paragraph above, are based on data from the year 2016.
The AD parameter values used for these input streams (i.e. βf,max and µf ) are the same
as those defined in Section 2.2.2 of Chapter 2. To reduce model complexity, we assume a
feedstock mixture density9 of 1 ton.m−3.
Based on the same report by the Flemish Energy Agency (Vlaams Energieagentschap,
2017), we assume that, after feedstock digestion, the resulting digestate is separated into
a thin and a thick fraction, of which the thin fraction, after biological treatment (nitrifi-
cation/denitrification), is spread on the land and the thick fraction is dried with the heat
produced by the CHP and sold10. Furthermore, based on personal communication with the
non-profit organization Biogas-e, we assume that a 10 % feedstock volume reduction takes
place during the digestion. After the digestate separation, we assume that out of 100% di-
gestate, 16% ends up in the thick fraction and 84% in the thin fraction (ϕdig,thin = 0.756).
The thin fraction is spread on the land at a cost χdig,spread of 5.16 e.ton−1. The thick
fraction is dried, undergoing a 60% volume reduction (ϕdig,thick= 0.0576) and sold at a
price πdig of 9.11 e.ton−1 (Vlaams Energieagentschap, 2017). De Geest et al. (2016) in-
dicate that this thick organic residue fraction can be of significant value as soil improver
as it is not microbially degradable in the biogas reactor and contributes to the organic
matter in the soil.
The parameters and their values are summarized in Table 3.2 below.
8This price includes, along with the maize price itself, the cost for chopping the corn, transport to the
site, silage of the corn and silage film.
9The different feedstock types have different densities. By mixing the feedstock in different ratios, we
end up with a different density for each mixture. As each mixture corresponds with a specific methane
yield Mm and feedstock price pm,FS (see Equation 3.16), we would need to add another equation to the
model to take into account changing feedstock density with changing methane yield and feedstock cost.
This would make the model more complex and might make it more difficult to calculate the optimal values.
We therefore decided to assume a general density of 1 ton.m−3 for all feedstock mixtures.
10This type of digestate post-treatment is however not applied by all AD installations in Flanders.
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3.3.3 Biogas production function
Equation 3.16 explains the formation of biogas as a function of the type of feedstock f and
the retention time HRT d,
Bf,d = βf,max ∗ [1− e(−µf∗HRTd)] (3.16)
and estimates the cumulative yield Bf,d (m
3 CH4.ton
−1 feedstock) as a function of the
ultimate methane yield βf,max (m
3 CH4.ton
−1 feedstock), the first-order rate constant µf
(day−1), and hydraulic retention time HRTd (days).
In the model, we use a simplified methane yield equation which links the methane content
of feedstock to the feedstock price. We calculated the methane yield Mm and feedstock
price pm,FS for a number of combinations between the most common feedstock types used
in Flanders (Vlaams Energieagentschap, 2017) (see Section 3.3.2). These combinations
vary from only the cheapest feedstock (i.e. manure) to only the most expensive feedstock
(i.e. maize), with a range of in-between options. The HRT was assumed at 30 days. We
then fitted an exponential function through the calculated data points, resulting in the
following biogas production function,
Mm = 26.642 ∗ e(0.0338∗pm,FS) (3.17)
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with Mm the monthly methane production (m
3 CH4.ton
−1 feedstock) and pm,FS the
monthly selected feedstock cost (e.ton−1 feedstock).
3.3.4 Electricity price function
The electricity price can be determined in two ways, depending on the selected model
scenario. The first way (Equation 3.18) is based on the assumption that the CHP will
constantly run at full load, producing a constant amount of electricity at a fixed price
πm,elec (e.MWh−1e ). The electricity price pm,elec (e.MWh
−1
e ) then becomes
pm,elec = πm,elec. (3.18)
with πm,elec the calculated average value of the historical DAM prices, i.e. 47.5 e.MWh−1e .
The second way (Equation 3.19) is based on the assumption that the AD operator partic-
ipates in the DAM and that the CHP will run at partial load, using only internal biogas
storage in the overhead space of the reactor. The electricity price, in that case, becomes
pm = 22.582 ∗ ln(ECCHP ) + 47.72. (3.19)
Although we do not include a scenario assuming external biogas storage in this specific
chapter, the electricity price in that case becomes
pm = 20.865 ∗ ln(ECCHP ) + 47.973. (3.20)
Equations 3.19 and 3.20 are based on the output of the DAM-specific model (see Section
3.4) by fitting a logarithmic function through the data points for excess CHP capacity
and corresponding electricity prices in Table 3.4. We also added an additional point to
state that, for ECCHP equal to one, pm,elec equals e.MWh−1e in order to include the
assumption of Equation 3.18.
3.3.5 Model scenarios
As we want to understand the impact of policy on the decision to participate in the DAM
(see Section 3.1.5), we compare two different policy frameworks. The first framework is the
current policy framework, i.e. GECs spread over a period of ten years, assuming constant
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full load operation. The second, alternative, framework is based on the first one, but we
allow the same eligible electricity production to be spread over a period exceeding ten
years, in this case 20 years. We refer to this alternative framework as ‘a package of MWh’.
As we want to show that the current framework does not stimulate flexible electricity pro-
duction and, hence, participation in the DAM, we simulate three different scenarios: (i) a
‘business-as-usual’ scenario under the current policy framework (BAU GEC), (ii) a flexible
power generation scenario under the current policy framework (FLEX GEC), and (iii) a
flexible power generation scenario under the alternative policy framework (FLEX PACK).
These scenarios are simulated for a new AD installation without external storage. Table
3.3 provides an overview of the main assumptions under these three scenarios.
More specifically, we assume a fixed CHP and digester capacity and allow excess CHP
capacity to be created through variable electricity production. The CHP capacity is set at
2.4 MWe (Vlaams Energieagentschap, 2017) and the digester capacity at 6495 m3. This
volume corresponds to the amount of feedstock needed on a monthly basis to run the CHP
at full load for the BAU GEC scenario, assuming an overall feedstock cost of 21.2 e.ton−1
and corresponding bio-methane production of 58.6 m3CH4.ton
−1 feedstock11 for an HRT
of 30 days (see also Section 3.3.2).
In the results section for this model (Section 3.5), we will compare the total profit and
evolution of feedstock cost pm,FS , electricity production ppm, electricity price pm,elec and
excess CHP capacity ECCHP for all three scenarios.
11We assume the feedstock combination of 7.5% maize, 25% manure and 67.5% OBW.
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CHAPTER 3. FLEXIBILE POWER PRODUCTION
3.4 Results and discussion for the DAM-specific model
This section presents the results for the DAM-specific analysis. The objective of the DAM-
specific model was to maximize profits from DAM participation for AD operators. Table
3.4 shows the results of the sensitivity analysis on the excess CHP cost and storage options
for the 22 scenarios, with scenario 6 and 17 the base scenarios for internal and external
storage respectively.
























1 65,500 1.31 53.76 206,577 3.14 5
2 78,600 1.29 53.61 176,541 2.68 5
3 91,700 1.29 53.61 147,580 2.24 5
4 104,800 1.26 53.26 120,358 1.83 5
5 117,900 1.26 53.26 94,445 1.43 5
6 131,000 1.21 52.52 71,640 1.09 5
7 144,100 1.17 51.87 52,123 0.79 5
8 157,200 1.12 51.03 37,526 0.57 5
9 170,300 1.11 50.85 26,011 0.40 5
10 183,400 1.08 50.19 16,192 0.25 5
11 196,500 1.04 49.31 10,638 0.16 5
12 65,500 1.53 56.41 153,944 2.34 12
13 78,600 1.46 55.85 106,468 1.62 12
14 91,700 1.4 55.23 64,333 0.98 12
15 104,800 1.35 54.65 27,488 0.42 12
16 117,900 1.31 54.14 -4,797 -0.07 12
17 131,000 1.26 53.53 -32,315 -0.49 12
18 144,100 1.21 52.68 -55,037 -0.84 12
19 157,200 1.17 51.99 -73,243 -1.11 12
20 170,300 1.13 51.34 -88,085 -1.34 12
21 183,400 1.09 50.46 -98,858 -1.5 12
22 196,500 1.06 49.76 -105,863 -1.61 12
The results in Table 3.4 indicate that, with increasing CHP investment cost, the optimal
CHP capacity relative to the reference decreases. A CHP with higher capacity will, for
an identical digester capacity, have a lower average usage, implying that there will be
less full load hours for a larger CHP. Peaking at times when electricity prices are high is,
however, still possible. Therefore, the average price for electricity production is lower for
increasing CHP price and lower maximum CHP capacity. The optimal CHP generator
capacity is the result of the equilibrium between loss of profit, as larger CHP generators
run less often, and the profit from being able to increase production at times with higher
electricity prices. Because of the higher capacity (i.e. external storage capacity) more
gas can be stored and transformed into electricity at a higher price. However, because
of the high external storage costs, this strategy does not seem to result in higher profits
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and can even cause an installation, without external support, to become loss-making (as
of scenario 16).
Figure 3.3 shows how an AD operator should optimally modulate his production through-
out the day, depending on the specific time of day, specific day of the week, and specific
month of the year. This optimal modulation is valid for an installation of which the pa-
rameters are described in Section 3.2, i.e. an installation which continuously produces 1
MWhe with internal storage in the overhead space of the digester, and for the base sce-
nario 6, i.e. an excess CHP cost of 131,000 e.year−1 and an excess CHP capacity of 1.21.
This means that a surplus capacity of 0.21 MWe is installed, allowing for the production
of 1.21 MWhe at peak times instead of 1 MWhe.
The CHP is halted at night time (around 2 to 3 AM) and restarted in the morning (around
6 to 7 AM) at excess capacity by using the biogas reserves built up during the night. The
production pattern shifts to the right side when moving from week day to weekend, as the
CHP is halted and restarted at a later time on Saturdays and Sundays. It can, however, be
observed that a similar weekly production pattern is largely followed throughout the whole
year with only small differences at specific points. The advantage that can be attained by































Figure 3.3: Optimal electricity production after application of DAM on the reference year for scenario 6.
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There are some limitations to the model.
First of all, the model assumes a constant investment cost per kWe installed. In reality,
however, the specific unitary marginal investment cost of a CHP reduces with increasing
capacity. Szarka et al. (2013) show that the average cost for CHP units decreases with
increasing capacity, especially for units with an installed capacity between 30 and 500
kWe. However, the decrease in cost for installed capacities higher than 1 MWe is rather
small. This means that our constant investment cost assumption will be of limited impact.
Moreover, an additional necessary component for DAM participation is a special unit
which has access to a trade platform. This control unit allows a power-trader to control
the CHP unit. The cost for this unit is estimated at between 5000 and 10,000 e (Szarka
et al., 2013). The costs for direct access to trade platforms such as Belpex amount to
25,000 e per year as a minimum, in addition to transaction costs. The model did not
take these costs into account.
Additionally, the model does not consider additional costs from increased wear and tear
caused by the starting-up and shutting-down of the CHP or the lower conversion efficiency
when the CHP runs at partial load. This, together with the previous remark, indicates
that the calculated potential for profit might be overrated.
Finally, optimal results were calculated solely based on historical data from the DAM,
without taking into account the use of meteorological data. These data could become
more important with the increasing share of renewable energy coming from solar or wind
power, and, hence, the increasing fluctuations in electricity supply and price. However,
currently, in Belgium, this share is too small to have a significant impact on price.
3.5 Results and discussion for the policy model
3.5.1 Results
This section discusses the results for the policy model analysis. The objective of this
exercise was to analyze the impact of the current policy framework on participation in the
DAM by maximizing overall profits for AD operators for three different scenarios. More
specifically, we will look at the evolution in time of the variables feedstock cost pm,FS ,
electricity production ppm, excess CHP capacity ECCHP and electricity price pm,elec for
a period of 240 months. We will also compare, between the scenarios, the total overall
profit P for AD operators and the cost of policy implementation (both the current and
the proposed alternative).
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Figure 3.4 provides an overview of the evolution in time of feedstock cost, electricity
production, excess CHP capacity and electricity price for the three scenarios BAU GEC,
FLEX GEC, and FLEX PACK.
Generally speaking, the patterns that occur are similar for all four variables. The reason
behind this similarity is that feedstock cost determines biogas yield (Equation 3.17), and
hence, electricity production (Equation 3.11). The ratio of CHP capacity to electricity
production determines the excess CHP capacity (Equation 3.7), which, in turn, determines
the electricity price (Equation 3.19). For the one extreme scenario, the ‘business-as-usual’
BAU GEC, the variables were fixed to represent the current business model for producing
full load at a fixed electricity price, using a fixed quantity and mixture of feedstock. The
other extreme (scenario FLEX PACK) offers the same amount of support but spread over
a period of 20 years (see Table 3.3 for an overview of the assumptions). The in-between
scenario FLEX GSC allows for flexibility, but only issues GEC certificates for a period of
10 years. It is clear from the figure that this in-between scenario follows the BAU GEC
scenario for the first 10 years, only to switch approach in the last 10 years, following
a similar approach to the FLEX PACK scenario as this becomes more profitable in the
absence of GECs. As GECs yield almost double the value of the electricity price per
MWh produced, they provide the largest portion of the total revenue, and, hence, have a
tremendous influence on the profitability and business model for AD operation.
Figure 3.4 shows that the feedstock cost pm,FS for the ‘business-as-usual’ scenario BAU GEC
was fixed at the average value of 21.2 e.ton−1 throughout the whole 240 months. On the
contrary, when offered the free choice of feedstock without the 10 year time limit, we can
see that scenario FLEX PACK opts for the lowest feedstock cost of -5.5 e.ton−1, i.e. the
feedstock with the lowest energy content, and this for the complete period of 20 years. The
remaining scenario FLEX GEC shows a preference for the current feedstock mixture12,
while during the last 10 years, there is a preference for the cheapest feedstock mixture.
12In fact, the feedstock cost is slightly higher than the fixed average, i.e. 23.7 e.ton−1, due to rounding
factors in the calculated value of digester volume. More specifically, a CHP of 2.4 MWe can produce
1617.6 MWhe on a monthly basis assuming 674 full load hours per month, or 380,600 m
3 CH4. One
ton of feedstock mixture of 21.2 e.ton−1 produces 58.6 m3 CH4, meaning that 6495.1 ton feedstock are
needed on a monthly basis to produce at full load. To make sure the model is feasible, we rounded this
amount to 6825 ton and a digester volume of 6825 m3, in fact creating a slight excess capacity of 1.09 in
scenario BAU GEC with an electricity production of 1488 MWhe.month
−1. In the scenario FLEX GEC,
the model produces at excess capacity of 1 exactly (since not all variables are fixed), hence producing
slightly more electricity at a slightly higher feedstock price.
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Electricity production is maximal throughout scenario BAU GEC and for the first 10
years of the FLEX GEC scenario (1488 and 1618 MWhe.month
−1 respectively, due to the
rounding factors explained above in the footnote before). This coincides with an electricity
price of 47.5 e.MWh−1e . Throughout scenario FLEX PACK and during the last 10 years
of scenario FLEX GEC, electricity production is minimal (604 MWhe.month
−1) at an
electricity price of 70 e.MWh−1e and an excess CHP capacity of 2.68.
Overall, it can be concluded that the current system of GECs is not conducive for the use of
flexible power production in the anaerobic digestion sector. If, however, the validity period
for GECs were to be extended to 20 years, flexible power production would be encouraged
and could potentially facilitate a more favorably balanced electricity grid. Moreover, it
could lead to increased profits. Table 3.5 summarizes the results for total profit, feedstock
cost, electricity revenue and revenue from GEC for the two extreme cases BAU GEC and
FLEX PACK, and for the analyzed time period of twenty years.
Table 3.5: Summary of results for total profit, feedstock cost, electricity revenue and GEC



















BAU GEC -120,442,128 18,059,583 7,935,098 16,041,118 16,041,118
FLEX PACK -110,879,174 -4,685,086 4,741,727 6,505,852 13,011,705
The numbers indicate that, under the assumptions stated in Section 3.3.2 of the method-
ology, the current business and support system is not profitable for AD installations. Even
simulations for only the first 10-year period when GECs are provided indicate a negative
profit. This should not come as a surprise since the 2016 draft report from the Flemish
Energy Agency VEA already indicates that public support is not sufficient to make the
AD technology profitable13 (Vlaams Energieagentschap, 2017). This effect is also observed
in reality, where, according to the Biogas-e 2016 Progress Report, in 2015, forty one AD
installations were operational, nine were put on stand-by, six were in the process of take-
over or dealing with technical or administrative issues, and three went bankrupt (De Geest
et al., 2016). Even though profits are less negative for scenario FLEX PACK than for the
BAU GEC scenario (by 8%), they are still negative, confirming the earlier conclusion that
participation in the DAM will not bring substantial benefits to AD operators.
Moreover, under the current support framework the goal is to produce continuously at
full load, but feedstock costs run very high. They are, in fact, the most important cost
13The financial gap for this technology is set at 117 e.MWh−1e for a calculated banding factor of 1.21.
However, in the support framework the banding factor is capped at 1 and the support provided at 93
e.MWh−1e .
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factor under the current framework besides the operational costs. If support could be
spread over a longer time period, as simulated in scenario FLEX PACK, feedstock costs
could decrease as the model selects feedstock with a lower energy content (i.e. manure)
to create excess CHP capacity. This then presents the possibility of participating in the
DAM market, where higher average electricity prices can be attained.
Finally, when we look at the amount of support disbursed for the first 10 years, we can
indeed see that under a flexible business model, this amount is much smaller when com-
pared to the traditional model due to the fact that less electricity is produced. For a 20
year period, however, the amount is 18% lower when compared to the traditional model,
indicating that this type of support could be more efficiently used than under the current
system (as it results in less negative profits).
3.5.2 Sensitivity analysis
As a final step in the analysis of the results, we conduct a sensitivity analysis with regard
to two parameters. The first parameter is the discount rate r, the second parameter is
the average DAM electricity price (see Table 3.4) on which we based the electricity price
function (Equation 3.19). We perform the same analysis for the scenarios BAU GEC and
FLEX PACK for a discount rate of 5 and 15% respectively. Concerning the electricity
price function, for the same excess CHP capacity ECCHP , we increased the average DAM
electricity prices in Table 3.4 by 5 and 10% respectively and refitted the electricity price
function through these points (see Section 3.3.4). The refitted equations then become
pm = 32.199 ∗ ln(ECCHP ) + 47.902 (3.21)
for an assumed price increase of 5%, and
pm = 41.816 ∗ ln(ECCHP ) + 48.084 (3.22)
for an assumed price increase of 10%.
The reason for increasing the DAM electricity prices is the assumption that, in future, an
increasing share of intermittent RE sources will result in an increasing need for flexibility
and, hence, increasing DAM electricity prices. It is important to mention that we did not
make a similar assumption for the fixed electricity price πm,elec that is received when the
excess capacity ECCHP is set at 1, i.e. the business-as-usual scenario BAU GEC. Table
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3.6 provides an overview of the sensitivity analysis.




















BAU GEC -120,442,128 18,059,583 7,935,098 16,041,118 16,041,118
FLEX PACK -110,879,174 -4,685,086 4,741,727 6,505,852 13,011,705
Sensitivity on interest rate - r = 5%
BAU GEC -140,280,128 21,059,394 9,253,192 16,041,118 16,041,118
FLEX PACK -127,983,010 -5,463,322 5,529,372 6,505,852 13,011,705
Sensitivity on interest rate - r = 15%
BAU GEC -74,870,622 11,035,576 4,848,872 16,041,118 16,041,118
FLEX PACK -70,949,037 -2,862,898 2,897,510 6,505,852 13,011,705
Sensitivity on DAM electricity price - DAM prices increase by 5%
FLEX PACK -110,224,394 -4,685,086 5,396,507 6,505,852 13,011,705
Sensitivity on DAM electricity price - DAM prices increase by 10%
FLEX PACK -109,569,614 -4,685,086 6,051,287 6,505,852 13,011,705
We compare the results of the baseline case, i.e. our original calculations, with an increase
in r and in the DAM electricity prices. With regard to the interest rate r, the results
indicate that a similar conclusion can be drawn as for the baseline, meaning that, for the
FLEX PACK scenario, profits are less negative, feedstock costs are lower and the amount
of GEC support disbursed for a ten year period GEC is significantly lower in comparison
to the BAU GEC scenario. We can draw a similar conclusion for the sensitivity analysis on
the DAM prices. Higher DAM prices result in improved profits through increased revenues
from electricity sales and a higher amount of GEC support can be attained if the support
period is spread over twenty years instead of ten. The sensitivity analysis hence indicates
that our model is quite robust.
3.5.3 Discussion
This model was developed with the main goal of demonstrating an alternative public
support mechanism to stimulate flexible electricity production. Therefore, in the future,
a number of limitations and possible research extensions are identified.
First of all, we calculated profit from flexible power production under the assumption
that all the biogas produced would be used in the DAM. However, to spread the risk,
AD operators might decide to use only part of the biogas for DAM participation. The
remainder of the biogas could then be set aside for full load production at a fixed electricity
price or for participation in the future market. In this case, the calculated profit for
scenario FLEX PACK is overrated.
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The limitation identified in the previous model regarding reduced CHP efficiency at partial
load also holds for this specific model.
Moreover, we have assumed a fixed HRT of 30 days. In practice, the HRT is longer, re-
sulting in higher biogas production, and hence, higher revenue from electricity. Therefore,
we could reformulate Equation 3.17 to take into account not only feedstock cost, but also
HRT.
Additionally, we calculate biogas production as if it takes place in a batch reactor. We
could, however, include the dynamic modeling approach developed in Chapter 2 to make
the model fit more closely with reality, i.e. in a CSTR reactor.
Furthermore, the FLEX PACK scenario implies mono-digestion of manure. Even though
this type of digestion is currently already taking place at livestock farms in small-scale
agricultural digesters, one could wonder whether mono-digestion is also feasible on a larger
scale. As only about 1% of manure is currently digested in Flanders (De Geest et al., 2014,
Vlaamse Landmaatschappij, 2014b), opportunities could potentially exist in this area, not
only for AD operators, but also for reducing greenhouse gas emissions from manure storage.
Also, flexible power production results in lower average electricity and heat production.
As the heat produced is used to dry the thick fraction of the digestate, we could calculate
whether the amount of heat produced is still sufficient to dry the entire quantity of thick
fraction.
Finally, it is important to mention that it is possible for AD operators to apply for an
extension of the public GEC support framework and, hence, benefit from the traditional
GECs for a longer period than the standard 10 years. However, this extension procedure
is very unclear and is usually initiated too late by the AD operators (De Geest et al.,
2014).
3.6 Conclusion
As the share of renewable electricity continues to grow, there is an increasing need for an
alternative energy source to counterbalance the power generated by intermittent energy
sources. In this framework, this chapter looks at the potential for the AD sector to
participate in the DAM electricity market. We identified two research questions and
developed two optimization models to answer these questions.
The first question to be asked was whether opportunities for AD exist in the DAM. We
solved this question by developing a linear optimization model to calculate the optimal
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electricity production and excess CHP capacity for AD operators participating in the
DAM. The results indicate that, based on the Belgian context, the DAM is an interesting
option but will not have a large impact on increasing revenue for AD operators. Additional
support will be necessary. These conclusions follow those made by Hochloff and Braun
(2014). However, a future increase in electricity price volatility may improve the potential
for DAM.
The advantage of a price agreement based on Belpex DAM prices is that the price is
set by the market and someone less versed in negotiation is better off in a transparent
market platform as compared to bilateral price negotiations where the other party may
have a better knowledge of possible future price evolutions in the electricity market. The
calculation of the maximum profit per MWhe as compared to the average price was based
on the average DAM price. It is however possible that some AD operators have had price
agreements in previous years with prices significantly higher or lower than this average
DAM price.
The calculations in the first model assume that excess CHP capacity needs to be purchased
to be able to participate in the DAM. The determining factor, however, is the ratio of
maximum CHP capacity to actual electricity generation, which in turn depends on the
biogas potential of the AD feedstock. Hence, excess CHP capacity can be created by
using cheaper feedstock with lower biogas potential, using less feedstock, or increasing
the hydraulic retention time. These options will result in a lower total biogas yield for
a digester with similar capacity. Therefore, participating in the DAM offers the option
of optimally using biogas yield at times of higher electricity prices, without necessarily
investing in excess CHP capacity.
This option was analyzed in a second, non-linear optimization model. Through this model,
we analyzed whether the current policy framework is the most efficient one for promoting
flexible power production through AD. The results indicate that the current policy frame-
work, i.e. GEC for a period of 10 years, does not stimulate participation in the DAM. As
less electricity is produced under a flexible business model, AD operators lose an impor-
tant share of their revenue from subsidies. Moreover, our results show that allowing the
same amount of GECs to be spread over 20 instead of 10 years increases the profitability
of AD installations.
As the share of intermittent renewables will surely increase in future, it is important
to also stimulate those renewable technologies that can produce electricity in a flexible
manner. Our analysis has shown that potential exists for the AD sector to participate in
the DAM, but that this will not happen unless the right policies are in place. Our results
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show that allowing the same amount of support to be spread over a longer period of time
could stimulate the use of flexible electricity production in the AD sector and increase the
profitability of this sector.
Within the framework of this dissertation, this chapter is related to the interplay between
the Renewable Energy Directive and the Waste Framework Directive. The current green
electricity certificates policy instrument provides incentives for biogas operators to con-
stantly produce electricity at full load. However, there is an emerging need for flexibility
in the electricity market which rather requires partial load electricity production. In this
chapter, we show that increased profits could be attained by participating in the day-
ahead market through technological change by varying the type and cost of feedstock.
This chapter is linked to the previous one as both are dealing with the fact the sometimes
environmental policy does not provide incentives for innovation. Moreover, in both cases
we developed a single-firm optimization model, the difference being that, in this chapter,
the feedstock cost and electricity price are endogenously determined by the model while, in
the previous chapter, they were inserted as fixed parameters in the model (i.e. exogenously
determined).
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Variable symbol Meaning Unit




∆C additional cost e
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DIG digester volume m3
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Strategic investment decisions under the nuclear power debate in
Belgium
Abstract: We analyze how uncertainty about a nuclear phase-out coupled with the im-
plementation of renewable energy subsidies and nuclear taxes affects investment capacity
and productivity decisions by electricity suppliers in Belgium. The analysis is implemented
for oligopolistic, perfectly competitive and monopolistic markets in order to understand
how the level of competition influences firms’ decisions and the development of the renew-
able energy sector. To achieve this goal, we build a Nash equilibrium and a monopolistic
model in which suppliers can take a strategic position to influence the market price and
we compare these results with a perfect competition model. First, our analysis indicates
that, regardless of subsidies, an increase in uncertainty about a nuclear phase-out results
in lower levels of investment (by over 50% difference) – primarily in renewable energy –,
in lower total production, and a higher electricity price. Also, we show that the imple-
mentation of subsidies reduces the ‘uncertainty’ effect on overall producer’s decisions and
total expected profits. Finally, we find that imperfect oligopolistic markets offer more
possibilities for increased expansion in renewable energy as compared to extreme perfect
and imperfect markets.
Part of this chapter is currently under review as:
de Frutos Cachorro, J., Willeghems, G., Buysse, J., 2017. Strategic investment deci-




4.1.1 Setting of the chapter within the dissertation
In this chapter, we look at the interplay between the 2015 Paris Agreement, the Renewable
Energy Directive and the Belgian nuclear phase-out, and the impact of this interplay on
all the players in the electricity market. More specifically, we evaluate the predictability
aspect of the Belgian nuclear phase-out policy regarding policy uncertainty and investment.
In this chapter, we move from a single-firm optimization model to a multiple-firm Nash-
Cournot market equilibrium. We also compare the results of this type of market model
with the results obtained by using a partial equilibrium simulation model.
4.1.2 Objectives of the work
The Belgian electricity market is characterized by high dependence on nuclear energy and a
dominant market position by one of the market players that operates all the nuclear plants
in Belgium. In view of the nuclear phase-out (Belgian Federal Government, 2003) and
the EU’s Renewable Energy Directive (European Parliament and Council of the European
Union, 2009), ensuring security of supply has become a challenge for decision makers. The
goal of this study is to analyze how uncertainty about a nuclear phase-out, coupled with the
implementation of renewable energy subsidies and nuclear taxes, affects the investment
capacity and productivity decisions of electricity suppliers in Belgium. The analysis is
conducted for oligopolistic and perfectly competitive markets and monopolies.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1.3 presents a brief overview of the Belgian
electricity market, followed by a literature review on electricity market models in general
and for Belgium specifically in Section 4.1.4. In Section 4.2, we describe the model,
followed by an explanation of model parameters and assumptions and an overview of the
different model scenarios. Model results are presented and discussed in Sections 4.3 and
4.4, and, finally, the study is concluded in Section 4.5.
4.1.3 The Belgian electricity market
The Belgian electricity market is characterized by two specific features that have a sub-
stantial influence on the functioning of the market. These are presented in Table 4.1.
First of all, there is a high dependence on nuclear energy, with this technology being
responsible for over 30% of the current total installed power generation capacity. The
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nuclear fission 5,926 (30.7%) Axpo trading 119 (0.6%)
coal 1,164 (6.0%) EDF Luminus 820 (4.2%)
OCGT 464 (2.4%) Engie Electrabel
11,339
(58.8%)
CCGT 4,588 (23.8%) Electrawinds Distributie 38 (0.2%)
biomass (furnace and
anaerobic digestion)
620 (3.2%) Eneco Energy Trade 270 (1.4%)
hydro power 1,394 (7.2%) Enel Trade 405 (2.1%)
solar PV 2,953 (15.3%) GETEC Energie 556 (2.9%)
wind (onshore and
offshore)
1,961 (10.2%) Lampiris 243 (1.3%)






a ‘Other’ in this case is actually the grouping together of different renewable energy technologies which
are not exploited solely by one producer but operated by SME’s and households. These technologies are
onshore and offshore wind energy, solar PV and anaerobic digestion.
second biggest technology is the closed cycle gas turbine (CCGT), which accounts for
almost 24% of the total installed capacity, followed by solar PV at 15%. Secondly, one
player, i.e. Engie Electrabel, holds a dominant market position with more than 58% of
this current capacity, including the nuclear reactors. None of the other market players
hold a share of more than 5% of the total installed capacity.
In the following sections we will briefly describe the legislative framework regarding nuclear
and renewable energy generation.
The nuclear phase-out
Belgium has seven nuclear reactors, the first of which became operational in 1974. Engie
Electrabel operates all seven nuclear units and owns three of the units outright, as well
as 89.8% of another three (the remaining 10.2% are owned by EDF Luminus). Electrabel
jointly owns the remaining unit with France’s EDF.
On 31 January 2003, the Belgian Senate approved the Federal Act which prohibited the
building of new nuclear power plants and limited the operating lives of existing ones to
40 years, effectively shutting down 30% of the country’s nuclear capacity in 2015 (Inter-
national Energy Agency, 2016, World Nuclear Association, 2016, Belgian Federal Govern-
ment, 2003). In 2007, however, the Commission on Energy 2030, in its final report, advised
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keeping the nuclear option open and reconsidering the nuclear phase-out as it would be
extremely expensive and greatly unsettling for the economy under post-Kyoto constraints
and in the absence of Carbon Capture and Storage (D’haeseleer et al., 2007). This advice
was repeated two years later in the government-commissioned report from GEMIX on the
ideal energy mix for Belgium (Groep GEMIX, 2009). Moreover, the same Commission on
Energy 2030 report defined four priorities to guarantee security of supply, the following
two of which are the most relevant in the framework of this study. Firstly, the Commission
identified diversity of supply of primary sources and technologies (type and origin) as a
first and foremost rule. Secondly, they stated that a stable investment climate must be
guaranteed for competitive market players to have timely and sufficient new electricity
generation capacity and to retain a substantial refinery capacity (D’haeseleer et al., 2007),
a recommendation that was reiterated in the GEMIX report (Groep GEMIX, 2009).
In 2009, based on the GEMIX report, the Belgian government decided to postpone the
phase-out of the oldest reactors by 10 years, until 2025. However, new elections took place
in 2010 before the postponement was passed by Parliament and the phase-out remained
in place as originally planned, i.e. for 2015.
In December 2011, the government confirmed that it would close the nuclear power plants
in accordance with the phase-out law of 2003. At the same time, wholesale prices were
too low and policy uncertainty too high to trigger investments in other base-load capacity
(International Energy Agency, 2016). This coincided with the unforeseen long outages
at two units from mid-2012 onwards due to the detection of thousands of quasi-laminar
flaws in the forged rings of the reactor vessels (FANC, 2015). As security of supply came
under heavy pressure, the government, with the approval of the Nuclear Safety Authority,
extended the long-term operation of the three oldest nuclear power plant units from 2015
to 2025, in combination with a number of other measures (International Energy Agency,
2016).
However, the extension of the operational license for these three nuclear plants has not
solved the issue of security of supply. It has merely postponed it to 2022-25 when the
remaining four plants will be shut down, as foreseen under the current policy. The Inter-
national Energy Agency recommends that the government seriously consider what would
be the optimal policy for securing affordable low-carbon electricity. It suggests that al-
lowing the nuclear plants to run for as long as they are considered safe by the regulator
would ease pressure on electricity security. The extension of the nuclear license would also
reduce the costs of electricity generation in the medium term and likely reduce the costs of
the phase-out itself (International Energy Agency, 2016). This recommendation is in line
with the recommendation formulated in the European Commission’s Energy Road Map
88
CHAPTER 4. STRATEGIC INVESTMENT DECISIONS
2050 (European Commission, 2012) which states that nuclear energy will be required to
provide a significant contribution to the energy transformation process in those Member
States where it is pursued, as it remains a key source of low carbon electricity genera-
tion. In the meantime, the uncertainty about the nuclear phase-out still does not create
a stable investment climate for competitive market players to diversify the primary power
generation sources.
In this context, we will analyze how investment capacity decisions by electricity suppliers
in Belgium are influenced by an increase in the probability of extending the nuclear license,
and how these results are affected by the implementation of environmental energy policies,
such as nuclear tax or renewable subsidies. In what follows, we describe the background
of nuclear taxes and subsidies for renewables in Belgium.
Nuclear taxes
Two types of nuclear tax exist in Belgium, i.e. the annual fee and the nuclear tax.
The annual fee is levied as the counterpart of the extension of the nuclear license and
was established under the Federal Act of 31 January 2003 where it was decided that the
operators of the three oldest nuclear plants should pay an annual fee. This fee is allocated
to the ‘Energy Transition Fund’ and amounts to e20 million per year per reactor (JVH,
2016, Belgian Federal Government, 2003).
The nuclear tax is a repartition contribution levied by the Belgian Federal Government
since 2008 for nuclear plant operators, targeting the four newest nuclear plants. The
contribution is calculated based on the capacity of the installations and changes annually
as a function of the profits generated by electricity production through nuclear fission.
Contrary to the annual fee, this contribution is mainly aimed at funding the State energy
policy – it is allocated to the General State Budget – and at increasing competition on
the electricity market. The repartition contribution amounted to e200 million in 2015
(Synatom, 2016).
Renewable energy subsidies
A diverse set of policy instruments has been set in Belgium to support RE development.
The tax competence to establish tax reductions and exemptions with respect to different
taxes including personal income and corporate income belongs to the federal authority. On
the other side, the three regions of the country – Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels Capital
Region - can implement different types of subsidies on the basis of their competences in
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RE matters. The regions can also establish tax rebates and tax credits with respect to
their competences, including energy and environment matters. Hence, tax and non-tax
incentives in favor of RE have been introduced both at the federal and each regional level.
On the one hand, the federal authority has adopted different tax incentives such as the tax
credit for research and development and the green investment tax deduction. On the other
hand, the three regions of the country have introduced a wide range of non-tax incentives,
which differ from one region to the other. For instance, the Flemish Region has intro-
duced an ecology premium system, which consists of financial support to companies for
making environmental investments. The Walloon Region has adopted a support system
for research and development through which the Walloon Government grants recoverable
advances to companies. Financial support to RE in the Brussels Capital Region includes
energy premiums, which take the form of the reimbursement of a percentage of the in-
vestments made in RE sources. A final example is the system of the green certificates,
which has been implemented in the three Regions. It allows producers of RE to receive a
complementary price for their sales of RE. The system works on basis of quotas of green
energy that transmission system operators are required to purchase. The price of the cer-
tificate is determined by the market but a minimum price is guaranteed by the regions and
to a certain extent by the federal authority. Section 3.1.5 in Chapter 3 provides a more
detailed explanation on the functioning of the green electricity certificates in Flanders.
Additional information can be found in the 2017 report by the Flemish Energy Agency
(Vlaams Energieagentschap, 2017).
4.1.4 Electricity market models
General electricity market modeling trends
A number of different decision and analysis support models have been developed in recent
years, focusing on electricity generation market modeling. An overview of these market
modeling trends was presented by Ventosa et al. (2005) and already discussed in Section
1.4 of Chapter 1.
In addition to this classification, which is based on the mathematical structure of each
model, Ventosa et al. (2005) also categorize electricity market models based on degree of
competition and time scope (see Figure 4.1).
They explain that markets can be classified into three broad categories according to their
degree of competition: perfect competition, oligopoly and monopoly. Perfect competition
or competitive markets – also referred to as pure, or free competition – expresses the idea
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Figure 4.1: Theoretical electricity market models depending on competition and time
scope (Ventosa et al., 2005).
of the combination of a wide range of firms, which freely enter or leave the market and
which considers prices as information, since each bidder only provides a relative small share
of the good to the market and thus do not exert a noticeable influence on it. Therefore,
perfect competitors cannot influence the levels of market clearing prices. Moreover, buyers
are numerous and disperse, which also means that they cannot influence prices. Perfect
competition markets are almost impossible to find in the real world as all markets have
some type of imperfection. This is the reason they are mostly considered only theoretically.
However, its study helps to understand real world markets and their phenomena. An
oligopoly is a form of market structure that is considered as half way between two extremes:
perfect competition and monopolies. This kind of imperfect competition is characterized
by having a relatively scarce amount of firms, but always more than one, which produce a
homogeneous good. Due to the small number of firms in the market, the strategies between
firms will be interdependent, thus implying that the profits of an oligopolistic firm will
highly depend on their competitors’ actions. A monopoly is a form of market structure
of imperfect competition, mainly characterized by the existence of a sole seller and many
buyers. This gives the monopolist the ability to set prices with the only limitation of
consumers’ willingness to pay. Therefore, in monopolies, the seller is a price-maker and
consumers will be price-takers (Policonomics, 2017b). Table 4.2 provides a brief summary
of the main differences between the three market categories, as explained above.
Since micro-economic theory proves that a perfectly competitive market can be modeled
as a cost minimization or net benefit maximization problem, optimization-based models
are usually the best way to model this type of market. Similarly, a monopoly can be
modeled by the profit maximization program of the monopolistic firm. In these models
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price-setting price-taker price-taker price-maker
the price is often derived from the demand through a demand-price function. In contrast,
under imperfect (oligopolistic) competition conditions the profit maximization problem of
each participant must be solved simultaneously. Moreover, under imperfect competition
conditions, the choice of modeling approach is defined by the time scope of the study.
For instance, in the case of short-term operation (one day to one week), the best way to
represent the market is the leader-in-price model where the incumbent firm pursues its
maximum profit, taking into account its residual demand function that relates the price to
its energy output. The most controversial assumption of this theoretical model lies on the
static perspective that the residual demand function provides about other agents. In the
medium-term case (one month to one year), the vast majority of the models are based on
both Cournot and supply function equilibrium. Finally, microeconomics suggests that the
Stackelberg equilibrium may fit better than other oligopolistic models with the long-term
investment-decision problem due to its sequential decision-making process – the Cournot
model, on the contrary, is a simultaneous game. This means there is a leader firm that first
decides its optimal capacity; the follower firms then make their optimal decisions knowing
the capacity of the leader firm. In this game, the leader has decided not to behave as in
the Cournot’s model, and production will be larger for the firm with lower marginal costs.
Moreover, this type of game highlights two things: the importance of accurate market
information when defining a strategy, and the interdependence of each player’s strategies,
especially when there is a market leader (with the benefit of moving first) and a follower
(Policonomics, 2017c). Nevertheless, the literature indicates that, from a practical point
of view, for a comparison between the Cournot equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium,
the difference in results is minor.
Models for the Belgian electricity market
In the Belgian context of nuclear phase-out and the EU’s Renewable Energy Directive, a
number of studies have already been conducted on the future of Belgian power generation
and the optimal electricity mix. For instance, Van Wortswinkel and Lodewijks (2012)
applied the Belgian TIMES model, which is a techno-economic, partial equilibrium model
of the energy system, to the case of the Belgian region of Flanders, with the purpose of
supporting the model user in their decision-making on cost-optimal energy. Through a
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model similar to the PRIMES model1, Albrecht and Laleman (2014) investigated policy
trade-offs for the Belgian electricity system and concluded that (i) market participation
by renewables is essential for an affordable and sustainable energy-mix in the future, (ii)
a higher share of renewables will result in higher overall system costs in future decades,
and (iii) the feedstock costs of biomass will be the main driver in the overall costs of any
energy mix involving a high share of renewable energy (RE) technologies.
Indeed, most of the economic literature about electricity market structure and production
decisions for the Belgian case is based on partial and general equilibrium models (Albrecht
and Laleman, 2014, Van Wortswinkel and Lodewijks, 2012) in which the main model as-
sumption is that individual suppliers of the electricity market assume perfect competition;
that is, they consider that no single firm can influence the market price. However, in re-
ality, proper market models must deal with imperfectly competitive markets (see Ventosa
et al. (2005)), that is, suppliers can take a strategic position to influence the market price
and, thereby, the total electricity generation capacity in the market.
Taking into account imperfect markets (i.e. oligopolies) and investment capacity decisions
in the long term, and basing ourselves on the typology described by Ventosa et al. (2005)
(see Figures 1.2 and 4.1), we have developed a Nash-Cournot equilibrium model. Thus,
players are in Nash equilibrium when each firm’s strategy is the best response to the
strategies employed by the other firms. To the best of our knowledge, this equilibrium
concept has, so far, not been introduced in the current models of electricity mix forecasts
for the Belgian case.
In particular, the formulation of our electricity market model as a Nash equilibrium game
is based on models from the existing literature (Leibowicz, 2015, Filomena et al., 2014,
Genc and Sen, 2008, Harker, 1984). Filomena et al. (2014) analyze the problem of tech-
nology selection and capacity investment for electricity generation in a competitive en-
vironment under uncertainty regarding marginal costs. Genc and Sen (2008) focus on
investment capacity decisions in the electricity market in Ontario (Canada), by using the
concept of S-adapted open-loop Nash equilibrium, a multi-period dynamic game with an
uncertain demand price function. Next, Murphy and Smeers (2005) compare long-term
investment in generation capacity under different market electricity structures, namely
perfect competition and oligopolistic market with dynamic interactions (open-loop and
feedback Nash equilibria). Finally, Leibowicz (2015) couples a regional integrated assess-
ment model and a Nash equilibrium model to investigate how climate policy and learning
spillovers interact with market electricity structure to affect renewable technology adoption
1The PRIMES energy model simulates the European energy system through a multi-market equilibrium
solution for energy supply and demand (Capros, 1998).
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and producer profits. However, only production decisions are analyzed. In this study, we
analyze operational production and investment capacity decisions of oligopolistic players
under uncertainty, as in Filomena et al. (2014) and Genc and Sen (2008), where prices are
endogenously determined by a linear demand function. While the previously described
models consider uncertainty in demand or marginal costs, our paper introduces uncer-
tainty in the future use of nuclear power production. In particular, investment capacity
strategies in equilibrium are analyzed under different probabilities of extension of nuclear
license. Moreover, to understand how decisions are influenced by different types of market
structure and competition levels, we perform a similar analysis but assuming (i) perfect
competition and (ii) monopoly.
In the following methodology section, we will describe the model that we have built and




The model starts from the assumption that a finite number N of firms have a finite
number of technologies H at their disposal and have to optimally decide about their annual
quantity of full load hours Nhi(k) and additional investment capacity possibilities Ei(k)
per firm i and per technology k. In our model, parameters and variables are represented by
Greek and Latin symbols respectively, and units are displayed within brackets, in italics.
Section 4.6 provides an overview of all the symbols used.
Firms aim to maximize their expected individual profit Ê(Πi)
2 (e), where Πi is defined
as a discrete random variable that takes the value Π1i with probability γ (given) if license
permits for nuclear power plants are extended, and Π2i with probability (1−γ) if not. Also,
I = { 1 . . . N } denotes the set of firms in the market, K = { 1 . . . H } the set of available




i + (1− γ)Π2i , (4.1)
2It should be noted that, while profit is a variable and should hence be represented by a Latin symbol,
it is common practice to represent profit by the symbol Π. This symbol should not be confused with π,
which represents the parameter price.
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∀i ∈ I, ∀k ∈ K,∀s ∈ S, (4.2)
and Πsi (k) (e), the individual profit per probability scenario per technology .
Firstly, Πsi (k) is described in Equation 4.3 as the difference between the individual total
revenue TRsi (k) (e) and the individual total cost TC
s
i (k) (e) per technology, per proba-
bility scenario,
Πsi (k) = TR
s
i (k)− TCsi (k),
∀i ∈ I, ∀k ∈ K,∀s ∈ S. (4.3)
If we describe the previous equation in detail,




∀i ∈ I, ∀k ∈ K,∀s ∈ S, (4.4)
where Qsi (k) is the quantity of electricity produced (MWh) (Equation 4.5), p
s is the elec-
tricity price (e.MWh−1) (Equation 4.7), and σ(k) are subsidies received per technology
(e.MWh−1). In particular, we assume σ(k) > 0 for RE technologies and σ(k) = 0 for
the others. Please refer to Section 4.2.3 for a detailed overview of the amount of subsidies
assumed per specific RE technology.
Moreover, the individual amount of electricity produced per technology, for each probabil-
ity scenario s, is the product of the annual quantity of full load hoursNhi(k) (hours.year
−1)
and the final installed capacity, FICsi (k), which is described in Equation 4.6 as the sum
of the current installed capacity Isi (k) (MW ), and the additional investment in capacity
per firm and technology, Ei(k) (MW ),
Qsi (k) = Nhi(k) ∗ FICsi (k), (4.5)
FICsi (k) = I
s
i (k) + Ei(k),
∀i ∈ I, ∀k ∈ K,∀s ∈ S. (4.6)
95
4.2. METHOD
Note that, in order to distinguish the different probability scenarios s, we consider I1i (nuclear) >
0 and I2i (nuclear) = 0.
Next, the electricity price ps depends linearly on total demand (see Equation 4.7), where
coefficients a and b will be estimated later by linear regression,




∀i ∈ I, ∀k ∈ K,∀s ∈ S. (4.7)
Finally, as described in Equation 4.8, individual total cost per technology, and probability
scenario, TCsi (k), is made up of four components.
TCsi (k) = (χvar(k) + χFS(k))Q
s




∀i ∈ I, ∀k ∈ K,∀s ∈ S. (4.8)
The first component corresponds to the variable cost depending on the amount of electric-
ity produced per technology, in particular, the sum of χvar(k) and feedstock costs, χFS(k)
(both in e.MWh−1). The variable cost includes variable operational and maintenance
costs. It is a production-related cost which varies with electrical generation/consumption,
and excludes personnel, fuel and CO2 emission costs. It is important to note that these
variable costs are not incurred by all technologies. Please refer to Table 4.3 for an
overview of these costs. The second component corresponds to the fixed operational and
maintenance cost (excluding personnel and refurbishment costs) per technology χfix(k)
(e.MW−1), which depends on final installed capacity FICsi (k) (MW ). The third compo-
nent consists of the capital expenditure, or investment cost, which is defined as a quadratic
cost function with respect to additional investment capacity, Ei(k) (MW ) with ι(k) the
unitary marginal investment cost per technology (e.MW−2). Finally, the last component
consists of the tax τ(k) (e), in this case only applicable to nuclear energy and solely
dependent on whether or not the technology is being used.
4.2.2 Model resolution according to the degree of market competition
The previous problem allows us to model the economic electricity market structure ac-
cording to different assumptions on the degree of market competition (see Section 4.1.4).
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Oligopoly
As the main body of this work, we will model the oligopolistic economic electricity market
structure as a Nash-Cournot competition model (or a Nash-Cournot game) in which a finite
number of non-cooperative firms maximize their profits, taking into account the decisions
of the other firms, (Leibowicz, 2015, Genc and Sen, 2008) (see also Figure 4.1). In these
types of models, firm-specific profit functions are defined, and partial differentiation is used
to construct a function representing a firm’s best response for given (exogenous) output
levels of the other firms in the market. A stable equilibrium occurs where these functions
intersect (i.e. the simultaneous solution of the best response functions of each firm). The
consequence is that, in equilibrium, no firm wants to change its output decision (Morrison,
1998).
Hence, an equilibrium for our specific Nash-Cournot game exists and the problem for each
individual firm then is to maximize the individual expected profit Ê(Πi), subject to the





∀i ∈ I, ∀k ∈ K.
(4.9)
The equilibrium can be derived from the optimality conditions of the model for each
individual player. Optimality conditions have been used in mathematical programming
for three purposes. The first (and least used) purpose is to solve numerical problems,
the second purpose to characterize optimal solutions analytically – as is very commonly
done in economics – and the third to provide the conditions that an algorithm attempts
to achieve. The characterization of the optimality conditions depends on both first order
conditions for identification of stationary points and second order conditions for discovery
of the nature of the stationary points found, i.e. a maximum or a minimum. Kuhn and
Tucker, in 1951, developed optimality conditions for problems which contain inequality
constraints and/or sign restricted variables. They are necessary conditions for a solution
in non-linear programming to be optimal. Interpreted in an economic way, the Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions require that either a good be produced at a nonzero level
and that marginal profit equals marginal cost, or that this good not be produced and
marginal profit be less than or equal to marginal cost (McCarl and Spreen, 2011).
In the case of our electricity market model, we formulate the first order optimality condi-
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tions of the game (or KKT conditions), as the derivative of the objective function Ê(Πi)
with respect to decision variables Ei(k) and Nhi(k). The first KKT condition corresponds




































= Nhi(k) ∗ (χvar(k) + χFS(k)) + χfix(k) + ι(k) ∗ Ei(k),
∀i ∈ I, ∀k ∈ K,∀s ∈ S. (4.14)
The second KKT condition corresponds to the derivative of the objective function with





























= FICsi (k), (4.17)
δps
δNhi(k)




= FICsi ∗ (χvar(k) + χFS(k)),
∀i ∈ I, ∀k ∈ K,∀s ∈ S. (4.19)
Note that these KKT condition are specified for each individual firm separately and that
there is no interaction between the variables of the equations of the different firms except
for the variable price of electricity. The price of electricity is thus the variable that captures
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the interaction between the different strategies of the firms. Solving the KKT conditions
for the different firms simultaneously while keeping the price of electricity equal amongst
firms captures their strategic interaction while operating in the same market.
The computer language GAMS permits formulating this type of economic equilibrium
models as a mixed complementarity problem. This formulation is referred to as a ‘mixed
complementarity problem’ (MCP), reflecting the fact that it may incorporate a mixture
of equations and inequalities (Rutherford, 2002). Our specific Nash equilibrium is hence
solved by means of an MCP problem, executed in GAMS (GAMS Development Corpora-
tion, 2010) (see Kalvelagen (2003) for programming details).
Perfect competition
After looking at the electricity market from an oligopolistic perspective, we now treat the
market as if it were in perfect competition and we maximize the total expected welfare
Ê(W ) (e) (see Figure 4.1). The expected total welfare Ê(W ) takes into account the
probability γ, in the same way as was the case for the maximization of the expected profit
Ê(P ), and is calculated the following way,
Ê(W ) = γW 1 + (1− γ)W 2, (4.20)
with,
W s = a ∗
∑
i,k









∀i ∈ I, ∀k ∈ K,∀s ∈ S. (4.21)
In economic terms, the total welfare W (e) is defined as the sum of the consumer and
producer surplus (Perman et al., 2011). In our model, the calculation of W s is based on
Gabriel et al. (2012) and Kalvelagen (2015). In perfect competition, the total welfare is
maximized when the market is in equilibrium, i.e. when the price equals the marginal
cost, or, alternatively, the price minus the marginal cost equals zero. The total welfare,
then, is represented by the area enclosed by the demand and supply function, on the left
of the equilibrium point. We can calculate this area by subtracting the integral of the




i (k), from the integral of the demand price










/2, resulting in Equation 4.21.






s.t. (4.1)− (4.7), (4.20), (4.21)
∀i ∈ I, ∀k ∈ K
(4.22)
and is solved by means of a non-linear programming optimization in GAMS (GAMS
Development Corporation, 2010).
Monopoly
As a third perspective, we treat the electricity market as a monopoly and we maximize
the total expected profit of the monopolistic firm (see Figure 4.1), which, in our case,
is constituted of the different players in the market. Contrary to the Nash equilibrium
where we maximize the expected profit for each individual firm, in the monopolistic case,
we maximize the sum of all expected profits not taking the consumer perspective into
account,






Qsi (k) ∗ (ps + σ(k))− TCsi (k)
)
∀i ∈ I, ∀k ∈ K,∀s ∈ S. (4.24)




s.t. (4.1)− (4.7), (4.23), (4.24)
∀i ∈ I, ∀k ∈ K
(4.25)
and is solved by means of a non-linear programming optimization in GAMS (GAMS
Development Corporation, 2010).
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4.2.3 Model parametrization and assumptions
Technology assumptions
The starting point of the model is the current capacity of the different technologies installed
in Belgium for each firm. These data were obtained from Elia, Belgium’s high-voltage
transmission system operator (30 kV to 380 kV), operating over 8000 km of lines and
underground cables throughout Belgium (Elia, 2016a). Table 4.3 provides an overview of
the most relevant economic parameter values, as well as assumptions made on maximum
values of decision variables.
Data regarding investment costs ι(k) and fixed and variable operational costs, χfix(k) and
χvar(k) respectively, were taken from the ETRI Report (Joint Research Centre, 2014).
The investment cost, depending on the information available to the authors of the ETRI
Report3, consists of (i) civil and structural costs, (ii) major equipment costs, (iii) bal-
ance of plant costs, (iv) electrical and I&C supply and installation, (v) project indirect
costs, (vi) development costs, (vii) interconnection costs, and (viii) insurance costs. The
Joint Research Centre (2014) defines fixed operational costs as those costs that do not
vary significantly with a technology’s electricity generation or consumption. They exclude
personnel costs and costs of refurbishment needed to extend lifetime beyond technical life-
time. Variable operational and maintenance expenses are production-related costs which
vary with electrical generation/consumption. In the ETRI report, they exclude personnel,
fuel and CO2 emission costs.
Feedstock costs χFS(k) were taken from Laleman et al. (2012) for all technologies ex-
cept anaerobic digestion. For the latter technology, feedstock costs were calculated based
on assumptions from a 2016 report by the Flemish Energy Agency VEA (Vlaams En-
ergieagentschap, 2017).
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The maximum amount of load hours Nhi(k) was taken from Albrecht and Laleman (2014),
while the maximum possible expansion capacity for all firms
∑
iEi(k) was derived from a
number of sources. First of all, the maximum capacity for offshore wind was taken from
the Elia study on adequacy and flexibility in the Belgian electricity system (Elia, 2016b).
Secondly, the maximum expansion capacity for onshore wind production for Belgium was
calculated in the following way. The maximum wind production potential, being 5 TWh
per year (European Wind Energy Association, 2005), was divided by the maximum amount
of full load hours to determine the maximum capacity. The present installed capacity∑
i I
s




i (k), resulting in
the maximum possible expansion capacity
∑
iEi(k), which was finally split into equal parts
in order to obtain the maximum possible expansion capacity per firm. Similar calculations
were conducted for solar PV technology. In this case, however, we estimated the maximum
annual production by first calculating the potential for building integrated photovoltaics
for Belgium (International Energy Agency, 2001), followed by the calculation of the energy
produced each month by taking into account monthly solar irradiance and number of days
per month. As described in the nuclear exit framework (see Section 4.1.3), there will be no
further expansion of nuclear energy. Moreover, due to the commitments made by Europe
to reduce CO2 emissions, we assume that there will be no expansion in the capacity of
coal-fired power plants (Elia, 2016b). Equally, as Belgium has very limited potential to
increase its hydro capacity, we assume that there will be no expansion in the capacity
of this particular technology either (Albrecht and Laleman, 2014). Finally, we assume
that municipal solid waste incinerators are built with the objective of getting rid of the
last non-recyclable fraction of municipal waste and not with the objective of producing
additional power. We therefore assume that the expansion in capacity of this particular
technology will also be zero.
Nuclear taxes and renewable energy subsidies
Section 4.1.3 explains the details of the nuclear tax calculation. However, to reduce model
complexity, we opted to use a lump sum of e250 million instead of a more complex
calculation. This amount is the sum of nuclear taxes for all Belgian plants in 2008.
Subsidies σ(k) for RE were set at 93 e.MWh−1 produced for all RE technologies, except
for municipal solid waste incineration. This amount is the minimum support set by the
VREG, the Flemish Regulator for the energy market, independent of the type of RE
technology, for installations with a starting date of 1 January 2013. For installations with
a starting date before 1 January 2013 the system is much more complex. Municipal solid
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waste incinerators also receive subsidies in Flanders, as part of the waste is considered
as a ‘renewable’ energy source. This fraction consists of food waste, badly sorted paper
and cardboard, etc. As the waste is not considered to be 100% renewable, subsidies
amount to 60 e.MWh−1 produced (Pauwels, 2016). As energy subsidies are regionalized
(see Section 4.1.3), a different system exists for the region of Wallonia and Brussels-capital
(Elia, 2016a). However, to reduce model complexity we opted to use the Flemish approach
for all power production.
Electricity price demand function
The electricity price is endogenously determined by the model through a linear demand
price function (see Equation 4.7). This demand price function is based on data from the
European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) regard-
ing annual electricity production (ENTSO-E, 2016)4 and data from Belpex regarding aver-
age electricity price on the day-ahead market (in e.MWh−1) from 2006 to 2014 (Belpex,
n.d.).
We had to use two different sources, as the annual quantity of electricity traded on the
Belpex day-ahead platform is only a fraction of the total annual Belgian electricity produc-
tion. Moreover, we calculate the annual average hourly day-ahead market prices, accessible
through the Belpex data platform. We prefer the Belpex source over Eurostat for two rea-
sons. First of all, in 2013, the composition of retail electricity prices in Belgium was only
27% for energy, while the remaining fraction went to taxes and VAT (18%), public levies
(3%), distribution (44%), transmission (4%) and renewables and co-generation (4%) (KU
Leuven Energy Institute, 2013). When using the Belpex prices we are using the actual
prices that energy producers receive for their production, which also respond to demand,
and not the prices consumers pay, as provided by Eurostat. It is the producer price that
will determine the results of the model, and overestimating the price might overestimate
the results. Secondly, Eurostat prices are averaged over the first semester of each year.
Since there are seasonal price differences, due to seasonal differences in demand, we prefer
to average prices over a complete year instead of six months.
We conducted a linear regression using the statistical computing language R (R Devel-
opment Core Team, 2008), version 3.1.2, removing outliers, and defined the following
electricity price demand function (adjusted R-squared 0.8846).
4We made the assumption that Belgian electricity supply equals Belgian demand, in order to reduce
model complexity.
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We assume a quadratic investment cost function to capture increasing costs of additional
investments which will stimulate firms to expand with multiple technologies, and to obtain
more qualitative results (Genc and Zaccour, 2011, Genc and Sen, 2008)). These increasing
costs capture, for instance, the effect that the best locations to invest in technology such
as wind of solar panels are taken first at a lower cost. A higher capacity will require most
costs to find more suitable places and make them available for the generation of power. In
particular, the investment cost function per firm per technology is assumed to be convex
and increasing with respect to investment capacity expansion Ei(k), and has the following
functional form:




with d(k) and e(k) positive parameters.
Because we do not have sufficient data to regress investment expenses with respect to
additional investment capacity, we attribute all investment expenses to the quadratic term.
Thus, we assume d(k) = 0 and e(k) = ι(k), where ι(k) is the marginal unit investment cost
per technology and is taken from the ETRI Report (Joint Research Centre, 2014). As final
results could be affected by this important assumption, a discussion of these parameter
costs is provided in the scenario analysis in Section 4.3.5.
4.2.4 Model scenarios
In this study, we compare four different scenarios which are presented in Figure 4.2.
The benchmark scenario SC1 calculates the Nash equilibrium without nuclear tax and RE
subsidies, assuming that nuclear license permits will be extended (γ = 1). The second
scenario SC2 calculates the model equilibrium in the presence of nuclear tax and RE
subsidies, equally assuming that nuclear license permits will be extended (γ = 1). The
third and fourth scenario, SC3 and SC4, calculate the model equilibrium based on a
predefined probability for extension of the nuclear license, in the absence and presence of
taxes and RE subsidies respectively. More specifically, we look at a low (γ = 0.1), medium
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Figure 4.2: Overview of the different model scenarios
(γ = 0.5) and high (γ = 0.9) probability for extension. Finally, we add the scenario with
nil probability of nuclear license extension (γ = 0), that is, when a nuclear phase-out is
guaranteed.
4.3 Results
In this section, we first analyze how, in an oligopoly, an increase in uncertainty about
nuclear phase-out, coupled with the implementation of renewable subsidies and nuclear
taxes, influences investment capacity and productivity decisions by electricity suppliers.
We look at the results from three angles: (i) the effect of the implementation of RE
subsidies and nuclear taxes (Section 4.3.1), (ii) the effect of an increase in the probability
of extending the nuclear license, or equivalently, an increase in uncertainty about nuclear
phase-out (Section 4.3.2), and (iii) the effect of the interaction of these previous policies
(Section 4.3.3). Finally, in Section 4.3.4, we determine the main differences in the analysis
based on assumptions made about the degree of market competition, i.e. oligopoly, perfect
competition and monopoly.
Table 4.4 provides an overview of the main results for the case of an oligopoly (i.e. Nash-
Cournot equilibrium). More detailed results can be found in the annexes.
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Furthermore, to better understand the results for additional investment capacity for each
technology and model scenario, we conducted a ‘levelized cost of electricity (LCOE)’ type
calculation for each technology per scenario. We define the LCOE (e.MWh−1) as the cost
to produce 1 MWh of electricity per technology per probability scenario5 (see Equation
4.28).









, ∀s ∈ S. (4.28)
An overview of the LCOE per technology and scenario can be found in Annex 4.D.
4.3.1 Effect of renewable energy subsidies and nuclear tax
To analyze the effect of subsidies and taxes on the firm’s decisions, we compare SC1 and
SC2.
As expected, Table 4.4 – and in more detail in Annex 4.B – show that the implementation
of RE subsidies promotes investment in RE capacity. The installed capacity increases five-
fold. The model also simulates a shift in choice of technologies driven by RE subsidies.
Without RE subsidies (SC1), the model favors onshore wind (61% of total capacity) over
offshore wind (1%) and solar PV (38%) (see Annex 4.B). When subsidies are provided,
however, the model favors solar PV (25%) over wind (onshore 16% and offshore 14%)
and biomass (grate furnace 19%, anaerobic digestion 12%, and CHP co-generation 14%).
These results are mainly driven by the capacity limit for onshore wind (i.e. 947 MW in
total) and solar PV, and the quadratic cost function for all technologies. The RE subsidies
stimulate all players to expand in RE technologies. They would do so preferably in the
cheapest technology but, with increasing capacity, also the investment costs are simulated
to increase. The result is that the producers diversify their technology choice.
Next, Figure 4.3 illustrates the results for total production and production per energy type
and probability scenario s6 and model scenario, that is, in case of absence (SC1 and SC3)
5It is important to note here that, in contrast to the commonly used LCOE (f.i. Albrecht and Laleman
(2014)), our LCOE calculations per technology are not constant and vary for each probability scenario.
Moreover, it should be noted that, according to Joskow (2011), the LCOE is a flawed indicator for com-
paring the economic attractiveness of dispatchable technologies, i.e. technologies that can be controlled by
the system operator and be turned on or off based on their economic attractiveness, such as coal, gas, etc.,
and intermittent technologies, such as wind, solar, etc., because it effectively treats all electricity generated
as a homogenous product and fails to take into account that the value of electricity supplied varies widely
over the course of a typical year.
6In Figure 4.3, results for the probability scenario (s=2) are identical to those for the scenario (s=1) but
assuming that production from nuclear power is nil. Moreover, we remember that in s=1, respectively in
s=2, production is nil when the probability of nuclear license extension is 0, respectively 1 by assumption
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and presence (SC2 and SC4) of renewable subsidies and nuclear taxes. In what follows, we
focus on the top of the figure (production in s=1) in which the nuclear license is extended.
Figure 4.3: Total production and production per energy type for the probability scenario
(s = 1) (top) and (s = 2) (bottom) for the model scenarios without (SC1 and SC3) and
with subsidies and taxes (SC2 and SC4).
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In general, total production in SC2 increases by 12% when compared to SC1. In particular,
when RE subsidies are provided, RE production and the share of renewables in total
production increases while the production from non-renewables decreases (see Annex 4.E).
The increase in RE production is solely due to the investment in additional capacity, as
RE technologies will always be used to their fullest potential, i.e. the maximum amount
of full load hours (see Annex 4.C). Conversely, electricity production by non-renewables is
reduced either by reducing the amount of full load hours in existing installations (in the
case of nuclear energy), or by ceasing production altogether (in the case of CCGT). The
electricity price, which is endogenously determined by the amount of electricity produced,
decreases by 11%, from 53 e.MWh−1 in SC1 to 47 e.MWh−1 in SC2.
Moreover, because of RE subsidies and regardless of nuclear taxes, the total expected
profit, defined as the sum of expected profits for all the players increases by 58% (see
Annex 4.A for details). In particular, individual expected profits increase for all players,
except for Electrabel, who experiences a decrease in profits. Electrabel, however, being a
dominant player in the market, still holds the majority of all profits.
4.3.2 Effect of probability of extension of nuclear license
To better understand the effects of an increase in the probability of extending the nuclear
license, or, equivalently an increase in uncertainty about nuclear phase-out, we compare
results of SC1 and SC3, for each different predefined probability γ of extending the nuclear
license (see Table 4.4, rows 2 to 6).
When we look at investments in additional capacity, we can see that lower probabilities
of license extension result in higher investments in capacity. Once again, wind and solar
energy are preferred over all other technologies, and capacity investment decreases grad-
ually with an increasing probability of permit extension, reaching a minimum value in
SC1 (γ = 1), that is, when nuclear license extension is guaranteed. In the cases of nil,
low and medium probability (i.e. γ = 0, γ = 0.1 and γ = 0.5 respectively), CCGT, and
CCGT advanced CHP for the case γ = 0, are also included in the energy mix (see Annex
4.B). This is because, when the probability of extension is low, players expect that more
non-nuclear capacity will be needed to fulfill demand and, because of the absence of RE
subsidies, CCGT becomes a competitive technology as it is cheaper than the biomass-based
technologies.
Next, as observed in Figure 4.3, total production decreases with increasing probability
for license extension. In particular, nuclear production increases when the probability of
nuclear license extension increases while production by other technologies (‘non-nuclear
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and non-renewable’) decreases when the probability for extension increases. This is logical
as production of electricity through nuclear power generation is cheap (see LCOE values in
Annex 4.D). It is, however, interesting to see that production from RE technologies seems
much less influenced by an increase in probability and only slightly decreases. The reason
for this is that RE technologies, and primarily solar PV and wind, have lower operational
and feedstock costs as compared to CCGT, which has lower investment costs. Therefore,
in a Nash equilibrium situation, higher profits can be obtained by using renewables such
as solar PV and wind as compared to using CCGT.
Moreover, as total production decreases with increasing probability, prices will increase
with increasing probability of nuclear license extension (see Table 4.4). This means that
Electrabel puts upward pressure on prices when a nuclear license is highly likely. However,
in the total absence of nuclear power (SC3, γ = 0), electricity prices will increase by around
23%7 with respect to the baseline case (SC1, γ = 1), a statement that is corroborated
by numerous reports on the Belgian power sector (Febeliec, 2017, International Energy
Agency, 2016, Groep GEMIX, 2009, D’haeseleer et al., 2007).
Overall, we can conclude that expected profits increase with increasing probability. This
is due to the fact that expected profits for Electrabel, with its monopoly on nuclear power
electricity generation and its ownership of over 50% of the total installed capacity, increase
while expected profits for the other players decrease (see Annex 4.A).
4.3.3 Effect of interaction between both policies
In this section, we take a closer look at the effect of the interaction of both an increase in
the probability of extending the nuclear license and the implementation of nuclear taxes
and RE subsidies. This is done by comparing SC1 with SC4, with a focus on capacity
expansion, electricity production, electricity prices and expected profits.
Overall, results follow the same pattern as in the previous section when the probability of
nuclear license extension increases, but quantity levels are higher because of the presence
of RE subsidies and nuclear taxes. Thus, with increasing probabilities of nuclear extension,
investments and total production decrease while prices increase . However, the presence
of subsidies reduces the effect of the increase in uncertainty on total expansion capacity
and then on total production. In particular, total expansion capacity decreases by 1,354
MW (57%) from SC3, γ = 0 to SC1, γ = 1, that is, in absence of subsidies and just by
1,193 MW (17%) from SC4, γ = 0 to SC2, γ = 1, that is, in presence of subsidies.




Finally, in presence of subsidies and taxes, total expected profits are non-monotonic with
respect to the probability of license extension (see Table 4.4, column 4), and increase just
by e78 million, from γ = 0 to γ = 1, as compared with the increase of e1,016 million in
the absence of subsidies and taxes. As we can see in Figure 4.4, this is due to the fact that
the implementation of subsidies and taxes slows the increase in profits for Electrabel with
increasing probabilities of nuclear license extension. In SC4, γ = 0, Electrabel remains
the winner in terms of share in profits, but its share is about half of what it was in the
baseline case, SC1.
Figure 4.4: Expected profit of Electrabel and the sum of the other producers for different
probabilities of nuclear license extension, in absence and presence of RE subsidies and
nuclear taxes.
4.3.4 Effect of degree of market competition
In this section, we analyze the effect of different assumptions regarding the degree of mar-
ket competition. For this purpose, we will briefly compare the outcome of the simulations
assuming, in addition to the oligopoly that was analyzed in detail in Sections 4.3.1 to
4.3.3, perfect competition and monopoly, which are on opposite sides of the competition
spectrum (see Section 4.1.4). The comparison is conducted for the different probability
levels γ and the case without RE subsidies and nuclear taxes. Figure 4.5 provides an
overview of the results, and more specifically, the effect of the degree of market competi-
tion on expansion in capacity, electricity production8, electricity price, expected producer
profits and expected welfare.
8It should be noted that we only display the electricity production results for the scenario s=1. A
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4.3. RESULTS
Generally speaking, when we look at the impact of the probability of extension of the
nuclear license, it is clear that the results for all five variables follow the patterns described
in the previous sections. Hence, we will not go into the details for all types of markets.
It is nevertheless interesting to discuss the observed differences between the markets per
level of probability.
First of all, we look at the expansion in capacity for different types of energy (i.e. renew-
able, nuclear and other) (upper left corner of Figure 4.5). The lowest levels of expansion
take place for the case of monopoly. Indeed, this type of market is characterized by hav-
ing one decision-maker who is price-maker and who aims to increase production prices in
order to increase his profits (lower right corner of Figure 4.5). The rise in prices (lower
left corner of Figure 4.5) is achieved through a decrease in production (upper right cor-
ner of Figure 4.5), and this by lower investments in capacity. In contrast, higher levels
of expansion are observed in the case of perfect competition, where electricity producers
are price-takers. However, the highest levels of expansion are reached in the middle of
the competition spectrum, i.e. in the case of an oligopoly. This type of market deals
with multiple decision-makers with two conflicting objectives. On the one hand, decision-
makers want to push up prices by limiting total production, but, on the other hand, they
want sufficient individual profits by increasing their own share in the production, with
technologies that provide most profit. In particular, investments in technologies with high
investment cost and low operational cost levels (RE technologies such as solar PV and
wind) are preferred to reach these individual objectives.
The production and price results for the different types of markets (upper and lower
right corner of Figure 4.5 respectively) are in line with the existing literature (Kalvelagen,
2015). The less perfect the market is (i.e. monopoly), the less production and the higher
the prices will be. Moreover, we observe that the effect of an increase in the probability
of license extension on total production is lower in less perfect markets.
Table 4.5 provides a detailed overview of the RE production according to the degree of
market competition and probability of license extension γ. These numbers confirm our
earlier observations regarding capacity expansion that, for lower levels of γ (γ = 0 to
γ = 0.5), investment in RE technologies is highest in the case of oligopolistic market
competition, and hence, RE production levels are the highest as well. The difference in
these levels between perfect competition and oligopoly is, however, small.
It can hence be concluded that imperfect, oligopolistic markets offer more possibilities for
increased expansion in renewable energy as compared to extreme perfect and imperfect
markets. This is due to the effect of higher prices in oligopolistic markets as compared to
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Table 4.5: Renewable energy production according to the degree of market competition













γ = 0 15,949 15,968 15,327
γ = 0.1 15,816 15,973 15,327
γ = 0.5 15,327 15,770 14,866
γ = 0.9 15,327 15,198 13,419
γ = 1 15,327 15,123 13,272
perfectly competitive markets. In practice, this means that producers decide to produce
less with CCGT installations because the profits on electricity generated with CCGT are
sometimes too low. The higher price allows investment in technologies with a higher
investment cost, such as wind and solar PV, and lower operational costs. Oligopolistic
markets are, however, more influenced by an increase in the probability of nuclear license
extension as compared to monopolies, and need to expand in non-renewable technologies
(i.e. CCGT) in order to secure supply when a nuclear phase-out is highly likely.
Finally, we look at the expected welfare and producer profits. The more perfect the
market, the greater the welfare and the lower the profits will be, as is stated in the
literature. Logically, the welfare is the highest in the case of perfect competition (socially
optimal solution) and the lowest in the case of monopoly. However, we can also see that the
inefficiency of imperfect market structures (monopoly and oligopoly), that is the difference
in welfare between these market types and perfect competition, is the highest for a 0.5
probability of permit extension, or, equivalently, for a 0.5 probability of nuclear phase-out,
that is, in an overall uncertain climate.
4.3.5 Scenario analysis of quadratic investment cost function
One important assumption of the model relates to the quadratic investment cost func-
tion (described in Section 4.2.3). Because of the lack of data to estimate a quadratic
cost function with respect to the additional investment capacity, we conducted a scenario
analysis with different investment cost parameters in order to validate our choice – this is
the baseline case. As can be seen in Table 4.6, we simulated four different scenarios, i.e.
Baseline, Scenario 1a, Scenario 1b, Scenario 1c, in such a way that the marginal unitary
cost per technology d(k) + e(k) is the same.
More specifically, simulation results regarding the optimal total additional investment
capacity and expected profit are shown for the model scenarios SC1 and SC2 (see Section
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d(k) = 2 ∗ ι(k)/3
5,905 -6,146
e(k) = ι(k)/3
4.2.4). We do not observe any important changes in total expansion capacity. However,
expected total profits are significantly different for the different quadratic cost function
scenarios. In particular, we found the maximum value in the baseline case to be e2,053
and e3,255 million for SC1 and SC2 respectively. As SC2 corresponds to the model
scenario including RE subsidies, higher profits as compared to SC1 seem logical. However,
surprisingly, we observe some negative values for the scenarios 1a, 1b and 1c in the case of
SC2, which are not realistic outcomes. Therefore, we used the values of the baseline case
for our analysis.
4.4 Discussion
The results of the modeling exercise indicate that (i) an increase in uncertainty about
a nuclear phase-out results in lower levels of investment, lower total production and a
higher electricity price, (ii) the implementation of subsidies reduces the ‘uncertainty’ effect
on overall producer’s decisions and total expected profits, and (iii) imperfect oligopolistic
markets offer more possibilities for increased expansion in renewable energy as compared
to extreme perfect and imperfect markets. These outcomes are in line with other research
that has been conducted on the topic, in Belgium as well as outside of the country. For
the specific case of Belgium, both the Commission on Energy 2030 (D’haeseleer et al.,
2007) and the GEMIX Group (Groep GEMIX, 2009), in their respective reports, called
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for a guaranteed stable investment climate to allow competitive market players to invest
timely and sufficiently in new electricity generation capacity and to retain a substantial
refinery capacity. In a more general frame, Gulen and Ion (2016) found a strong negative
relationship between firm-level capital investment and the aggregate level of uncertainty
associated with future policy and regulatory outcomes. Similarly, Fuss et al. (2008) found
that policy uncertainty regarding climate change induces investors in the energy sector
to wait and see whether the government will further commit to climate policy. They
state that if learning about government commitment is more valuable than investing in
mitigation technologies immediately, the investment will be postponed. This might lead
to supply shortages and limited diffusion of less carbon-intensive technology.
In regard to the methodology used in the chapter, both the model and the assumptions
we used can be improved.
First of all, we could improve our static model by using a multi-period dynamic model
in order to analyze the effect of uncertainty about nuclear phase-out on the evolution of
investment capacity decisions over time.
Also, keeping in mind the Belgian electricity market structure with one bigger firm which
can be considered the ‘leader’, and other, smaller firms which can be considered the
‘followers’, a Stackelberg game might be more appropriate. However, as the literature
indicates that, from a practical point of view, the difference in results between a Cournot
and Stackelberg game is minor (Ventosa et al., 2005), we assume the added value of the
latter game might be rather limited.
Moreover, a more complex demand-price function could be considered in the modeling –
for example a constant elasticity demand function. We make the implicit assumption that
electricity demand is the same throughout the year. However, demand is usually higher
at night time as compared to day time, and in winter as compared to summer. This can
be incorporated in the model by splitting the year into different periods, and estimating
different demand price functions for each of these periods.
Additionally, we could also analyze the results for an endogenously determined probability
as compared to a exogenously determined and fixed probability in the current model.
Furthermore, we did not, at this stage, take into account technology learning or the
impact of policy uncertainty on investment. Since our model, for now, is only a one-stage
model, we did not include the potential lowering of (investment) costs due to technological
innovation. Moreover, we did not take into account the potential benefits of holding off
investments as discussed for instance in Fuss et al. (2008).
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Also, as a starting point for the analysis we used the current generation capacity of the
different technologies installed in Belgium per firm (see Section 4.2.3). This means that
we started our analysis from a non-ideal energy mix9. We also did not take into account
the end-of-life of the current installations. Installations that are now almost at their end-
of-life might be replaced with other technologies, resulting in a different end result of the
analysis. This aspect could however be taken up in a multi-period dynamic model.
Finally, we made the assumption that Belgian electricity supply equals Belgian demand.
In reality, however, Belgium imports a net amount of electricity from abroad. In 2014,
this net import amounted to 17,508 GWh from France, the Netherlands and Luxemburg
(ENTSO-E, 2016). An alternative to increasing local generation capacity is to increase
the transmission capacity from neighboring countries. In order to incorporate this aspect
in our model, we could consider neighboring countries as additional players in the Belgian
electricity market, which could strategically influence local suppliers’ decisions.
4.5 Conclusion
The Belgian power sector currently finds itself in a state of uncertainty regarding the nu-
clear phase-out. Until now, the government’s official position has been that the remaining
four nuclear reactors will be shut down in 2022-2025 without license extension. However,
seeing that a permit extension was granted for the oldest reactors in 2015 and taking into
account the shortage of electricity supply, opinions are divided about whether or not the
current permits should be extended, creating an uncertain investment climate.
In this context, the goal of our study was to analyze how, for the Belgian electricity market,
uncertainty about nuclear phase-out coupled with the implementation of RE subsidies
and nuclear taxes affects investment capacity and productivity decisions by electricity
suppliers. This analysis was conducted in detail for oligopolistic markets but also for
perfect competition and monopolistic markets.
First of all, a Nash-Cournot equilibrium model was developed that allows suppliers to take
a strategic position to influence the market price and, then, the total electricity generation
9The ideal energy mix could be considered as an energy mix that enables to decarbonize at an affordable
and manageable pace, in a way that will meet the emission reduction obligations while maintaining energy
security, and giving investors the necessary confidence and keeping consumers on board. According to the
GEMIX report on the ideal energy mix for Belgium by 2020 and 2030 (Groep GEMIX, 2009), petroleum
will retain its importance for the transport sector, natural gas will evolve in a similar pattern to petroleum
in an international context. Regarding coal, its relative share of gross domestic final consumption could
remain approximately constant by 2020. The future of coal is closely linked to the spread of carbon capture
and sequestration chain. Regarding renewables, the expectation is that, by 2020, RE sources would yield
12% of the gross final demand.
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in the market. Four different scenarios were defined to analyze the effect of implementing
nuclear tax and RE subsidies, the effect of an increase in the probability of extending the
nuclear license, or equivalently, an increase in uncertainty about nuclear phase-out, and the
effect of the interaction between both on additional investment capacity and productivity
decisions, in particular, the annual quantity of full load hours for each technology.
The results show that, in the framework of decarbonization of the energy sector, there
should be continued support for renewable energy in the form of subsidies, as these help to
secure supply and diversify the energy mix. Indeed, RE subsidies promote new investments
in renewable technologies as well as a level playing field between suppliers, hence reducing
Electrabel’s dominance in the market and promoting innovation.
Moreover, our analysis indicates that, regardless of subsidies, an increase in uncertainty
about nuclear phase-out results in lower levels of investment - primarily in renewable
energy - in lower levels of total production and higher electricity price. In absence of
RE subsidies and nuclear taxes, this increase in uncertainty leads to an increase in total
expected profits, due to the increase in profits of the dominant player in the market,
Electrabel, while expected profits for the other players are reduced. However, we show that
the implementation of RE subsidies and nuclear taxes reduces the effect of the increase in
uncertainty on total expansion capacity decisions, and slows the rise in profits of Electrabel
and then of overall expected profits.
Next, concerning the influence of the degree of market competition, we showed that im-
perfect oligopolistic markets offer slightly more possibilities for increased expansion in
renewable energy as compared to extreme perfect and imperfect markets. They are, how-
ever, more influenced by an increase in the probability of nuclear license extension as
compared to monopolies, and need to expand in non-renewable technologies as well in
order to secure supply when a nuclear phase-out is highly likely.
Finally, our study derives relevant policy implications regarding the debate on nuclear
energy. While the Belgian government currently seems committed to a nuclear phase-
out, as is the case in many other European countries (Aune et al., 2015), most scientific
reports recommend extending the nuclear license in order to reduce the current pressure on
supply uncertainty, on the condition that the safety of the plants can be ensured (Febeliec,
2017, International Energy Agency, 2016, Groep GEMIX, 2009, D’haeseleer et al., 2007).
In this study, we show that, in the absence of uncertainty about future nuclear energy
production, i.e. when nuclear license extension or nuclear phase-out is guaranteed, the
demand for electricity can be fulfilled by investing in renewable energy. In particular,
in the case of permit extensions, results show that electricity prices will be around 18%
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lower, but there will be around 57% less investment in additional RE capacity than in
the total absence of nuclear production in oligopolistic market conditions. At any rate,
these installations would be necessary in the future in order to fulfill demand. Therefore,
extending the nuclear license would only postpone the problem of security of supply. A
long-term energy strategy without uncertainty regarding nuclear phase-out and taking into
account the future environmental benefits of renewable technologies becomes necessary in
order to ensure a stable investment climate.
Within the framework of this dissertation, this chapter is related to the interplay between
the Renewable Energy Directive, the 2015 Paris Agreement and the Belgian nuclear phase-
out. In this chapter, we show that an increase in uncertainty about a nuclear phase-
out negatively affects investments in the energy sector, particularly investments in RE
technologies. Moreover, because of the phase-out uncertainty and lower investment levels,
an increase in GHG emissions from electricity generation is highly likely, and in conflict
with the goals set in the 2015 Paris Agreement. This is an example of how the effectiveness
of a mix of policy instruments can be hampered, and, in this case, can cause pollution
swapping.
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τ(k) nuclear tax e
χvar(k)
variable cost depending on the
amount of electricity produced
per technology
e.MWh−1
χFS(k) feedstock costs per technology e.MWh−1
χfix(k)
fixed operational and
maintenance cost per technology
e.MW−1
Variable symbol Meaning Unit
Ei(k)
additional investment in
capacity per firm and
technology
MW
FICsi (k) final installed capacity MW
Nhi(k)
annual quantity of full load
hours
hours.year−1
ps electricity price e.MWh−1
Πsi (k)
individual profit per probability
scenario per technology
e
Qsi (k) quantity of electricity produced MWh
TRsi (k)









W total welfare e
Index Meaning
i firms in the market
k technologies in the market
s probability scenarios concerning the extension of nuclear license permits
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Can spatial reallocation of livestock reduce the impact of GHG
emissions?
Abstract: Historically, concentrated livestock production and, consequently, manure pro-
duction and management have resulted in considerable environmental impacts in many
parts of Europe. In this study, the effect of a reduction in manure pressure through spatial
distribution of CO2 equivalent emissions was investigated and the impact on the carbon
footprint verified through a consequential life cycle approach. An economic and environ-
mental optimization was conducted using mathematical linear programming and the main
differences between both approaches determined. The results of the model simulations
show that, while the economic optimum is achieved by maximizing the transport of raw
manure until fertilization standards are fulfilled and subsequently processing the excess
manure, the environmental optimum, from a carbon footprint point of view, is achieved
by separating all manure, as this strategy causes the least CO2 emissions (around 34%
less), mainly due to the limited manure storage time. Moreover, the analyses indicate
that rearrangement of the spatial distribution of livestock production in Belgium will not
substantially decrease CO2 emissions. Solutions should instead be sought by changing the
manure storage systems
This chapter is published as:
Willeghems, G., De Clercq, L., Michels, E., Meers, E., Buysse, J., 2016. Can spatial




5.1.1 Setting of the chapter within the dissertation
In this chapter, we look at the interplay between the Nitrates Directive and the 2015 Paris
Agreement, and the impact of this interplay on the players in the manure market. More
specifically, we evaluate policy incoherence through the unintended effect the Nitrates
Directive might have on the amount of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, resulting in pol-
lution swapping. To perform our analysis, we develop a multiple-firm partial equilibrium
model.
5.1.2 Objectives of the work
Intensive livestock production is widely regarded as having a detrimental impact on the
environment (Sage, 2012, Steinfeld et al., 2006, Meers et al., 2005) due to livestock supply
chains requiring significant inputs of feed, energy and water, production of CH4, NH3 and
other emissions, and pollution risks arising from inefficient waste management practices
(McAuliffe et al., 2016). While research into whole-system pig production indicates that
feed production generates the greatest environmental pressure, on a localized scale, waste
management becomes more problematic, with the main concerns being global warming
from GHG emissions, aquatic eutrophication and acidification from ammonia emissions
(Lopez-Ridaura et al., 2009, Sandars et al., 2003). More specifically, large amounts of
GHG emissions, such as CH4 and N2O, relating to manure storage and its application on
crop land create a substantial environmental burden (De Vries, Vinken, Hamelin and De
Boer, 2012, Rigolot et al., 2010, Lopez-Ridaura et al., 2009, Loyon et al., 2007). There
is a need for a detailed assessment of overall environmental impacts from pig manure
management, incorporating available technologies applied at different handling stages in
order to reduce the environmental burden (Prapaspongsa et al., 2010).
One tool for assessing the environmental performance of complex systems, such as pig
production, is life cycle assessment (LCA). This has often been applied in the case of pig
production (McAuliffe et al., 2016). The LCA literature distinguishes two types of LCA:
the attributional approach to environmental impact calculation (also called the accounting
or descriptive approach) attempts to provide information on the share of global burden
that can be associated with a product and its life cycle (United Nations Environment
Programme, 2011b), while the consequential approach is designed to generate information
on the consequences of actions (Ekvall and Weidema, 2004).
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Livestock waste-related, and mostly attributional, LCAs have received widespread atten-
tion in the EU in recent years, possibly due to the Water Framework Directive targets
in 2015. Waste management is the most localized concern for pig production, due to the
N and P content of animal manure and, hence, technologies have been developed to re-
duce risks associated with traditional manure management techniques, such as anaerobic
digestion, biological treatment of manure and manure separation (McAuliffe et al., 2016).
However, the existing literature reports conflicting results for the optimal solutions for
pig waste management. According to McAuliffe et al. (2016), the general consensus from
the research was that treated manure or slurry generated a lesser burden than untreated
manure. There were, however, exceptions, such as Lopez-Ridaura et al. (2009), who found
that traditional slurry spreading had less impact than aerobic treatment, while Bayo et al.
(2012) suggested spreading was preferable to constructed wetlands. Moreover, since these
types of studies apply LCAs of GHG emissions for specific areas and animal products, and
use different approaches, scopes and functional units, it makes them very hard to compare
and draw consistent conclusions (Weiss and Leip, 2012).
In Belgium, the main bottleneck for manure management is the strong geographical con-
centration of livestock and manure production in the province of West Flanders and the
northern part of Antwerp (Van der Straeten and Buysse, 2013). To adhere to targets in
the Nitrates Directive, raw manure is currently exported from zones with high manure
pressure to zones with low pressure until fertilization standards are fulfilled, to minimize
the economic cost, after which the manure surplus is processed. On the one hand, calls
have been made to reduce the high manure pressure and related environmental effects by
reducing, relocating and more evenly distributing livestock production (Werkgroep voor
Rechtvaardige en Verantwoorde Landbouw, 2013). On the other hand, based on the lit-
erature, one could argue that a high livestock density increases manure processing and,
therefore, reduces the environmental impact of manure management.
In order to come to a clear conclusion on the matter, in this study, we use the concept of
consequential LCA (Ekvall and Weidema, 2004) to explore the spatial distribution of CO2
equivalent (eq.) emissions from pig manure management in Belgium. The consequential
LCA is preferred over an attributional approach because consequential modeling estimates
how flows to and from the environment will change as a result of different potential deci-
sions (United Nations Environment Programme, 2011b, Curran et al., 2005), such as, in
this case, the spatial reallocation of livestock production. In this study, however, we do
not conduct a complete LCA of all the flows created by manure management. First of all,
we limit ourselves to those flows that contribute to the carbon footprint (CF), i.e. the
GHG emissions from manure into the atmosphere in the form of CO2, CH4, and direct and
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indirect N2O and NOx. Secondly, since in Belgium pig production creates the greatest
environmental pressure, only the GHG emissions from concentrated pig production are
taken into account.
In this study, we answer the following question: ‘Can spatial reallocation of livestock pro-
duction in Belgium reduce the impact of GHG emissions?’. This question is translated into
three research objectives: 1) conduct an economic (cost minimization) and environmental
(GHG minimization) optimization for three manure management strategies, which are, in
this case, pig manure transport, treatment and separation, in Belgium, 2) determine the
main differences between both approaches, and 3) determine the consequential CF of a
decrease in manure pressure (i.e. wider distribution of pig production). As a basis for our
calculations, we use a linear programming model that simulates manure disposal decisions
driven by legal constraints and market forces, to which we link CF calculations in order
to investigate the impact of spatial reallocation.
5.2 Method
In this section, we first describe the assumptions upon which the LCA calculations are
based, followed by a description of the linear programming model in which we insert the
LCA data and conduct the consequential LCA.
Figure 5.1 provides an overview of the manure management system upon which the life
cycle as well as the manure allocation calculations are based and explains how both ap-
proaches are combined. We will come back to this figure in the various sections of the
methodology.
The basic assumption of the model is that different types of animals produce manure with
a different nutrient content. The nutrient content can be altered by managing the manure
in different ways, such as manure separation or biological treatment. To apply manure to
the field, fertilization standards have to be adhered to. These standards depend on the
crop type. The LCA calculations determine the environmental impact of each manure
management strategy, focused here on GHG emissions, while the manure allocation model
(MAM) allows us to determine the optimal spatial manure allocation depending either
on economic optimization (allocation cost minimization) or on environmental optimiza-
tion (CF minimization). It is important to note that, with regard to the environmental
optimization, we only take into account the management of pig manure, while for the
economic optimization we consider all existing livestock in Belgium. The reason for this
is that, for the same amount of nutrients, pig manure is more concentrated per ton (see
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Figure 5.1: Manure management system with system boundaries and manure management
strategies.
Vlaamse Landmaatschappij (2014b), meaning that it makes more sense to transport pig
manure than cow manure. Moreover, dairy farms usually have access to their own land
for growing roughage, in contrast to pig farms, and hence will prefer to apply the manure
first and foremost on their own fields.
5.2.1 Functional unit and system boundaries
The functional unit is the total amount of pig manure produced on an annual basis in each
municipality in Belgium. The life cycle and boundaries of our assessment are presented
in Figure 5.1, together with a representation of the MAM (see 5.2.3). System boundaries,
indicated in the figure by the black dotted line, are set starting from manure production to
the arrival of the (processed) manure at its final destination. The life cycle stages involved
are manure production, storage, processing, transport and, finally, application to the land.
The system boundaries exclude the production of capital goods, such as machinery and
equipment, similar to most international studies. The CO2 emissions from manure storage
and processing are not taken into account because these emissions are considered part of
the short carbon cycle, i.e. resulting from recent CO2 uptake by crops. On the other
hand, the emission of CO2 originating from fossil energy use is taken into account.
Typically, animal manure is composed of different constituents, such as nutrients, organic
matter, minerals, etc. (Coppens, 2009). These elements all circulate in their own life cycle
and are only present in manure in specific parts of that life cycle (represented by the gray
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dotted arrows). Moreover, not all of these elements cause GHG emissions. Therefore, in
our analysis, we limit ourselves to those elements and that part of the life cycle where
GHG emissions from manure management occur, in the form of CO2, CH4, N2O and
NOx
1. Figure 5.1 illustrates this research restriction, where the presence of these elements
in animal feed and animal production lies outside the system boundaries and is hence not
taken into account in this study.
5.2.2 Life cycle approach
As mentioned before, in this study, we look at selected life cycle stages for certain elements
that are responsible for GHG emissions. We focus on the life cycle of those elements with
respect to livestock, and hence, manure production.
The first step within this study is the calculation of the costs and environmental impact
in terms of GHG emissions for the two traditional manure management strategies applied
in Belgium, i.e. raw manure transport and biological treatment, and a third strategy, ma-
nure separation. The raw manure transport strategy includes on-farm storage, transport
outside the pressure region to the spreading area and application to crop land, substitut-
ing mineral fertilizers. In Belgium, manure treatment consists of three important phases:
(i) physical separation into a liquid (85%) and a solid (15%) fraction; (ii) composting of
the solid fraction into an exportable product and (iii) reduction of the nutrient content in
the liquid fraction through biological treatment (Meers et al., 2008). Hence, the manure
treatment strategy includes storage, transport to the treatment plant, mechanical sepa-
ration, biological treatment of the liquid fraction, transport and composting of the solid
fraction, and transport and application of the effluent and the compost to crop land. The
manure separation strategy includes storage, transport to a manure treatment plant where
it is separated, intermediate storage of the separated fractions, transport and application
of the liquid fraction to crop land, and composting and export of the solid fraction. To
make the distinction between raw manure on the one hand, and treated and separated
manure on the other hand, we refer to processed manure to describe manure treatment
and separation at the same time.
The following subsections provide a summary of the emission sources relating to the ma-
nure management strategies. Table 5.1 at the end of this section presents an overview of
1Nitrogen oxides (NOx) act as indirect greenhouse gases by producing the tropospheric greenhouse gas
‘ozone’ via photochemical reactions in the atmosphere. The main sink for NOx gases is oxidation in the
atmosphere, however, a significant amount of NOx arising from soils can be used up in the tree canopy
before it escapes to the troposphere. Another pathway for NOx in the atmosphere is that of dry deposition
back on land. Such deposition can then lead to increased emissions of the direct greenhouse gas nitrous
oxide (N2O) (Reay, n.d.).
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the different emissions and emission sources. Annexes 5.A to 5.E explain in more detail
how the calculations were made.
Emissions from storage
Pig manure is stored as slurry in a pit under the pig unit and causes CH4 and N2O
emissions (Jacobsen et al., 2014, VMM et al., 2013, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, 2006a). Direct N2O emissions are small in comparison to the large quantity of
CH4 emissions from pig slurry storage (Montes et al., 2013). It is important to note that
CH4 and N2O have a global warming potential that is, respectively, 25 and 298 times as
strong as the potential from CO2.
The calculations for raw manure are based on storage for six months before spreading,
since the total storage capacity has to be sufficient to store at least the quantity of manure
produced by the animals in the pig unit during a six month period (Vlaamse Regering,
2014, Lemmens et al., 2007). This capacity is necessary, since the time period during which
manure can be applied is limited, according to the crop cycles and nutrient requirements.
In Belgium, manure and other fertilizers can only be applied from mid-February until the
end of August (Vlaamse Landmaatschappij, 2016). Furthermore, for manure separation
and treatment, we assume the slurry is stored on-farm before processing2. Moreover, we
assume that the excess manure is delivered to the collective treatment plant at 25% of the
original storage capacity of six months, hence, the average storage time equals one and
a half months. The collected manure is then stored for a short period of time (ten days
on average) in a buffer tank. After separation, the liquid fraction will either be applied
on the land, in the case of manure separation as strategy, or biologically treated, in the
case of manure treatment as strategy. We assume the liquid fraction destined for crop
application is stored for another four months before it can be applied3, while the solid
fraction is transferred to the composting installation almost immediately.
Production of CH4 takes place during manure decomposition under anaerobic conditions
(Jacobsen et al., 2014, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2006a). The IPCC
Tier 2 method is used to calculate the CH4 output (VMM et al., 2014, Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, 2006a). Emissions of N2O from stored manure are a consequence
of nitrification and denitrification processes. Additionally, indirect N2O emissions from
2In an ideal situation, the manure is delivered to the treatment plant as fresh as possible. In reality,
however, this is often not the case.
3We stated above that the average total manure storage time is assumed at six months due to the
limited application period. Manure destined for processing is stored for one and a half months before
transport to the collective treatment plant. At the plant it is stored for another ten days. That means
that of the total assumed storage period of six months, four months still remain before the thin fraction
can be applied to the land.
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manure are caused by volatilized NH3 and NOx which may be deposited at sites downwind
from manure handling areas and contribute to indirect N2O emissions (VMM et al., 2014,
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2006a).
Based on experiments and literature reviews, it is assumed that CH4 emissions from the
liquid fraction are twelve times lower in comparison to raw slurry for the same storage
period, while the CH4 emissions from the solid fraction are assumed to be negligible
(Mosquera et al., 2010). Nitrous oxide emissions from the liquid fraction are assumed
to be negligible due to anaerobic conditions which prevent nitrification (Petersen et al.,
2013, Mosquera et al., 2010). The solid fraction, on the other hand, causes higher N2O
emissions, since there are more mineralization and nitrification processes due to the more
aerobic environment. However, due to the short storage period, the N2O emissions from
the solid fraction are assumed to be zero. Ammonia emissions are assumed to be inhibited
by covering the storage tanks. Please refer to Annex 5.A for a detailed calculation of
emissions from manure storage.
Emissions from manure processing
Emissions from manure processing consist of emissions from mechanical separation, bio-
logical treatment of the liquid fraction and composting of the solid fraction.
It is assumed that a centrifuge is used for the mechanical separation of the slurry since
this is the most common technique used in Belgium. Most of the time, separation occurs
within a closed device or within the pig unit. Therefore, emissions are expected to be
minimal and the quantity of nutrients entering the system should be the same as the
quantity leaving it (Lemmens et al., 2007, Melse et al., 2004).
There is considerable uncertainty about the N2O emissions caused by nitrification and
denitrification. Under well-controlled conditions, nitrogen losses of up to 1% of N2O
and 0.01% of NH3 were measured at a full scale installation of a Trevi plant (Lemmens
et al., 2007, Smet and Deboosere, 2007). The low NH3 emissions are a result of the
natural acidification of the activated sludge and the low concentration of NH3 during the
nitrification/denitrification process (Lemmens et al., 2007). The N2O emissions are even
lower than the emissions from raw manure applied to soil (Smet and Deboosere, 2007).
Similarly, Loyon et al. (2007) found that less than 1% of the total nitrogen entering the
treatment plant was emitted as N2O. Methane emissions are assumed to be negligible
(personal communication, BioArmor 2015). The high residual content of N, P and K
in the effluent from the biological treatment plant is still too high to allow discharge in
Belgium. However, the effluent can be applied to crop land. In practice, the effluent
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is applied locally on pasture and cropland as potassium fertilizer, since the amount of
potassium is more or less equal to the amount found in raw slurry.
During composting, 28% of the nitrogen from the solid manure is emitted as NH3-N, 1%
as N2O-N and 1% as N2, which adds up to a total N-loss of 30% (Basset-Mens et al.,
2007). Similarly, Lemmens et al. (2007) and Melse et al. (2004) mention a nitrogen reduc-
tion of 30% and 15 to 50% during the composting process respectively. However, manure
composting occurs in closed systems (hall or tunnel composting) where the gases are cap-
tured and treated, and thus the emissions are considered to be zero. Through composting,
30% of the dry matter is broken down. To calculate the mass balance, only pig manure
is taken into account, whereas, in practice, the solid fraction of manure is co-composted
with chicken manure. By adding dry organic material, such as chicken manure, the C/N
ratio is increased, which is necessary for the composting process. Please refer to Annex
5.B for a detailed calculation of emissions from manure processing.
Emissions from manure application
Direct N2O emissions and indirect N2O emissions from NH3 volatilization from man-
aged soils can be derived using the IPCC equations (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, 2006b).
In comparison to raw manure, separation has no influence on the emission of NH3 from the
liquid fraction or the solid fraction when applied to grassland and cropland respectively.
This is also the case for N2O emissions from the liquid fraction when applied to grassland
(Mosquera et al., 2010). Consequently, the same emission factors are used as for the
application of raw manure. Please refer to Annex 5.C for a detailed calculation of emissions
from manure application.
Emissions from non-renewable energy use
The use of non-renewable energy includes the energy used for transport and injection of
the manure slurry, and for manure processing.
It is assumed that slurry transport occurs by truck with a load of over 20 ton and an
emission of 110 g CO2 eq.ton
−1.km−1 (Stichting Klimaatvriendelijk Aanbesteden & On-
dernemen (SKAO), 2011). A fuel use of 2.49 and 0.8 L of diesel per m3 manure is assumed
for applying the slurry to the land and injecting it, respectively (Lopez-Ridaura et al.,
2009). According to Defra (2012), well-to-wheel greenhouse gas emissions for the combus-
tion of 1 L of diesel equal 3.18 kg CO2 eq.. Furthermore, energy is necessary for separation,
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biological treatment and composting. The emission factor for electricity in Belgium is 400
kg CO2.MWh
−1 (Commissie Benchmarking, 2009). Moreover, we assume that, after ma-
nure separation, the thick fraction is routinely transported to a composting facility at an
average distance of 50 km, after which the composted, hygienized fraction is transported
to the Northern part of France, over an average distance of 300 km, in accordance with
manure legislation.
With regard to manure processing, we assume the use of a centrifuge for mechanical
separation since it is the most common technique used in Belgium. According to Lemmens
et al. (2007), the energy consumption of a centrifuge is 2 kWh.m−3 slurry, while the energy
use for composting on a large scale is assumed to be 50 kWh.ton−1, including pre- and
post-treatment, conversion and aeration (Lemmens et al., 2007, Melse et al., 2004). In a
biological treatment plant where nitrogen is biologically removed from the liquid fraction
by nitrification and subsequent denitrification, electrical energy is necessary for aeration,
pumping and power. Aeration consumes the highest amount of energy. Registered uses
for the two systems found in Belgium are 16 kWh.m−3 manure (BioArmor system) or
17 kWh.m−3 manure (Trevi system4). In the BioArmor system, manure is biologically
treated in a sequential batch reactor and sedimentation occurs in the SBR or in a regular
sedimentation tank, while the Trevi biological treatment system is characterized by a
separate nitrification and denitrification basin. Please refer to Annex 5.D for a detailed
calculation of emissions from non-renewable energy use.
Avoided emissions
The manure slurry applied to crop land also substitutes for synthetic fertilizers. In order to
calculate the CF, it is necessary to include (subtract) the impact relating to the production,
transport and application of these replaced fertilizers. The production of fertilizers has a
high energy demand, and consequently accounts for a large CF. According to Yara (2010),
the production of 1 kg nitrogen with the Best Available Techniques emits 3.7 kg CO2
eq.kg−1 N. The average cradle to gate CF for the production of 1 kg phosphorus fertilizer
(triple super phosphate) and 1 kg potassium fertilizer (potassium sulphate) in Western
Europe equals 0.46 kg CO2 eq.kg
−1 P2O5 and 0.29 kg CO2 eq.kg
−1 K2O respectively
(Kool et al., 2012). For transport, an emission factor of 0.11 kg CO2 eq.ton
−1.km−1 is
assumed. The Mineral Fertilizer Equivalent (MFE) of nitrogen is based on the system for
effective nitrogen and equals 60% for slurry (Sigurnjak et al., 2016, Vaneeckhaute et al.,
2014, Vlaamse Landmaatschappij, 2014a). For P2O5 and K2O, the MFE is assumed to
4Trevi environmental consultancy and technology is a Belgian company which has developed its own
pig manure treatment plant (Trevi, n.d.)
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be 90% (Coppens, 2008). The use of synthetic fertilizers also results in direct and indirect
N2O emissions through volatilization of NH3 and NOx, similar to the emissions related to
the application of organic fertilizers. Please refer to Annex 5.E for a detailed calculation
of the avoided emissions from manure management.
Table 5.1 presents an overview of the main assumptions and emissions per emission source
in the manure management process.
Table 5.1: Overview of emissions and assumptions
Emission source Assumptions Emissions
Storage
In a pit under animal confinements
CH4, N2OIntermediate storage before processing
Covered storage of the liquid fraction after
separation
Transport Non-renewable energy use from transport CO2
Application
Emissions from managed soils
N2O, CO2Non-renewable energy use from application
Processing
Non-renewable energy use from separation,
biological treatment and composting
N2O, CO2Emissions from biological treatment
Transport of manure fractions
Avoided mineral
fertilizer use
Manure and manure fractions can replace
mineral fertilizers
N2O, CO2
5.2.3 Manure Allocation Model (MAM)
Model development
The second step of the analysis is to develop a model that optimizes manure allocation and
builds on the spatial mathematical programming multi-agent simulation approach devel-
oped by Van der Straeten et al. (2010), using the optimization software GAMS (General
Algebraic Modeling System, GAMS Development Corporation (2010)).
Two scenarios are analyzed; in the first scenario we minimize the economic cost of manure
allocation in Belgium (S COST), while in the second one we minimize the CF of ma-
nure allocation in Belgium (S CF). It is important to note that a ‘manure border’ exists
in Belgium, meaning that manure cannot be transported between Flanders and Wallo-
nia. Hence, we simulate both scenarios for each region at the same time, but only allow
transport of manure and derived products within each region.
The three strategies for manure management are, as mentioned above, transport of raw
manure from nutrient excess to nutrient deficit areas, manure separation, and biologi-
cal treatment of manure (manure treatment). The MAM minimizes either the costs or
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the GHG emissions from manure management in Belgium while respecting the fertiliza-
tion standards defined by the Flemish Land Agency (Vlaamse Landmaatschappij, 2014a).
While cost-efficiency is calculated based on transport distances and the cost of manure
separation and treatment, GHG emissions, and hence, CF, are determined based on a
consequential LCA approach.
As mentioned before, Figure 5.1 shows a schematic representation of the MAM, as a part of
our specific life cycle. Different types of livestock in municipality m produce manure with
a different nutrient content, i.e. a specific quantity (in kg) of nitrogen and phosphorus each
year (left on the figure). After storage, the manure is applied on the field, where different
crops have different fertilization standards, meaning that, per crop type, a specific amount
(in kg) of nitrogen and phosphorus can be applied to the land per hectare per year (to the
right of the figure). This manure will first be applied to the fields in municipality m1, and
then to the fields in other municipalities m2 to minimize transport distance and cost.
Because a manure surplus exists, not all raw manure can be applied on the field. Therefore,
this excess manure has to be processed, altering the nutrient content of the different manure
streams. This is the middle step in the figure, representing the different manure processing
strategies mentioned previously. By adjusting the nutrient content of the different types
of manure through processing, more (processed) manure can be applied on the field.
Of course, this manure allocation comes at an economic cost. First of all, there is the
cost of transporting the (processed) manure from municipality m1 to municipality m2.
Secondly, there is the cost of spreading the manure on the field itself. Thirdly, processing
the excess raw manure also comes at a cost. This cost depends on the type of processing
and the manure type. In the cost calculation we also include (subtract) the avoided cost
that would have been incurred if mineral fertilizer had been used instead of (processed)
manure.
Apart from the economic cost, manure allocation causes GHG emissions. In the MAM,
we account for five types of emissions: emissions from manure storage, emissions from
manure processing and application, emissions from non-renewable energy use (i.e. trans-
port and injection of manure slurry and manure processing) and avoided emissions from
the production, transport and application of mineral fertilizers. These GHG emissions are
implemented in the model as calculated values based on the assumptions stated in Section
5.2.2.
During the optimization, which is either a cost or a GHG minimization, the model allo-
cates, for each municipality, the quantity of manure that should be processed, and trans-
ported (in raw or processed form) within the same, or to another, municipality, all while
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adhering to the fertilization standards.
In what follows, the MAM will be explained in more detail through mathematical equa-
tions. The model parameters and variables are represented by Greek and Latin symbols
respectively, and units are displayed within brackets in italics. Section 5.6 provides an
overview of all the symbols used. The model description is based on Van der Straeten
et al. (2010).
As we do not have access to data at individual farm level, we model the manure market
on aggregated data at municipal level. The model distinguishes different types of manure:
cattle, pigs, chicken and other. Equation 5.1 calculates the manure production Qt,m per




νt,m ∗ εt (5.1)
with νt,m the number of animals per type and municipality and εt,n the excretion standard
per animal (ton manure).
The emission rights ϕm,n per municipality m, crop type c and nutrient type n (kg nutrient)




σc,m ∗ δc,n (5.2)
as the product of the surface per crop type σc,m (ha) and the fertilization standards per
crop and nutrient type δc,n (kg nutrient.ha
−1). We distinguish 3 types of nutrients, i.e. N,
P and K. However, emission rights and fertilization standards have only been established
for N and P.
Individual farms or, in our case, municipalities, have to adhere to fertilization standards
and hence, the quantity U∗n,m of nutrients from manure disposed on the land per munici-
pality and nutrient type (kg nutrient) has to be smaller than the allowed emission rights
(Equation 5.3),
U∗n,m < ϕn,m (5.3)
where the amount of nutrients disposed on the land U∗n,m can be linked to the amount of






Ut,m ∗ αn,t (5.4)
where αn,t represents the nutrient content per manure type (kg nutrient.ton
−1manure).
As not all raw manure can be disposed off on the land, a certain amount has to be
processed. In our model, we assume two types of processing, i.e. treated manure Tt,m
and separated manure St,m (both in ton). The disposal of manure Ut,m on the land then
becomes equal to
Ut,m = Qt,m + It,m − Et,m − Tt,m − St,m (5.5)
with Ut,m the sum of the production of the manure at the farm Qt,m plus the incoming
manure It,m minus the outgoing manure Et,m minus the processed amount of manure Tt,m
and St,m. Interaction with other municipalities takes place for the case of It,m and Et,m
where quantities of manure are transported between municipalities.
Equation 5.6 prevents the amount of exported manure from exceeding the produced ma-
nure for each manure type per municipality.
Et,m ≤ Qt,m (5.6)
As objective function for the scenario S COST, the model assumes cost minimizing behav-
ior. The total cost TC (e) consists of several components, related to the different manure
allocation options,
TC = CTR + CSPR + CPR − CAV . (5.7)




Tt,m ∗ τm1,m2 ∗ χT (5.8)
with τm1,m2 the distance between two municipalities m1 and m2 (km) and the unit trans-
port cost χT (e.km−1.m−3).
The second component is the cost for spreading manure on the field CSPR (e),
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Ut,m ∗ χSPR (5.9)
which is determined by the product of all manure applied on the field Ut,m with χSPR,
the unit cost of manure spreading (e.m−3), and this for all types of manure and all
municipalities.




(Tt,m ∗ χTR,t) + (St,m ∗ χSEP,t) (5.10)
which is made up of, on the one hand, the cost for manure treatment, and, on the other
hand, the cost for manure separation. As Table 5.2 shows that these costs differ per type
of manure (but only for the composting part), the respective treatment and separation
cost χTR,t and χSEP,t are calculated per manure type t (e.m−3). The treatment cost
χTR,t then consists of the separation, composting and biological treatment cost, while the
separation cost χSEP,t only consists of the separation and composting cost (see Table 5.2).
Finally, the fourth component is the avoided cost CAV (e) that would have been incurred




U∗n,m ∗ µn ∗ χn (5.11)
which is calculated as the sum over all nutrient types and municipalities of U∗n,m multiplied
with the mineral fertilizer equivalent µn (kg.ton
−1) and the nutrient cost χn (e.kg−1).
The objective function for S COST then becomes to minimize the total cost TC for manure






∀t ∈ T, ∀m ∈M,∀n ∈ N.
(5.12)
As objective function for the scenario S CF, the model assumes GHG emission minimizing
behavior. Similar to the total cost, the total carbon footprint TCF (ton CO2 eq.) consists
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of several components, equally related to the different manure allocation options,
TCF = CFST + CFTR + CFSPR + CFPR − CFAV . (5.13)
These components are emissions from storage CFST , emissions from transport CFTR,
emissions from spreading the manure on the land CFSPR, emissions from manure process-
ing CFPR and avoided emissions CFAV (all in ton CO2 eq.). The assumptions behind
the calculation of the different components are described in detail in Section 5.2.2, while
a more detailed overview of the calculation of the specific emissions components can be
found in Annexes 5.A to 5.E.
The objective function for S CF then becomes to minimize the total carbon footprint





s.t. (5.1)− (5.6), (5.13)
∀t ∈ T, ∀m ∈M,∀n ∈ N.
(5.14)
The model was run for both scenarios (S COST and S CF) and results were obtained
relating to cost and CF. Moreover, as the main focus of the model is the CF, more detailed
outputs were generated on the different CF for (i) each type of manure management - raw,
treated or separated manure, and (ii) each group of emissions - emissions from storage,
transport, treatment, application and avoided emissions. The results of these analyses are
presented in the results section.
5.2.4 Model parametrization and assumptions
The GHG emissions within the system boundaries of the three manure management
strategies are determined for each municipality in Belgium. The emissions for each live-
stock category are calculated using the ‘2006 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) guidelines for national GHG inventories’ (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, 2006a), reports on emissions and energy use and available country-specific data
from the norms and guidelines of the Flemish Land Agency, ‘Vlaamse Landmaatschappij’
VLM, (Vlaamse Landmaatschappij, 2014b), the Belgian National Inventory System (NIS)
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database and the National Inventory Report for Belgium (VMM et al., 2014).
The MAM is based on Van der Straeten et al. (2011) and Van der Straeten et al. (2010),
and implements the fertilization standards for total and animal-sourced nitrogen and total
phosphorous within the Flemish manure legislation (Vlaamse Landmaatschappij, 2014b).
The model is based on livestock quantities and crop surfaces at the municipal level from
the 2012 Agricultural Survey from the Belgian Federal Public Services Economy, S.M.E.s,
Self-employed and Energy (Federal Public Service Economy S.M.E.s Self-employed and
Energy, 2012). Technical and economic data on manure management strategies are taken
from the study on Best Available Techniques for Manure Processing (Lemmens et al.,
2007), and an excerpt from the ‘Mestwijzer’ from the Belgian Soil Service (Coppens,
2009).
Table 5.2 provides a summary of the technical and economic data on manure management
strategies. Please note that the costs per ton for manure processing χTR,t and χSEP,t
change depending on the management strategy used.




























85.7 0.204 2 6.92 7.92
Fattening
pigs
90 0.220 2 7.50 7.92
Sows and
breeding pigs
51.8 0.070 2 2.38 7.92
a Coppens (2009), b calculations based on Lemmens et al. (2007), c Lemmens et al. (2007)
Table 5.3 provides an overview of the parameters that are specifically mentioned in Section
5.2.3 and their values.
The specific mineral fertilizer equivalents µN , µP and µK have been set at 60% for N
(Vlaamse Landmaatschappij, 2014b), 90% for P, and 90% for K (De Vries, Groenestein
and De Boer, 2012a). The specific nutrient costs χN , χP and χK have been set at 1.1, 2.2
and 0.6 e.kg−1 fertilizer.
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5.2.5 Consequential footprint approach
Where an attributional LCA provides information about the impacts of the processes
used to produce (and consume and dispose of) a product, without considering indirect
effects arising from changes in the output of a product, a consequential LCA provides
information about the consequences of changes in the level of output (and consumption
and disposal) of a product, including effects both inside and outside the life cycle of the
product. An attributional LCA generally provides information on the average unit of
product and is useful for consumption-based carbon accounting. It informs comparisons
between the direct impacts of products, and is used to identify opportunities for reducing
direct impacts in different parts of the life cycle. A consequential LCA, on the contrary,
models the causal relationships originating from the decision to change the output of the
product, and therefore seeks to inform policy makers on the broader impacts of policies
which are intended to change levels of production (Brander et al., 2008).
The consequential CF approach generates information on the consequences of potential
decisions (Ekvall and Weidema, 2004), such as in this case spatial reallocation of live-
stock production. For this reason, the systems analyzed in LCAs using the consequential
approach, consist in theory only of processes actually affected by the decision (United
Nations Environment Programme, 2011a). In general, marginal data are used to describe
the consequence of a decision (Ekvall and Weidema, 2004) and the processes defined in
the system are based on an approximation of the change in material and energy flows as
a response to prospective decisions or disturbances (Curran et al., 2005). According to
Ekvall and Weidema (2004), the boundaries of the system should be defined up to the
point where the consequences are very small or the uncertainties very large so that further
expansion of the system boundaries would not yield significant information on any realistic
decision.
The effect of the distribution of livestock production can be analyzed both from the supply
and the demand side for the surplus manure. The supply side implies an extra quantity of
nutrients from animal sources, and it equals the demand-side effect of relaxing fertilization
standards, i.e. allowing a marginal quantity of nutrients from additional manure to be put
on the field. As, in general, marginal data are used to describe the consequences of a
decision (United Nations Environment Programme, 2011a, Curran et al., 2005, Ekvall and
Weidema, 2004), we marginally increase the nitrogen standard by 1 kg per municipality in
order to understand the consequences of the decision to distribute livestock more evenly.
The model then calculates the consequential CO2 impact of this marginal increase, i.e.




specifically, in the model output of S CF, i.e. the scenario in which we minimize the CF,
we can find this value by looking at the shadow price in regard to Equation 5.3, for the
N nutrient balance. In constrained optimization in economics, the shadow price is the
instantaneous change, per unit of the constraint (i.e. kg N), in the objective value (i.e.
kg CO2 eq.) of the optimal solution of an optimization problem, obtained by relaxing
the constraint. In other words, it is the marginal utility of relaxing the constraint, or,
equivalently, the marginal cost of strengthening the constraint (Wikipedia, n.d.). In Figure
5.1, this is indicated by the dashed box at the bottom right of the figure.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Overview of the model objective outcome
It must be emphasized that while cost minimization focuses on the optimal allocation of
all manure produced in Belgium, CF minimization focuses solely on the optimal allocation
of pig manure, as changes in manure policy almost always influence pig manure allocation,
while the allocation of other types of manure remains unaffected.
The model simulations show that the total cost of manure management is 183 million
and 648 million euro for S COST and S CF respectively, while the total emission from
manure management is 1.02 million and 0.67 million tons CO2 eq. for S COST and S CF
respectively. The numbers indicate that a lower cost coincides with a higher CF and vice
versa. As transport of raw manure is the cheapest way to dispose of excess manure, the
model, when minimizing costs, will choose to transport as much raw manure as possible,
and excess amounts will be separated or biologically treated. Even though transport of raw
manure is the cheapest way to deal with manure allocation, it is also the most polluting
one. This largely explains why the CF in S COST is much higher than in S CF.
In the cost minimizing scenario S COST, of the total amount of 20 million tons of pig
manure produced annually, 33% is transported as raw manure, while 28% and 39% are
treated and separated respectively. Moreover, emissions from raw manure transport, bi-
ological manure treatment and manure separation amount to 0.48 million, 0.25 million
and 0.29 million ton CO2 eq. respectively. On the contrary, in the emission-minimizing
scenario S CF, the only emissions originate from manure separation, amounting to 0.67
million tons CO2 eq. This indicates that manure separation has the lowest CF of all three
manure management strategies.
Figures 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 allow us to look at these results in more detail.
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Figure 5.2 provides an overview of the GHG emissions in kg CO2 eq. per ton of original
manure for the three manure management scenarios, for the ‘pigs of 20 to 50 kg in weight’
category.
Figure 5.2: Graphical overview of GHG emissions per type of manure management strategy
for each type of emission source per ton original manure.
First of all, it can be seen that raw manure management creates the highest total GHG
emission per ton, followed by manure treatment and then manure separation, which has
the lowest5. Moreover, CH4 emissions from storage are the highest for raw manure man-
agement, lower for separated manure and the lowest for treated manure, due to differences
in storage time. This observation has also been made in a large number of environmental
studies of pig slurry transfer and treatment (Brockmann et al., 2014, ten Hoeve et al.,
2014, De Vries, Groenestein and De Boer, 2012a, Lopez-Ridaura et al., 2009, Loyon et al.,
2007). Even though the raw slurry can be transported over a considerable distance, the
processing strategies will always result in a lower CF since a shorter manure storage period
is required. Notwithstanding the liquid fraction of separated manure emitting additional
CH4 during storage after separation, this emission is greatly reduced, by about twelve
5The total emission per manure management strategy is based on the sum of the, positive, emissions
caused by manure management, and the, negative, avoided emissions by manure management. While
emissions from manure treatment might be lower than those from manure separation, the avoided emissions
from manure separation are larger than those from manure treatment, making manure separation, in our
specific case, the strategy with the lowest total GHG emissions.
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times. Mosquera et al. (2010) explain this reduction by the fact that CH4 is formed
in liquid slurry in the presence of a vast amount of degradable organic matter which is
fermented under anaerobic conditions. However, since most of the organic matter ends
up within the solid fraction after separation, less CH4 is formed in the liquid fraction.
Additionally, as manure can be biologically treated throughout the year, it is stored for
a shorter time period as opposed to raw manure, where application is restricted in time
(from mid-February until the end of August). The N2O emissions increase with storage
time. Moreover, emissions from transport are relatively low for raw manure, at 0.11 kg
CO2 eq.ton
−1.km−1, and higher for processed manure as this also includes, apart from
transporting the liquid fraction over a distance of 1 km in the case of Figure 5.2, the
transport of the thick fraction to a composting facility and the transport of the resulting
compost to France. The soil N2O emissions from the separated liquid fraction are assumed
to be slightly lower than those from the raw manure due to nitrogen losses after the sep-
aration process. Furthermore, as the liquid fraction of separated manure is a valuable
source of nutrients which can be applied to crop land, it accounts for greater savings in
mineral fertilizers compared to treated manure. By applying the liquid fraction of manure
slurry instead of biologically treating it, the avoided consumption of synthetic fertilizers
and GHG (i.e. N2O) emissions related to the application of such fertilizers results in GHG
emission savings.
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Figure 5.3 provides an overview of the size of the different emission types per scenario in
kg CO2 eq. per ton of original manure
6.
Figure 5.3: Graphical overview of the two model scenarios depicting the share of each
type of GHG emission source. Scenario S COST minimizes the cost, while scenario S CF
minimizes the carbon footprint.
The figure shows that when the total cost is minimized (S COST), over 40% of the total
GHG emissions are due to CH4 emissions from storage. In the S CF scenario, this emission
source also dominates, albeit to a smaller extent. The second largest source of emissions in
both scenarios is the soil N2O emissions after manure application, as also indicated above.
Emissions (N2O) from biological treatment (nitrification/denitrification) are present only
in the cost minimizing scenario, as manure treatment takes place here. Another important
observation is that manure transport only contributes a small proportion of the total
emissions. Finally, the figure indicates that the avoided emissions from the production of
mineral fertilizers and the avoided (N2O) emissions from mineral fertilizer application are
similar in size.
Finally, Figure 5.4 presents a graphical overview of the calculated GHG emissions on a
spatial scale, at municipal level.
6Avoided emissions from fuel use are not represented as they are too small to show, more specifically,
671,348 and 748,467 kg CO2 eq. per ton of original manure for S COST and S CF respectively.
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Figure 5.4: Graphical overview of the two model scenarios depicting the size of GHG
emissions (in ton CO2 eq.) on a municipal level. The map on the left-hand side shows
emissions for the S CF scenario, while the map on the right-hand side shows emissions for
the S COST scenario.
This figure indicates that the areas with the highest livestock density, i.e. the North and
North-western part of the country, emit the largest amounts of GHG from manure man-
agement. The emission pattern remains the same for both scenarios, although emissions
for the S CF scenario are remarkably lower, as was shown by the analysis.
5.3.2 Consequential carbon footprint analysis
As stated earlier, livestock production in Belgium and, thus, the GHG emissions relating
to these sources are concentrated in the North and North-Western part of the country. It
has been suggested that a more equal distribution of livestock production might reduce the
CF. By means of the consequential CF approach, the GHG emissions at municipality level
can be simulated for a more spatially equalized livestock production. The consequential
CF impact of a marginal increase in N fertilization standards is carried out for the GHG
emission minimizing scenario S CF. Figure 5.5 shows the results of the consequential CF
impact at municipal level for the whole of Belgium.
Results show that the consequential CO2 impact is relatively small. The greatest reduc-
tions in CF are attained in areas with high livestock densities and carbon emissions, mainly
in the North of Antwerp and West Flanders. One of the municipalities with a high CF is
Hooglede, in the Western part of Flanders, which also has the highest livestock intensity
(see dark blue colored area in Figure 5.5). When we allow for an extra kg of N to be
disposed of in this municipality, the change in nutrient deposition prevents the need for
the manure to be transported to a region with non-binding fertilization standards, and,
consequently, the CF decreases by 0.5 kg CO2 eq.
7. More specifically, we can derive that
7According to the color code on the map, dark blue colored areas can achieve a reduction of 0.5 to 0.6 kg
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Figure 5.5: Graphical overview of the consequential CF impact (in kg CO2 eq.kg N
−1) at
municipal level.
500 g CO2 eq. corresponds to 250 kg of manure being transported over a distance of 20
km, since the emission factor for transport is 110 g CO2.ton
−1.km−1.
The consequential CF analysis shows that a high livestock concentration indeed creates a
higher environmental burden than a more equally distributed animal production system.
Based on the coloring of Figure 5.5, we can deduce that the areas with a high livestock
intensity and manure pressure in the North and North West of the country can achieve
higher CF reductions if fertilization standards were to relax. However, the difference
between animals produced in areas with livestock overpopulation, on the one hand, and a
region with lower livestock density, on the other hand, is relatively small, with a maximum
of 0.5 kg CO2 eq.kg
−1N . This difference is due to manure transport between regions in
a competitive market for manure disposal space. The results show that the CF of this
transport is small compared to the other emissions in the manure management and animal
production chain (as was also demonstrated in Figures 5.2 and 5.3 by looking at the share
of transport emissions versus storage emissions for instance).
The GHG emissions from the average storage of 1 ton of manure amount to 95 kg CO2
eq. (Jacobsen et al., 2014) while the transport of that ton of manure from the surplus to
the deficit regions is 4.08 kg CO2 eq.
8 (i.e. 4.3%), assuming an average transport distance
of 50 km. Manure management, which is the consequence of livestock concentration, is
CO2 eq.kg
−1N . We use the municipality of Hooglede as a specific example to explain the outcome. The
specific result for this municipality was taken from the model output, of which Figure 5.5 is a representation.
8This number is calculated by multiplying the result of the consequential LCA, i.e. 0.5 kg CO2.kg
−1
N with the amount of N in 1 ton pig manure, i.e. 8 kg N.ton−1 manure.
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responsible for one quarter of the total GHG emissions from pig production. The total CF
of 1 kg of pig meat in Flanders is 5.7 kg CO2 eq., of which 1.37 kg (i.e. 24%) is attributed,
on average, to manure management (Jacobsen et al., 2014). This implies that the pig meat
production in areas with the highest livestock density emits 1.03% (i.e. 24% * 4.3 %) more
CO2 than pig meat production in areas with low livestock density due to manure man-
agement. Reducing this impact is more likely to be efficient through the implementation
of improved manure management techniques, such as separation or anaerobic digestion,
than through relocation of the livestock production itself. From the consequential analysis
it can hence be concluded that a spatial rearrangement of pig production in Belgium will
not substantially decrease the CF for this agricultural activity.
5.3.3 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we conduct a sensitivity analysis regarding the N2O emissions caused by
manure nitrification and denitrification. As an original assumption, we assumed a nitrogen
loss of 1% of N2O (see Section 5.2.2). However, as there is considerable uncertainty about
the extent of these emissions in reality, we conduct the analysis again for an assumed loss
of 5% N2O. We do this for the S COST scenario only as in the S CF scenario manure
separation is the selected technology with the least CO2 emissions per ton manure, and
increasing the amount of N2O emissions will, logically speaking, not alter the outcome
of the GHG minimization analysis. Figure 5.6 presents the graphical overview of this
sensitivity analysis.
The figure shows the impact of the assumption of 1% versus 5% N2O emissions during
manure treatment. While the manure allocation between raw manure transport, manure
treatment and separation remains the same, the total emissions from manure management
increase by 34% from 1.02 million to 1.36 million ton CO2 eq.. The impact is substan-
tial, due to the fact that N2O is considered 298 times as powerful as CO2 as a GHG
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2006a).
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Figure 5.6: Graphical overview of the original S COST scenario and the scenario with the
assumption of increased N2O emissions during manure treatment.
5.4 Discussion
The modeling exercise indicated that, out of the three selected manure management strate-
gies, manure separation had the lowest CF and that spatial reallocation of pig production
would not substantially decrease the CF for pig manure management. However, both the
model and the assumptions we used can be improved.
First of all, the model ignores part of the reality. We assumed that (processed) manure
transport takes place solely within the Belgian regions of Flanders and Wallonia. In
reality, however, manure transport also takes place from Flanders to Zealandic Flanders
in the Netherlands and Northern France. According to the 2015 Manure Report by the
Flemish Land Agency (Vlaamse Landmaatschappij, 2015), in 2015, 125.1 million kg N
and 60.9 million kg P2O5 were produced from manure in Flanders, of which 30% N and
37% P2O5 were processed and exported outside Flanders. Of all the nutrients exported
from Flanders, 69 and 26% ended up on French and Dutch soil respectively. Allowing
transport to those regions in the model would have further decreased the total cost of
manure management in the S COST scenario, while at the same time increasing the CF,
as more manure would be transported to these nutrient-poor regions and less manure
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would be processed, as the need for processing would be lower. Nevertheless, part of this
transport cost is already implicitly included in the model. Transport to Zealandic Flanders
mainly consists of (unhygienized) raw manure, while transport to Northern France mainly
constitutes the hygienized, composted thick fraction. In the MAM, we assume, firstly,
that the entire thick fraction of processed manure is transported to a composting facility
at an average distance of 50 km from the farm, and then transported to France as a
hygienized compost, over an average distance of 300 km. These costs are already included
in the model, but were not mentioned explicitly. As the statistics from the Flemish Land
Agency indicate that the majority of cross-border manure transport is directed to France,
we believe we have, to a large extent, already incorporated these additional costs. There
would, however, be no difference in the S CF scenario, as all manure would be separated
by default to minimize the CF.
Secondly, in our choice of three manure management strategies we did not include anaer-
obic digestion as only about 1% of manure is currently digested in Flanders (De Geest
et al., 2014, Vlaamse Landmaatschappij, 2014b). However, Prapaspongsa et al. (2010)
found that combining anaerobic digestion with natural crust slurry storage produced the
lowest impacts in terms of global warming potential, and McAuliffe et al. (2016) con-
cluded that, when it comes to waste management for pig production, anaerobic digestion
has many benefits over manure spreading. Moreover, Clemens et al. (2006) concluded that
biogas production is a very efficient way to reduce the GHG emissions, both through the
production of renewable energy and the avoidance of uncontrolled GHG emissions into the
atmosphere during manure management. Finally, Anderson-Glenna and Morken (2013)
observed that CH4 emissions from digestate are much lower in comparison to raw manure
slurry.
Anaerobic digestion could prove a good solution for manure management, as our results
indicate that over one third of total emissions are caused by CH4 emissions from storage
(see Figure 5.3). The difference in storage emission quantity between both scenarios lies
in the fact that we assumed a much shorter storage time for manure processing than for
raw manure transport. Changing these assumptions could hence alter the outcome of
the exercise. For instance, due to the current pig meat crisis in Europe, Flemish manure
processors have noticed that pig farmers store their manure for a longer period before
processing to hold off payments for this service.
Besides anaerobic digestion, a number of solutions have been proposed in the literature to
reduce the CF during manure storage. Methane production from slurry could be reduced
by the addition of inhibiting compounds and acids (Berg and Pazsiczki, 2003, Amon
et al., 2001). From the assessments carried out by Petersen et al. (2012) and Hou et al.
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(2015), it could be derived that slurry acidification significantly lowers CH4 emission.
Slurry acidification is already approved as Best Available Technology and widely applied
in Denmark as a cost-effective GHG mitigation measure (Petersen et al., 2012). Slurry
cooling can also reduce CH4 emissions, since lowered indoor temperatures and a reduced air
exchange rate reduce CH4 emissions (Monteny et al., 2001). However, the most effective
measure for CH4 emission inhibition is to prevent formation of bacteria inoculum by
frequent and complete slurry removal (Van den Weghe et al., 2005, Monteny et al., 2001,
Osada et al., 1998).
Finally, according to the Flemish Environmental Agency, in 2014, animal husbandry was
responsible for 63% of the total CH4 emissions in Flanders and pig manure storage ac-
counted for 64% of all CH4 emissions from manure storage (Vlaamse Milieumaatschappij,
2014). Therefore, for further research, it might be interesting to look at the economic and
environmental effects of imposing a CO2 tax on manure management.
5.5 Conclusion
In European regions with concentrated livestock production, manure management creates
major environmental problems. As the existing literature reports conflicting results for
optimal solutions for pig waste management, this paper investigates the effect of reduced
manure pressure through spatial distribution of CO2 equivalent emissions and the impact
on the CF, verified through a consequential LCA. While, in the past, transport distance
was assumed to be an important parameter in the determination of the total CF, our study
shows that rearrangement of the spatial distribution of livestock production in Belgium will
not substantially decrease CO2 emissions. This chapter contributes to the methodology
of consequential LCA by linking the CF analysis with an economic model that simulates
manure disposal decisions driven by legal constraints and market forces.
This approach makes both an economic and environmental optimization possible through
mathematical linear programming. The main differences between the environmental and
economic optima were also determined. The results of the model simulations show that,
while the economic optimum is achieved by maximizing the transport of raw manure until
fertilization standards are fulfilled and subsequently processing the excess manure, the
environmental optimum, from a CF viewpoint, is achieved by separating all manure, as
this strategy creates the lowest CO2 emissions, mainly due to the limited manure storage
time as compared to raw manure, and to a smaller extent due to the higher amount
of avoided emissions as compared to treated manure. As manure storage is the main
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contributor to the CF, solutions for GHG reduction from manure management should
lie in changing these storage systems, rather than in a spatial reallocation of intensive
livestock production.
Within the framework of this dissertation, this chapter is related to the interplay between
the Nitrates Directive and the 2015 Paris Agreement. In this chapter, we show that a
reduction in nitrate leaching increases GHG emissions from raw manure transport. This
is another example of how the effectiveness of a mix of policy instruments can be hampered,
in this case causing pollution swapping.
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excretion standard per animal
type
ton manure
µn mineral fertilizer equivalent %
νt,m




amount of manure produced per
animal type and municipality
ton manure






emission rights per municipality
and nutrient
kg nutrient
χn nutrient cost e.kg−1
χT manure unit transport cost e.km−1.m−3
χTR,t manure unit treatment cost e.m−3
χSEP,t manure unit separation cost euro.m
−3
χSPR manure unit spreading cost e.m−3
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5.6. OVERVIEW OF MODEL PARAMETERS, VARIABLES AND INDEXES
Variable symbol Meaning Unit
CAV
avoided cost from avoided
mineral fertilizer use
e
CPR manure processing cost e
CSPR manure spreading cost e
CTR manure transport cost e
Et,m quantity of outgoing manure ton
It,m quantity of incoming manure ton
St,m quantity of separated manure ton
Tt,m quantity of treated manure ton
TC total cost for manure allocation e
TCF total carbon footprint ton CO2 eq.
U∗n,m
quantity of nutrients from
manure disposed on the land
kg nutrient
Ut,m
quantity of raw manure
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5.A GHG emissions from manure storage
This section provides a detailed overview on how the GHG emissions for manure storage
were calculated. These calculations are based on on Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (2006a). GHG emissions from storage consist of methane emissions from storage
and direct and indirect nitrous oxide emissions from storage.
First of all, Equation 5.15 shows how to calculate methane emissions CH4,MM
(kg CH4.year




EFt ∗ νt (5.15)
with νt the number of animals per livestock/manure type t and EFt the annual CH4 emis-
sion factor per livestock/manure type (kg CH4.animal
−1.year−1), calculated according to
Equation 5.16,






with MCFS,k the methane conversion factor for manure management system S in climate
region k (%), MST,S,k the fraction of livestock (% ), B0,t the maximum methane producing
capacity for manure produced by livestock category t (m3 CH4.kg
−1 of volatile solids VS
excreted), 0.67 the conversion factor of m3 CH4 to kg CH4, storage time ST the basis
for calculating the VS production (days)9 and V St the daily volatile solids excreted by
livestock category t (kg V S.animal−1.day−1).
For pit storage below animal confinements, the MCF corresponding to the average tem-
perature of 11 °C and more than 1 month storage amounts to 19% (VMM et al., 2013,
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2006a). The default value for the maximum
methane production B0,t in Western Europe is 0.45 m
3 CH4.kg V S
−1 (Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, 2006a). The VS content of manure equals the fraction of the
consumed diet that is not digested and thus excreted as fecal material. VS excreted by
pigs are region-specific, using the average manure production in m3, its density and its
dry matter content. Region-specific values for the VS content were found in the National
Inventory Report (VMM et al., 2013).
When we apply these equations to our model, we make some adjustments for CH4 emis-
9The VS production is usually calculated on a yearly basis. However, in this chapter, it is only calculated
for the respective days of manure storage.
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sions regarding our assumptions on storage. First of all, we assume that storage time
ST (see Equation 5.16) is 180 days for raw manure U, and, in a first stage, 55 days for
manure S and T that will be processed (separated and treated). Then, for the case of
separated manure, we assume the think fraction of the manure will be stored for another
120 days after separation (see Section 5.2.2). However, we cannot use Equation 5.16 as
it is to calculate the amount of CH4 that will be emitted by the thin fraction. As we
assume, according to Mosquera et al. (2010), that emissions from the liquid fraction are
about twelve time lower in comparison to raw slurry, Equation 5.16 can be rephrased to
EFt,thin =






In this specific case, ST has become 120, for the 120 days the thin fraction is stored.
Hence, the total CH4 emission from manure management CH4,MM then becomes
CH4,MM = EFt,U ∗ νt,U + EFt,Sp ∗ νt,Sp + EFt,T r ∗ νt,T r + EFt,thin ∗ νt,Sp (5.18)
where EFt,U refers to the emission factor for raw manure (assuming T = 180), EFt,Sp and
EFt,T r refer to the emission factor for manure stored before separation and treatment,
EFt,thin refers to the emission factor for the thin fraction of separated manure, and νt,U ,
νt,Sp and νt,T r to the respective number of pigs of which manure is applied to the field
raw, after separation or after treatment.
Secondly, Equation 5.19 shows the calculation of direct N2O emissions (kg N2O.year
−1)











where νt is the amount of livestock species per category t, Nex,t the annual average N
excretion per head of species per category t (kg N.animal−1.year−1), MSt,S the fraction
of total annual N excretion for each livestock species per category t that is managed in
manure management system S, EF3,MM the emission factor for direct N2O emissions
from manure management system MM (kg N2O-N.kg N) and 44/28 the conversion of
N2O−NMM to N2OMM emissions. To quantify the nitrous oxide emissions from pig slurry
stored underneath the stable, 0.2% (EF3,MM ) of the total nitrogen is lost as nitrous oxide,
according to the default value of IPCC (VMM et al., 2013, Intergovernmental Panel on
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Climate Change, 2006a). It is important to note that these calculations normally assume a
storage period of one year. As we assume a different storage period for manure, depending
on the manure management system, we added the factor ST/365 to the equation to account
for this specific time period.
Thirdly, there may also be nitrogen losses in other forms (f.e. ammonia and nitrous oxides)
during manure management. Nitrogen volatilized as ammonia may be deposited at sites
downwind from manure handling areas and contribute to indirect N2O emissions. The











where N2Ovol,MM is the amount of manure nitrogen that is lost due to volatilization of
NH3 and NOx (kg N.year
−1), νt is the number of head of livestock species per cat-
egory t, Nex,t the annual average N excretion per head of species per category t (kg
N.animal−1.year−1), MSt,S the fraction of total annual nitrogen excretion for each live-
stock species per category t that is managed in manure management system S, Fracgas,MS
the percentage of managed manure N for livestock category t that volatilizes as NH3 and
NOx in manure management system S. It is assumed that 25% (Fracgas,MS) of the total
N emission from pig manure stored underneath the stables is converted to NH3 or NOx
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2006a).
The indirect N2O emissions from volatilization of N as NH3 and NOx are then estimated
using Equation 5.21,
N2OID,MM = (N2Ovol,MM ∗ EF4) ∗ 44/28 ∗ ST/365 (5.21)
with N2OID,MM the indirect N2O emissions due to volatilization of N from manure man-
agement (kg N2O.year
−1) and EF4 emission factor for N2O emissions from atmospheric
deposition of nitrogen on soils and water surfaces (kg N2O −N .(kg NH3 −N + NOx −
Nvolatilized)
−1). Of the total nitrogen losses, 1% (EF4) is converted to nitrous oxide N2O
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2006a). The factor 44/28 refers to the
conversion of NO2 −N to NO2.
Similar to the case of CH4, we have to take into account the different storage times of the
different manure fractions, i.e. 120 days for the storage of raw manure, 55 days for the
storage of the raw fraction of manure destined for separation and treatment, and finally,
120 days for the thin fraction of the separated manure.
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The total emissions from storage CFST then amount to the sum of the methane and direct
and indirect nitrous oxide emissions per type of manure management strategy, taking into
account the conversion factors CFCH4 and CFN2O,
CFST = (CH4,MM ∗ CFCH4) + ((N2OD,MM +N2OID,MM ) ∗ CFN2O) (5.22)
with CFCH4 and CFN2O equal 25 and 298 respectively (Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change, 2006a).
5.B GHG emissions from manure processing
Emissions from manure processing10 consist of emissions from mechanical separation, bi-
ological treatment of the liquid fraction and composting of the solid fraction. We assume
emissions from mechanical separation and composting to be negligible.
First of all, Table 5.4 provides an overview of the assumptions on the composition of
the manure slurry input, liquid and the solid fraction after mechanical separation, the
composted solid fraction and the effluent after biological treatment of the liquid.
Table 5.4: Composition of the slurry input, liquid and the solid fraction after mechanical
separation, the composted solid fraction and the effluent after biological treatment of the










Mass (kg) 1000 150 58 850 750
Dry Matter
(kg)
90 50 35 40 17.1
N total (kg) 8.1 1.62 1.13 6.48 0.65
P2O5 (kg) 4.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 0.40
K2O (kg) 7.2 0.72 0.72 6.48 6.48
Then, in Equation 5.23, we calculate the N2O, and, hence, CO2 emissions from biological





0.8 ∗ TN,t,m ∗ ((1− Fracgas,MS/100)− EF3)
∗ (0.01 + (0.0001 ∗ EF4))
)
∗ 44/28 ∗ CFN2O
(5.23)
10In this section, we only consider emissions that are not related to non-renewable energy use. The latter
are explained in Annex 5.D.
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We assume, as per data in Table 5.4, that 80% (i.e. 0.8) of N present in raw manure
remains in the thin fraction after separation. TN,t,m refers to the amount of N present
in the raw manure fraction destined for treatment. Then, we assume nitrogen losses of
1% N2O (0.01) and 0.01% NH3 (0.0001), according to Lemmens et al. (2007), Smet and
Deboosere (2007). We will add these emissions to the emissions from non-renewable energy
use by manure processing (see Annex 5.D, Equation 5.35).
5.C GHG emissions from manure application
These calculations are based on Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2006b).
The direct N2O emissions from managed soils can be calculated using Equation 5.24,
N2OD −N = (FSN + FON ) ∗ EF1 (5.24)
with N2OD − N the annual direct N2O − N emissions from N inputs, FSN the annual
amount of synthetic fertilizer N applied to soils (kg N.year−1), FON the annual amount
of animal manure, compost and other organic N additions applied to soils (kg N.year−1)
and EF1 the emission factor for N2O emissions from N inputs (kg N2O−N.kg N input−1).
In our specific case, we only take into account the annual amount of nitrogen from animal
manure from the raw, separated or biologically treated fraction that ends up on the field.
Conversion of N2O −N emissions to N2OD emissions is done by the following equation,
N2Odirect = N2OD −N ∗ EF1 ∗ 44/28. (5.25)
The indirect N2O emissions from atmospheric deposition of N volatilized from managed
soils are estimated using Equation 5.26.
N2OID −N = ((FSNFracgasf ) + (FONFracgasm)) ∗ EF4 (5.26)
where N2OID−N is the annual amount of N2O−N produced from atmospheric deposition
of N volatilized from managed soils (kg N2O − N.year−1), FSN the annual amount of
synthetic fertilizer N applied to soils (kg N.year−1), Fracgasf the fraction of synthetic
fertilizer N that volatilizes as NH3 and NOx (kg Nvol.kg N
−1
applied), FON the annual amount
of managed animal manure, compost and other organic N additions applied to soils (kg
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N.year−1), Fracgasm the fraction of applied organic N fertilizer that volatilizes as NH3
and NOx (kg Nvol.kg N
−1
applied). Similar to the case of direct emissions, in our specific case,
we only take into account the annual amount of nitrogen from animal manure from the
raw, separated or biologically treated fraction that ends up on the field.
The total emissions CFSPR, then, are calculated, for the raw manure fraction Ut,m, the
thin fraction of the separated manure fraction St,m,thin and the thin fraction of the treated
manure fraction Tt,m,thin as the sum, for each of these fraction, of the direct and indirect
N2O emissions, multiplied with the conversion factor CFN2O.
5.D GHG emissions from non-renewable energy use
These emissions consist of emissions from manure transport and injection and emissions
from electricity used for manure processing.
5.D.1 Transport and injection emissions
We first calculate the emissions from fuel use CFTR. These consist of transport emissions
CFTR,trans and injection emissions CFTR,inj . Transport emissions CFTR,trans consist of
emissions from transport of raw manure, the thin, thick and composted fractions of sep-
arated and treated manure. Injection emissions CFTR,inj consist of the emissions from
manure application on the field, i.e. raw manure and the thin fractions of separated and
treated manure.





Ut,m ∗ τm1,m2 ∗ EmisCO2 (5.27)
where EmisCO2 refers to the CO2 emissions from transport which are assumed at 0.11
kg CO2.ton
−1 manure.km−1.
For emissions caused by transport of separated manure, we use the same basis for calcu-
lation. However, in this case, the equation consists of three parts,
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0.05 ∗ St,m ∗ 300 ∗ EmisCO2
) (5.28)
where the first part refers to the transport of the thin fraction, St,m,thin, from municipal-
ity m1 to to the land in municipality m2, with τm1,m2 the distance between these two
municipalities. The second part refers to the transport of the thick fraction St,m,thick to
a composting facility, assumed at 50 km distance (see Section 5.2.2), and the third part
to the transport of the compost to France, assumed at a 300 km distance. We assume
that after composting, only 5% of the original weight of the manure fraction remains to
be separated.
The case for emissions caused by transport of treated manure, CFTR,trans,Tr, is similar
to Equation 5.28, with the difference that the thin fraction, after treatment consists of a
N-deficient, K-rich mixture. The total emissions from manure transport in the model then
become
CFTR,trans = CFTR,trans,U + CFTR,trans,Sp + CFTR,trans,Tr. (5.29)
The emissions caused by fuel use from manure application to the field, CFTR,inj , are




(Ut,m + St,m,thin + Tt,m,thin) ∗ Consdiesel ∗ CFdiesel (5.30)
where Ut,m, St,m,thin and Tt,m,thin refer to those fractions of manure applied to the field,
Consdiesel the amount of diesel consumed for manure injection, set at 0.8 l.m
3 manure
(Lopez-Ridaura et al., 2009), and CFdiesel the carbon footprint of diesel, set at 3.18 kg
CO2.l
−1 diesel (Defra, 2012).
The total emissions from transport can then be calculated as
CFTR = CFTR,trans + CFTR,inj . (5.31)
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5.D.2 Emissions from manure processing
Emissions from manure processing CFPR can be subdivided in to three broad categories:
(i) emissions from manure mixing prior to separation CFPR,mix, (ii) emissions from sepa-
ration CFPR,sep, and (iii) emissions from composting CFPR,comp.




(St,m + Tt,m) ∗ CFel (5.32)
where CFel refers to the emissions from electricity use in Belgium, set at 0.4 kg CO2.kWh
−1
(Commissie Benchmarking, 2009).





(St,m + Tt,m) ∗ CFel ∗ Elecsep (5.33)
where Elecsep refers to the electricity usage by a centrifuge for manure separation, set at
2 kWh.m3 manure (Lemmens et al., 2007).





Tt,m,thin ∗ CFel ∗ Elecbio (5.34)
where Elecbio refers to the electricity usage by a nitrification/denitrification unit for bio-
logical treatment, set at 17 kWh.m3 thin fraction (Trevi system).




(St,m,thick + Tt,m,thick) ∗ CFel ∗ Eleccomp (5.35)
where Eleccomp refers to the electricity usage by a composting unit, set at 50 kWh.ton
−1
thick fraction (Lemmens et al., 2007, Melse et al., 2004).
The total emissions from manure processing then become
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CFPR = CFPR,mix + CFPR,sep + CFPR,comp + CFN2O,T (5.36)
where we also include CFN2O,T , the emissions from the biological treatment of the thin
fraction of the treated manure.
5.E Avoided GHG emissions
Avoided GHG emissions CFAV are constituted of three categories: (i) avoided emissions
from mineral fertilizer use, (ii) avoided emissions from soil emissions from mineral fertilizer
use, and (iii) avoided emissions from fuel use from mineral fertilizer application.






































T ∗K,t,m ∗ µK/100 ∗ CFminK
) (5.39)
where CFAV,use,U , CFAV,use,S and CFAV,use,T refer to the avoided emissions per type
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respective N, P and K content of raw, separated and treated manure respectively (in kg
nutrient.ton−1 manure); µN , µP and µK to the mineral fertilizer equivalent (%), set at
60% for N, 90% for P, and 90% for K (De Vries, Groenestein and De Boer, 2012b); and
CFminN , CFminP , and CFminK refer to the CO2 emissions per nutrient, set at 3.7 kg
CO2.kg
−1 N (Coppens et al., 2013), 0.56 kg CO2.kg
−1 P2O5 (Kool et al., 2012), and 0.39
kg CO2.kg
−1 K2O (Kool et al., 2012).
Avoided emissions from mineral fertilizer use CFAV,use then amount to
CFAV,use = CFAV,use,U + CFAV,use,Sp + CFAV,use,Tr. (5.40)










∗ µN/100 ∗ (EF1 + (Fracgasf ∗ EF4)) ∗ 44/28 ∗ CFN2O
(5.41)
where Fracgasf refers to fraction of applied synthetic fertilizer N that volatilizes as NH3
and NOx, set at 0.1 kg (NH3−N+NOx−N).kg−1 N applied, and CFN2O the conversion
factor from N2O to CO2, set at 298.





+ U∗P,t,m/ShareP ∗ µP /100
+ U∗K,t,m/ShareK ∗ µK/100
)
∗ Consdiesel ∗ CFdiesel/1000
(5.42)
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+ S∗P,t,m,thin/ShareP ∗ µP /100
+ S∗K,t,m,thin/ShareK ∗ µK/100
)





+ T ∗P,t,m,thin/ShareP ∗ µP /100
+ T ∗K,t,m,thin/ShareK ∗ µK/100
)
∗ Consdiesel ∗ CFdiesel/1000
(5.44)
with SN,t,m,thin, SP,t,m,thin, SK,t,m,thin, TN,t,m,thin, TP,t,m,thin, and TK,t,m,thin the amount
of nutrient N, P and K available in the thin fraction of the separated and treated manure,
and ShareN the share of N in ammonia, set at 25%, ShareP the share of P in trisodium
phosphate, set at 45%, and ShareK the share of K in K-sulphate, set at 50%.
The total avoided emissions from fuel use from mineral fertilizer application then equal
CFAV,fuel = CFAV,fuel,U + CFAV,fuel,Sp + CFAV,fuel,T r. (5.45)
The total avoided emissions can then be calculated as follows,





6.1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS REVISITED
6.1 Research questions revisited
In this dissertation, we looked at how environmental policies, separately or through policy
interplay, can affect markets in unintentional ways, and aimed to determine the environ-
mental effectiveness and/or economic efficiency of this policy-market interaction. In order
to gain insight into the mechanisms behind these effects, we analyzed four specific cases
where environmental policies have caused unforeseen and undesirable impacts on the mar-
kets in which they operate. This was achieved by modeling the market and the effect
of the environmental policy instruments using different types of market models, starting
from single-firm optimization where prices and costs are determined exogenously as well
as endogenously in the model, and moving to multiple-firm Nash equilibrium and partial
equilibrium simulation models. We focused on two markets, i.e. the electricity market
and the manure market, and on five environmental policies, i.e. the Renewable Energy
Directive, the Waste Framework Directive, the 2015 Paris Agreement, the Nitrates Di-
rective, and the Belgian nuclear phase-out. We then defined four specific research cases
where these markets and policies interact.
For each of the four cases we defined a specific research question. To be able to provide
an overall perspective on the issue of environmental policy impact on markets, we also
formulated three general research questions.
In what follows, we will first briefly recapitulate the four specific research questions and
the outcome of our analyses. We will then broaden our conclusion by looking at these
four cases as a whole and aim to establish linkages and similarities or disparities between
them by formulating answers to the general research questions. This discussion will lead
to the formulation of a number of policy recommendations and is concluded by making
suggestions for future research.
6.1.1 Specific research questions
Chapters 2 and 3 were framed within the interplay of the Renewable Energy Directive
and the Waste Framework Directive, centered around the electricity market. We focused
on the anaerobic digestion sector as a processor of agricultural waste and manure and a
generator of renewable electricity through biogas. As already mentioned in the introduc-
tion in Chapter 1, this sector is currently facing increased financial uncertainty, caused by
high investment and operational costs, low electricity commodity prices and difficulties in
obtaining a stable and affordable supply of biomass. Seeing the potential for biogas as a
flexible, demand-oriented power supply, both Chapter 2 and 3 focused on how anaerobic
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digestion can be made more profitable.
Chapter 2 focused on the current anaerobic digestion business model where electricity is
produced at a constant rate and a fixed price, and aimed to find strategies that anaerobic
digestion operators apply to improve their economic performance and profitability within
the current policy framework. The analysis was conducted through a single-firm optimiza-
tion model, combining technical and economic equations. Feedstock cost and electricity
price were exogenously determined by the model, indicating that, in this case, an anaer-
obic digestion operator cannot actively participate in these markets and has to look for
other ways to increase his profits. Our analysis indicated that varying the substrate inlet
mass flow rate and organic loading rate could have a positive impact on the profitability
of anaerobic digesters and that this can be achieved either by increasing the interval time
between feedstock input, or by feeding individual streams of feedstock separately into the
system, while at the same time reducing the hydraulic retention time.
In Chapter 3, we looked at the evolution in the generation and marketing of electricity,
brought about by the increase in renewable energy production through the Renewable
Energy Directive. More specifically, we wanted to know whether opportunities exist for
anaerobic digestion in the day-ahead electricity market and whether the current Flemish
policy instrument of green electricity certificates is efficient at promoting the flexible power
production needed for participation in this specific market. To conduct our analysis, we
used a similar single-firm optimization model to the one used in Chapter 2. In this case,
however, feedstock cost and electricity price were endogenously determined by the model.
We opted for this approach to allow the anaerobic digestion operator to actively participate
in the market and optimize his decisions regarding the type and cost of feedstock and
the quantity and price of electricity. Our analysis indicated that there is potential for
anaerobic digestion operators in the day-ahead market but that the current design of
the green electricity certificates is not conducive to their participation. We found that
simply allowing the same amount of support to be spread over a longer period of time
could already stimulate the use of flexible electricity production and participation in the
day-ahead market and, hence, increase the profitability of the sector.
In Chapter 4, we took a step back from the anaerobic digestion sector in Flanders as a
renewable power producer and we turned our attention to electricity generation in Bel-
gium as a whole. In this case, electricity is generated by a mix of renewable, nuclear and
other (non-renewable, non-nuclear) sources, and investments in generation capacity and
electricity production are influenced by the Renewable Energy Directive, the 2015 Paris
Agreement and the nuclear phase-out. As the federal government has already once post-
poned its decision to close the three oldest nuclear plants because of security of supply
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issues, there is uncertainty as to their plans for the foreseen closure of the remaining four
plants. In our analysis, we studied how this uncertainty about a nuclear phase-out, cou-
pled with the implementation of renewable energy subsidies and nuclear taxes, affects the
investment capacity and productivity decisions of electricity suppliers in Belgium. The
methodological approach in this specific chapter is to move away from single-firm opti-
mization to a multiple-firm Nash-Cournot market equilibrium where the strategic positions
of firms and their interactions are taken into account. Also, in order to understand how
market assumptions influence model outcomes, the same problem was modeled assuming
perfect market competition and monopolistic market conditions using a partial equilib-
rium model. The results show that the implementation of renewable energy subsidies
promotes new investment in renewable energy technologies. Additionally, an increase in
uncertainty about a nuclear phase-out results in lower levels of overall investment – but
primarily in renewable energy –, in lower total electricity generation and higher electricity
prices, regardless of the fact if renewable energy subsidies are provided. However, in the
presence of subsidies reduces, this ‘uncertainty’ effect on firms’ decisions overall and on
total expected profits is less pronounced. Finally, regarding the assumption of level of
market competition, we found that imperfect oligopolistic markets offer more possibilities
for increased expansion in renewable energy as compared to extreme perfect and imper-
fect markets. Oligopolistic markets are, however, more influenced by an increase in the
probability of nuclear license extension as compared to monopolies, and need to expand in
non-renewable technologies in order to secure supply when a nuclear phase-out is highly
likely.
Finally, in Chapter 5, we changed focus from the electricity market to the manure market
as the market where agricultural waste streams and, more specifically, manure, end up.
Here, we looked at the impact of the implementation of the Nitrates Directive, through
the creation of a manure market, on the greenhouse gas emissions from manure manage-
ment. More specifically, as the Nitrates Directive, through the Manure Decree, imposes
fertilization standards, this means that manure cannot be applied on the field when the
farmers want or in the quantities they want. In a Belgian setting of areas with high live-
stock concentration, the implications are that, while less nitrates are leaching into surface
water through the implementation of the Nitrates Directive and the subsequent emergence
of a manure market, more CH4 from manure storage (longer storage period as manure
cannot be spread all year round anymore) and CO2 from manure transport (more trans-
port as manure has to be transported from areas with a high livestock density to areas
with a lower density) are emitted into the air as greenhouse gasses. Hence, the question
we sought to answer was whether spatial reallocation of livestock production in Belgium
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could potentially reduce the impact of greenhouse gas emissions, assuming that a lower
livestock density would reduce manure transport. Adhering to fertilization standards at
farm level implies an interaction between the livestock farms that produce and offer the
manure and the crop farms that accept the manure. These types of interaction, with many
players for one specific sector, are best modeled using a multiple-firm partial equilibrium
simulation model. Moreover, to take into account the environmental impact (carbon foot-
print) of manure management, we inserted an attributional and consequential Life Cycle
Assessment in the model. The results of the model simulations show that, while the
economic optimum (overall cost minimization) is achieved by maximizing the transport
of raw manure until fertilization standards are fulfilled and subsequently processing the
excess manure, the environmental optimum (carbon footprint minimization) is attained
by separating all manure before field application, as this strategy causes the least CO2
emissions, mainly due to the limited manure storage time. Also, our analyses indicated
that rearrangement of the spatial distribution of livestock production in Belgium will not
substantially decrease CO2 emissions. Furthermore, as our analysis demonstrates that
manure storage is the main contributor to the carbon footprint, solutions should instead
be sought by changing these storage systems.
These chapter-wise conclusions can then be extrapolated to answer the more general re-
search questions.
6.1.2 General research questions
Throughout the four case-specific chapters of this dissertation, we aimed to determine the
environmental effectiveness and/or economic efficiency of (the mix of) policy instruments
and offer specific suggestions on how to make improvements. In general, our research
efforts are summarized by three questions. In what follows, we will formulate an answer
to each of these questions.
How do environmental policies and their interplay affect markets?
From the analyses conducted in the four specific cases, we can draw three overall conclu-
sions on how environmental policies and their interplay affect markets. These conclusions
are related to (i) environmental policy change and technological change, (ii) environmen-
tal policy uncertainty and investment, and (iii) conflict and policy incoherence between
different policy instruments applied to address different environmental issues.
Firstly, Chapters 2 and 3 addressed the relationship between environmental policy and
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technological change in the following manner. The Flemish Energy Agency VEA calculates
the financial gap, i.e. the amount of support needed, for each renewable energy category
(see Section 3.1.5). It bases these calculations on a reference installation per category
and fixes, for each category, the parameters that will determine the amount of support
this category will receive (Vlaams Energieagentschap, 2017). Among these parameters
are feedstock type and cost, electricity price, and full load hours. Using parameters, or
fixed values, implies the assumption that installations will run in steady-state, meaning
that the behavior of the system or process is unchanging in time. This does, however,
not necessarily have to be the case, as was demonstrated in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.
More specifically, Chapter 2 showed that, by inserting variation in the process parameters
of substrate inlet mass flow rate, OLR and HRT (and, hence, turning them into process
variables), the technical and economic results of the anaerobic digestion system could be
improved. Then, Chapter 3 showed that, by varying the type and cost of feedstock –
and, hence, the amount of electricity produced – and electricity price, anaerobic digestion
operators could benefit from higher profits by participating in the day-ahead electricity
market (not taking green electricity certificates into account). Hence, these two chapters
reveal a conflict between a policy instrument that encourages steady-state operational
management on the one hand, and a potential profitable market that encourages dynamic
operational management and, hence, inspires technological change on the other hand.
Thus, we can conclude from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 that the green electricity certificates
instrument constrains the electricity market regarding technological change for flexible
power production. This conclusion is in line with other literature.
For instance, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2011) states
that the more ‘flexible’ (or technology-neutral) a policy regime is, the more innovation
takes place. Since future trajectories of technological change cannot be foreseen, it is
important to give innovators the incentive to search across a wider ‘space’ to identify the
best means of complying with regulations. Flexibility unleashes efforts to search for new
innovations, some of which may be only improvements on existing technologies. More-
over, technological innovation can lower the cost of achieving environmental objectives
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2012). Finally, Jaffe et al.
(2002) show that environmental policy interventions themselves create new constraints
and incentives that affect the process of technological innovation; and that, vice versa, the
environmental impact of social and economic activity is greatly affected by the rate and
direction of technological change.
Secondly, Chapter 4 reiterated the impact of policy uncertainty on investment by showing
that an increase in uncertainty about nuclear phase-out resulted in lower levels of invest-
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ment, particularly in renewable energy technologies. This behavior can also be observed
in other related sectors. For instance, from 2013 to 2014 there was a slight delay effect
regarding the investment in new small-scale agricultural digesters (i.e. ‘pocket’ digesters)
constructed in Flanders (18 new installations in 2013 versus 9 new installations in 2014)
due to delays in the revision of the framework for the Flemish Agricultural Investment
Fund (‘Vlaams Landbouwinvesteringsfonds’, VLIF) (De Geest et al., 2016). On 12 Decem-
ber 2014, the Flemish Government decided to make investments in peripheral equipment
such as manure mixers, digestate storage, pumping systems, etc. eligible for support un-
der the VLIF (Vlaams Coordinatiecentrum Mestverwerking, n.d.). This compensation rule
went into effect in 2015, resulting in a slight increase in the number of new investments
(12 new installations in 2015) in small-scale digesters that year (De Geest et al., 2016).
These observations are in line with other studies. For instance, Gulen and Ion (2016) doc-
ument a strong negative relationship between firm-level capital investment and the aggre-
gate level of uncertainty associated with future policy and regulatory outcomes. Moreover,
they found that different firms will be affected to different degrees, with stronger impacts
for firms with a higher degree of investment irreversibility and firms with a stronger reliance
on government spending. Also, their results suggest that policy uncertainty can cause sig-
nificant long-term fluctuations in investments of up to six years in duration. Closer to our
own research, Fuss et al. (2008) found that climate change policy uncertainty induces in-
vestors in the energy sector to wait and see whether the government will further commit to
climate policy. Market-driven uncertainty is more ‘harmless’ from an environmental (and
also from an investor’s) viewpoint than the uncertainty emanating from unclear govern-
ment commitments. Moreover, if learning about government commitment is more valuable
than investing in mitigation technologies immediately, the investment will be postponed.
This might lead to supply shortages and limited diffusion of less carbon-intensive technol-
ogy.
Thirdly, Chapter 4 also demonstrated, at the same time, that the effectiveness of a mix
of policy instruments can be hampered if these instruments are applied for divergent
purposes, resulting, in this case, in pollution swapping whereby mitigation of one pollutant
has a negative effect on another (Collins and McGonigle, 2008). This is also the case in
Chapter 5, where the reduction of nitrate leaching increased GHG emissions from manure
transport and in Chapters 2 and 3 where multiple policy instruments targeting biomass
have led to increased competition for, and price of, these biomass streams1.
Similar examples can also be found in the scientific literature. Regarding nuclear phase-
1It must be noted that, in our analyses, we did not demonstrate these effects. They are part of the
background to the problem statement for chapter.
181
6.1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS REVISITED
out and emission reduction, there are the Belgian studies by Albrecht and Laleman (2015),
Albrecht and Laleman (2014), and D’haeseleer et al. (2007), mentioned in Chapter 4, indi-
cating that greenhouse gas emissions will increase due to the nuclear phase-out. Moreover,
Nakata (2002) conducted a study regarding the impacts of a nuclear phase-out in Japan,
albeit by means of a partial equilibrium model, and found that the nuclear phase-out
would result in an 8% increase in CO2 emissions by the year 2040. And, in a study on the
impact of the German nuclear phase-out on Europe’s electricity generation, Bruninx et al.
(2013) found that nuclear generation will be replaced mainly by coal- and lignite-based
generation, which will increases the CO2-intensity of the German electricity sector. And,
when it comes to nitrate leaching, Laws et al. (2007) demonstrated that changing the
timing of slurry application from winter to spring to reduce the risk of nitrate leaching
was shown to potentially increase ammonia emissions on short grass swards.
Can the current policy assessment of these markets be improved by incorporat-
ing additional modeling aspects as compared to the current policy assessment
frameworks?
For this research question, we can draw two main conclusions.
The first conclusion relates to the choice of model. In Chapter 1, we introduced the dif-
ferent approaches that can be used to model markets. The choice of model very much
depends on the research question, and, more importantly, as we showed in Chapter 4, the
choice of underlying market assumptions influences the results for the same research ques-
tion. More specifically, in Chapter 4, our analysis indicated that, under the assumption
of oligopoly and the current policy framework, the electricity market offers more possibil-
ities for increased expansion in renewable energy as compared to perfect competition and
monopolistic markets. So far, the research conducted in the context of the nuclear phase-
out and future security of supply for the Belgian electricity market, has always assumed
perfect market competition and, hence, has not come across this specific result.
The second conclusion relates to the contribution of this dissertation to the existing liter-
ature. While we have not developed new approaches, the additional value of our analyses
lies in the fact that we have added a ‘dynamic element’ to the models used to solve each
research question, as compared to the conventional approaches. In this dissertation, we
broadly define ‘dynamic element’ as the opposite of elements in a steady-state. While a
steady-state implies that the behavior of the system or process in question is unchanging
in time or space, in this dissertation, the dynamic element in each model makes the system
or process in question changing in time or space. Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4
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deal with a dynamic process in time, while Chapter 5 deals with a dynamic process in
space.
More specifically, in Chapter 2, we used a techno-economic type of assessment2. While,
generally speaking, techno-economic assessments are unchanging in time, we added a
dynamic equation in our model to allow for variation in the operational system variables,
i.e. substrate inlet mass flow rate, organic loading rate and hydraulic retention time, over
time. By coupling the technical equations of the model to the economic ones, in a dynamic
context, we were able to discover a potential technological innovation with regard to the
feeding patterns of an anaerobic digester.
Dynamic elements were also inserted in Chapter 3, exposing another potential for tech-
nological change. In this case, we calculated the economic efficiency of the current policy
framework by using the same parameters that are used in government calculations for fi-
nancial gap and subsidy requirements (Vlaams Energieagentschap, 2017). However, these
model calculations do not take into account the possibility that anaerobic digestion oper-
ators may change operational strategies over time, in line with developing and promising
market trends. In our model, we inserted a dynamic approach over time, allowing anaer-
obic digestion operators to decide on input and output prices depending on the market
situation, which itself also evolves over time.
To summarize, these two chapters incorporated technological change in environmental
market models through dynamic modeling. Costanza and Ruth (1998) state that dynamic
modeling is designed to address the complexities that surround environmental investments
and problems, which require that non-linearities and spatial and temporal lags be reflected
in models used for decision support. Also, Grubb and Kohler (2002) explain that induced
technological change, which depends mostly on corporate investment in response to market
conditions3, is mostly observed in the energy sector and is endogenously modeled. This
idea is supported, amongst others, by studies of specific technology costs as a function
of market conditions and investment, and energy demand trends due to price shocks.
Moreover, Grubb and Kohler (2002) suggest that, when it comes to policy, far more
attention should be given to technological change and that efficient responses may involve
a wide mix of instruments, targeted to drive market-based innovation in relevant sectors,
and broader mitigation policies including economic instruments.
2Techno-economic assessment is, in principle, a cost-benefit comparison using different methods. These
assessments are used for tasks such as evaluating the economic feasibility of a specific project, investigating
cash flows over its lifetime, evaluating the likelihood of different technology scales and applications and
comparing the economic quality of different technology applications providing the same service (Lauer,
2008).
3Autonomous technological change, on the contrary, depends mostly on autonomous trends and gov-
ernment research and development, and is exogenously modeled (Grubb and Kohler, 2002).
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Löschel (2002) explains that another important aspect of the innovation process is the
heterogeneity in firm behavior as different firms respond differently to environmental poli-
cies. This heterogeneity can be addressed through game theoretical studies related to
strategic investments (Ulph, 1997). In Chapter 4, we investigated investment and produc-
tion decisions by electricity generating firms. These decisions have already been analyzed
extensively by means of partial equilibrium models, which, do not, however, take into ac-
count the dynamics or the interactions that take place between the different, heterogeneous
market players from one time period to another. As prices and volumes are influenced by
the strategic behavior of large players, satisfactory models may only be achieved if strate-
gic aspects are incorporated Bunn (2000). Our use of a Nash equilibrium model allows us
to do just that, thereby adding an extra dynamic to the market simulation, making it fit
more closely with reality.
In Chapter 5, we analyzed the impact on the carbon footprint of spatial livestock concen-
tration. Even though the type of model we used, i.e. a partial equilibrium model, does not
simulate dynamic interactions between players in the way that a Nash equilibrium does,
we added a dynamic spatial dimension to this analysis by performing a consequential LCA,
on top of an attributional LCA. The advantage of a consequential LCA is that it allows us
to estimate how flows to and from the environment change depending on choices made by
the decision-maker. It does this by using marginal data to represent the effects of a small
change in the output of goods and services. The consequential LCA approach allowed us
to see how GHG emissions caused by pig manure management change depending on the
manure management choices made by the farmers. This is important because, by modeling
the causal relationships originating from the decision to change the output of the product
– in this case, the change in type of manure management strategy –, the model allowed
us to inform policy makers of the broader impacts of policies that are intended to change
levels of production (Brander et al., 2008). Moreover, Stevens and Quinton (2009) suggest
that, in order for pollution swapping to be fully considered in policy making, there is a
need for a tool that can assess the impacts of different pollutant types on the environment.
They suggest that economics provides the best potential for creating this tool through the
use of market and non-market evaluation to calculate the cost of the mitigation option
and the pollution. This is exactly what we did in our study by linking the cost of manure
management and the related GHG emissions together.
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How can environmental policies be improved to eliminate these aforementioned
policy-market effects?
For each of the case studies, we formulated a number of specific policy recommendations.
These will be paraphrased here and general policy recommendations will be formulated in
Section 6.2.
Chapters 2 and 3 focused on technological change and environmental policy. We demon-
strated that the current policy instrument of green electricity certificates does not en-
courage innovation through flexible electricity production. As the share of intermittent
renewables such as wind and solar energy will surely increase in future, it is important,
within the framework of the Renewable Energy Directive and the Energy Decree, to also
stimulate those renewable technologies that can produce electricity in a flexible manner
and to allow and stimulate technological innovation to achieve this. Our analysis showed
that extending the validity period for green electricity certificates from ten to twenty years
for the same amount of electricity produced could increase the economic efficiency of this
policy instrument by increasing the profitability in the anaerobic digestion sector without
increasing the cost of support.
Chapter 4 focused on the impact of policy uncertainty on investment. We found that
a long-term energy strategy without uncertainty regarding nuclear phase-out and with
continued support for renewable energy in the form of subsidies is necessary in order to
ensure a stable investment climate in the electricity sector.
Finally, Chapter 5 focused on environmental policies, markets and pollution swapping. We
suggest that, to reduce GHG emissions from manure management within the framework
of the Nitrates Directive, policy measures should be developed that encourage changing
manure storage systems to reduce the time period of storage and the CH4 emissions that
are caused by this storage.
6.2 Policy Recommendations
Our specific policy recommendations can then be generalized along the three focus areas
that were identified.
First of all, when it comes to environmental policy and technological change, Jaffe et al.
(2002) state that there are two underlying realities regarding the relationship between
technological change and environmental policy: first, the environmental impact of social
and economic activity is greatly affected by the rate and direction of technological change;
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and second, environmental policy interventions themselves create new constraints and in-
centives that affect the process of technological developments. And, while researchers
dispute the extent to which environmental policy-induced technological change reduces
the social cost of environmental compliance, there is little dispute among economists that
flexible, incentive-oriented policy approaches are more likely to foster low-cost compliance
paths than prescriptive regulatory approaches (Jaffe et al., 2005), a conclusion that was
reiterated by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2011). The
Flemish Energy Decree aims for 20.5% of the electricity produced in Flanders by 2020 to
come from renewable sources. However, as we have seen, this increase in mostly inter-
mittent energy sources presents a challenge for the electricity grid. This results in new
economic incentives for flexible power production which are currently not being stimulated
by the green electricity certificates instrument. Hence, we can conclude from Chapter 3
that either the current policy instrument should be made more flexible, or that a new
instrument should be created to provide incentives to participate in the flexible electricity
market. This is already the case in Germany where anaerobic digestion operators can
apply for an additional flexibility premium if their installations are configured in such a
way that they can be used during periods of peak electricity demand (Hahn et al., 2014,
Hochloff and Braun, 2014). This conclusion follows a recommendation by the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (2013), specifically for renewable energy
sources, that focusing policy incentives on innovation in electricity system flexibility may
prevent some of the problems associated with the current policy effect of trying to ‘pick
winners’ amongst a portfolio of renewable energy technologies of unknown potential (i.e.
intermittent and non-intermittent) because improved electricity grid management will
yield benefits, irrespective of which intermittent renewable energy technologies ultimately
prove to be ‘winners’.
Secondly, regarding the impact of environmental policy uncertainty on investment, Gulen
and Ion (2016) conclude that, when making policy decisions, regulators should be mindful
of the fact that the uncertainty surrounding these decisions can be just as damaging as
making the wrong decision. Moreover, regarding uncertainty surrounding climate change
policies, Fuss et al. (2009) found that it is better to have climate change policies that are
stable over a certain length of time but change abruptly than it is to have less abrupt
but more frequently changing policies as less frequent fluctuations reduce the expected
value of information and result in smaller cumulative CO2 emissions. These conclusions
are also in line with the specific recommendations made by D’haeseleer et al. (2007) in
the Commission on Energy 2030 report and by Groep GEMIX (2009), in relation to
securing Belgium’s energy supply. These state that a stable investment climate must be
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guaranteed for competitive market players to have timely and sufficient new electricity
generation capacity and to retain a substantial refinery capacity. The results in Chapter
4 also show that certainty regarding nuclear phase-out increases investments in renewable
energy by the different firms. Even though, up until now, the Belgian government has
been firm on their intention to phase-out nuclear energy, the fact that so many reports
have been written about it, and that the topic regularly comes up in the Belgian news,
shows that this debate is still very much alive today. In addition, earlier decisions on the
nuclear phase-out have already been changed because the certainty of supply of electricity
was not met. This antecedent can created the expectation that history could repeat itself
in the future.
Finally, Collins and McGonigle (2008) state that pollution swapping is a particular issue
when implementing policy options for tackling diffuse pollution, such as nitrate leach-
ing. Moreover, they recommend that the impact of interventions on other pollutants and
other factors should be considered when instigating mitigation strategies for individual
pollutants, and that there is therefore a need to take a holistic approach to mitigation.
Additionally, Stevens and Quinton (2009) found a number of barriers to the recognition
of pollution swapping in agri-environmental legislation, including a lack of tools to eval-
uate the relative impacts of different pollutants, gaps in our knowledge of the impacts
of mitigation measures on non-target pollutants and institutional barriers. They add
that, in policy-making, it is common for different aspects of environmental pollution to
be legislated for by different government departments, divisions or organizations. This
makes reaching a consensus even more difficult due to the need to balance contrasting
objectives. Finally, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2007)
recommends, as a policy lesson, that in those cases where different policy instruments that
address different environmental issues conflict, it is necessary to have a method to com-
pare the magnitude of qualitatively different impacts of environmental policies and that
a cost-benefit analysis allows such comparisons, through an economic evaluation of the
various environmental impacts. Additionally, the OECD recommends that policy makers
should apply mutually enforcing instruments, as long as the benefits of doing so exceed
the related costs. Therefore, in the specific cases of impact of nuclear phase-out and the
Nitrates Directive on GHG emissions, policy makers should be made aware of these effects
and apply additional policy instruments to avoid additional emissions. This is, in fact, a
recommendation that comes up in Chapter 5 where we suggest to look at measures that
reduce the greenhouse gas emissions from manure storage.
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6.3 Recommendations for further research
Although this dissertation yields valuable insights into the interplay between environmen-
tal policy and markets, we identified a number of limitations that might be worth exploring
in future research.
First of all, we looked at the influence of environmental policy on technological change
through two single-firm optimization models. By merging these two models we would
be able to predict better the choice of technology for the anaerobic digestion operators
in the electricity market. This integration is computationally complex because the time
interval is different (days versus months). However, if the integration is successful, a more
complex set of management options for anaerobic digestion operators could be simulated.
As the model developed in Chapter 2 simulated changing feeding patterns and hydraulic
retention times, the combination of the models could, for instance, investigate the economic
feasibility of shifting the use of high energy content substrates to periods with higher energy
prices, or, change the retention time as a function of input and output prices. Moreover,
we could incorporate, in the modeling process, uncertainty through the use of stochastic
optimization techniques, and also the risk attitudes of decision-makers, as suggested by
Grubler et al. (1999), Anderson (1999), and Carraro (1998).
Secondly, we tried to understand the impact of policy uncertainty on investment in the
energy sector through a multiple-firm Nash equilibrium model. This model could be
improved to better predict the strategic actions by the different electricity market players
in a number of ways. For instance, we could assume that the dominant player on the
market also takes a strategic position when it comes to the total electricity generation
capacity in Belgium. This way, Electrabel could, by limiting new investments in electricity
generation capacity, stimulate the call for extension of the nuclear production license and,
hence, aim to increase its profits. This is currently not captured in the model as it
only simulates the strategic behavior with regard to the impact on electricity price and
not the impact of the decision to extend the license. This proposed extension is in line
with Genc et al. (2007), who make the distinction between two types of oligopolistic
games under uncertainty, depending on the behavioral assumptions of the players. The
first type is a game with expected scenarios, where investment decisions are based on
an expected scenario. The second type is a game with probabilistic scenarios, where
investment decisions depend on the scenario that unfolds. Due to the difficulties associated
with modeling uncertainty within a complex capacity expansion model, in our case, we
decided to replace the probabilistic scenario by an expected scenario. It would, however,
be interesting to include, in the model, an endogenously determined probability, instead
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of the exogenously determined and fixed probability of the current model. Moreover, by
using a multi-period dynamic model we would be able to analyze the effect of uncertainty
about nuclear phase-out on the evolution of investment capacity decisions over time. Also,
a more complex demand-price function that includes elasticities of demand or depended
on the time of year would present an interesting research avenue.
Finally, we looked at how certain environmental policies, through markets, can cause
pollution swapping by using a partial equilibrium simulation model. Collins and McGo-
nigle (2008) recommend that future modeling work should predict the interaction between
multiple pollutants, and assess the best strategies for deploying policy measures for the
mitigation of pollution. Also, Stevens and Quinton (2009) suggest that economics provides
the best potential for creating a tool that can assess the impacts of different pollutant types
on the environment through the use of market and non-market evaluation to calculate the
cost of the mitigation options and the pollution. By applying a monetary value to each
mitigation option it would be possible to compare contrasting pollutants. Following this
recommendation, it would be interesting to impose, within the manure allocation model
in Chapter 5, a CO2 tax on manure management to understand and predict the economic
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Governments develop public policies to guide actions towards achieving a desired outcome.
These policies have an effect whenever their implementation alters the inputs and incen-
tives for individual decisions and manipulates the costs and benefits that individual actors
face in nearly every facet of modern life. And, because the setting that these policies
seek to influence is typically a complex adaptive system, making a policy change can have
counter-intuitive results and cause side-effects or unintended consequences.
This dissertation focuses on environmental policies and their unintentional effects on mar-
kets, from an economic point of view. We look at four specific cases of how environmental
policies can cause unforeseen and undesirable impacts on markets in which they operate
and aim to determine the environmental effectiveness and/or economic efficiency of this
policy-market interaction. For each of the four cases, we model the market effects, i.e.,
the interaction of supply and demand within individual markets and specific actors, to
better understand human choices and resource allocation caused or influenced by policy
instrument mixes that target different environmental goals. Modeling the effect of these
instruments on a specific market can help to clarify whether these instruments will enhance
economic efficiency and/or environmental effectiveness. This type of research is relevant
because of its importance in making institutional decision-makers (i.e. policy-makers) as
well as individual decision-makers (i.e. firms) aware of these effects so that they can put
forward alternative ways to deal with them. We look at two markets that include agricul-
tural waste streams, i.e. manure and organic biological waste, as goods that can be traded.
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The first market of interest is the electricity market, where agricultural waste streams can
be traded and converted, through anaerobic digestion, into electricity, which in turn is a
tradable good. The second market is the manure market, where manure can be traded in
raw and processed form. Furthermore, we focus on four EU-level policies that promote
environmental sustainability, and their application at the regional – Flemish – level, and
one specific policy at the national – Belgian – level. These policies are (i) the 2009/28/EC
Renewable Energy Directive, (ii) the EU Climate and Energy Package 2020, Kyoto second
commitment period and 2015 Paris Agreement, (iii) the 91/676/EEC Nitrates Directive,
and (iv) the Belgian nuclear phase-out.
During the course of this dissertation, the following three general research questions are
answered: (i) how do environmental policies and their interplay affect markets, (ii) Can
the current policy assessment of these markets be improved by incorporating additional
modeling aspects as compared to the current policy assessment frameworks, and (iii) how
can environmental policies be improved to eliminate these effects? Moreover, for each
of the four cases that were analyzed, case-specific research questions were developed as
well. These specific questions are analyzed and answered in separate chapters which are
linked through the methodological framework. This framework classifies the different
mathematical approaches to market modeling into three main trends, i.e. optimization
models, equilibrium models and simulation models. In each chapter of this dissertation,
we model the relevant market following a different type of model.
Chapters 2 and 3 are framed within the interplay of the Renewable Energy Directive
and the Waste Framework Directive, centered around the electricity market. We focus
on the anaerobic digestion sector as a processor of agricultural waste and manure and
a generator of renewable electricity through biogas. Seeing the potential for biogas as a
flexible, demand-oriented power supply, both chapters focus on how anaerobic digestion
can be made more profitable. Our analysis indicates that varying the substrate inlet mass
flow rate and organic loading rate could have a positive impact on the profitability of
anaerobic digesters and that this can be achieved either by increasing the interval time
between feedstock input, or by feeding individual streams of feedstock separately into the
system, while at the same time reducing the hydraulic retention time. Moreover, there
is potential for anaerobic digestion operators in the day-ahead market but the current
design of the green electricity certificates is not conducive to their participation. By
simply allowing the same amount of support to be spread over a longer period of time,
the use of flexible electricity production and participation in the day-ahead market could
be stimulated, and hence, the profitability of the sector could be increased.
Chapter 4 takes a step back from the anaerobic digestion sector in Flanders as a renewable
216
APPENDIX A. SUMMARY
power producer and turns its attention to electricity generation in Belgium as a whole.
We study how investments in generation capacity and electricity production are influenced
by the Renewable Energy Directive, the 2015 Paris Agreement and the nuclear phase-out.
The results of the analysis show that the implementation of renewable energy subsidies
promotes new investment in renewable energy technologies. Additionally, an increase in
uncertainty about a nuclear phase-out results in lower levels of overall investment, in lower
total electricity generation and higher electricity prices, regardless of the fact if renewable
energy subsidies are provided.
Chapter 5 focuses on the manure market as the market where agricultural waste streams
and, more specifically, manure, end up. Here, we look at the impact of the implementation
of the Nitrates Directive, through the creation of a manure market, on the greenhouse gas
emissions from manure management. Hence, the question we seek to answer is whether
spatial reallocation of livestock production in Belgium could potentially reduce the im-
pact of greenhouse gas emissions, assuming that a lower livestock density would reduce
manure transport. The results of the model simulations show that rearrangement of the
spatial distribution of livestock production in Belgium will not substantially decrease CO2
emissions. Furthermore, as our analysis demonstrates that manure storage is the main
contributor to the carbon footprint, solutions should instead be sought by changing these
storage systems.
These chapter-wise conclusions are then extrapolated to answer the more general research
questions.
First of all, from the analyses conducted in the four specific cases, we can draw three
overall conclusions on how environmental policies and their interplay affect markets. For
starters, when it comes to environmental policy and technological change, Chapters 2 and
3 show that the green electricity certificates instrument constrains the electricity market
regarding technological change for flexible power production. Then, regarding environmen-
tal policy uncertainty and investment, Chapter 4 shows that an increase in uncertainty
about nuclear phase-out results in lower levels of investment, particularly in renewable
energy technologies. Finally, when it comes to conflict and policy incoherence between
different policy instruments applied to address different environmental issues, Chapters
4 and 5 show that the effectiveness of a mix of policy instruments can be hampered if
these instruments are applied for divergent purposes, resulting, in this case, in pollution
swapping whereby mitigation of one pollutant has a negative effect on another.
Secondly, two answers are given to the question on how market effects can be calculated
in view of the different existing market models and assumptions. First of all, we show that
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the choice of model very much depends on the research question, and, more importantly,
the choice of underlying market assumptions influences the results for the same research
question. Secondly, even though we have not developed new approaches, the additional
value of our analyses lies in the fact that we have added a ‘dynamic element’ to the models
used to solve each research question, as compared to the conventional approaches.
Thirdly, we suggest environmental policies can be improved to eliminate the policy-market
effects described above in the following way. First of all, when it comes to environmental
policy and technological change, we can conclude from Chapter 3 that either the current
policy instrument should be made more flexible, or that a new instrument should be created
to provide incentives to participate in the flexible electricity market. Secondly, regarding
the impact of environmental policy uncertainty on investment, the results in Chapter 4
show that certainty regarding nuclear phase-out increases investments in renewable energy
by the different firms. Therefore, a stable investment climate must be guaranteed for
competitive market players to have timely and sufficient new electricity generation capacity
and retain a substantial refinery capacity. Finally, in regard to the pollution swapping
effect, we recommend that, in the specific cases of impact of nuclear phase-out and the
Nitrates Directive on GHG emissions, policy makers should be made aware of these effects




Overheden ontwikkelen beleid om met specifieke acties en maatregelen gewenste resultaten
te bereiken. Deze beleidsmaatregelen hebben een impact wanneer hun implementatie de
inputs en drijfveren voor individuele beslissingen verandert en de kosten en voordelen die
de individuele actoren in bijna elk aspect van het moderne leven ervaren manipuleren. En,
omdat de omgeving die dit beleid probeert te bëınvloeden typisch een complex adaptief
systeem is, kan een beleidsverandering ongewenste resultaten tot gevolg hebben.
Dit doctoraat richt zich op het milieubeleid en de ongewenste markt-effecten die hieruit
kunnen voortvloeien, vanuit een economisch standpunt. We analyseren vier specifieke
gevallen, of casestudies, die aantonen hoe het milieubeleid onvoorziene en ongewenste ef-
fecten kan veroorzaken op de markten waarin het werkzaam is, met als doel de effectiviteit
op milieuvlak en/of de economische efficiëntie van deze interactie te bepalen. Voor elk van
de vier gevallen modelleren we de markteffecten, en meer bepaald de wisselwerking tussen
vraag en aanbod binnen individuele markten en specifieke actoren, en dit om de menselijke
keuzes en toewijzing van hulpbronnen, gedreven door beleidsinstrumentmixen op vlak van
milieudoelstellingen, beter te begrijpen of te bëınvloeden. Het modelleren van het effect
van deze instrumenten op een specifieke markt kan helpen verduidelijken of deze instru-
menten de economische efficiëntie en/of effectiviteit op milieuvlak zullen verbeteren. Dit
type onderzoek is relevant omdat het belangrijk is om beleidsmakers en individuele beslis-
sers (d.w.z. bedrijven) bewust te maken van deze effecten, zodat zij alternatieve manieren
kunnen bedenken om hiermee om te gaan. We focussen in dit onderzoek op twee spec-
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ifieke markten die werken met afvalstromen uit de landbouw, en meer specifiek mest en
organisch biologisch afval, als stromen die verhandeld kunnen worden. De eerste markt
is de elektriciteitsmarkt, waar agrarische afvalstromen verhandeld kunnen worden en via
anaërobe vergisting tot elektriciteit worden omgezet, wat op zijn beurt een verhandelbaar
goed is. De tweede markt is de mestmarkt waar mest in zowel ruwe als verwerkte vorm kan
worden verhandeld. Voorts richten we ons op vier beleidsmaatregelen die de duurzaamheid
op vlak van milieu bevorderen, zowel op Europees niveau als hun toepassing op regionaal –
Vlaams – niveau, alsook een specifieke beleidsmaatregel op nationaal – Belgisch – niveau.
Deze beleidsmaatregelen zijn (i) de richtlijn 2009/28/EG inzake hernieuwbare energie, ii)
het EU Klimaat- en Energiepakket 2020, het Kyoto Protocol en het Klimaatakkoord van
Parijs, iii) de nitraatrichtlijn 91/676/EEG, en iv) de Belgische kernuitstap.
Tijdens dit doctoraat worden de volgende drie algemene onderzoeksvragen beantwoord:
(i) hoe bëınvloedt het milieubeleid de markt, (ii) kan de huidige beleidsevaluatie van
deze markten verbeterd worden door aanvullende modelleringsaspecten te integreren in
vergelijking met de huidige beleidsbeoordelingskaders, en (iii) hoe kan milieubeleid ver-
beterd worden om deze effecten weg te werken? Naast de algemene onderzoeksvragen
worden voor elk van de vier geanalyseerde casestudies specifieke onderzoeksvragen on-
twikkeld. Deze specifieke vragen worden onderzocht en beantwoord in aparte hoofdstukken
die met elkaar gelinkt zijn via het methodologische kader. Dit kader classificeert de ver-
schillende wiskundige benaderingen van marktmodellering in drie grote trends, zijnde op-
timalisatiemodellen, equilibriummodellen en simulatiemodellen. In elk hoofdstuk van dit
doctoraat modelleren we de relevante markt volgens een ander type model.
Hoofdstukken 2 en 3 kaderen binnen de interactie tussen de Richtlijn Hernieuwbare En-
ergie en de Afvalrichtlijn, en zijn gericht op de elektriciteitsmarkt. De focus ligt op de
anaërobe vergistingssector als verwerker van agrarische afval stromen en als opwekker van
hernieuwbare elektriciteit via biogas. Beide hoofdstukken onderzoeken de mogelijkheden
voor biogas als flexibele, vraaggerichte en winstgevende stroomvoorziening. Onze analyse
toont aan dat variatie van de substraat-massastroom en het organische laadvermogen een
positief effect kan hebben op de winstgevendheid van anaërobe vergisters. Dit kan worden
bereikt door (i) het verhogen van de intervaltijd tussen de afzonderlijke toevoermomenten,
(ii) grondstofstromen afzonderlijk aan het systeem te voeden, en (iii) tegelijkertijd de hy-
draulische retentietijd te verkorten. Bovendien is er potentieel voor bijkomende opbreng-
sten door deelname aan de day-ahead elektriciteitsmarkt, maar blijkt uit onze analyses dat
het huidige ontwerp van de groene stroomcertificaten echter niet bevorderlijk is voor deel-
name aan deze markt. Door simpelweg dezelfde hoeveelheid steun beschikbaar te maken
voor een langere periode kan flexibele elektriciteitsproductie, en bijgevolg deelname aan
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de day-ahead markt, worden gestimuleerd waardoor de winstgevendheid van de sector kan
worden verhoogd.
Hoofdstuk 4 neemt een stap terug van de anaërobe vergistingssector als hernieuwbare
energieproducent in Vlaanderen en richt zich op de opwekking van elektriciteit in heel
België. We bestuderen hoe investeringen in productiecapaciteit en elektriciteitsproductie
bëınvloed worden door de Richtlijn Hernieuwbare Energie, het Klimaatakkoord van Parijs
en de kernuitstap. Uit de resultaten van de analyse blijkt dat de implementatie van groene
stroomcertificaten investeringen in hernieuwbare energie bevordert. Bovendien zorgt een
toenemende onzekerheid over een kernuitstap voor een lager niveau in totale investering,
lagere totale elektriciteitsopwekking en hogere elektriciteitsprijzen, ongeacht het feit dat
subsidies voor hernieuwbare energie voorzien worden.
Hoofdstuk 5 richt zich op de mestmarkt. We analyseren de impact van de Nitraatrichtlijn
op de uitstoot van broeikasgassen door mestbeheer, als gevolg van de oprichting van een
mestmarkt. De onderzoeksvraag die we willen beantwoorden is of ruimtelijke herverdel-
ing van de veehouderij in België de impact van broeikasgasemissies potentieel zou kun-
nen verminderen, aangezien een lagere ruimtelijke dichtheid van veeteelt de hoeveelheid
mesttransport zou verminderen. Uit de resultaten van de modelsimulaties blijkt dat de
reorganisatie van de ruimtelijke verdeling van de Belgische veehouderij de CO2 uitstoot
niet significant zal verminderen. Bovendien toont onze analyse aan dat mestopslag de
belangrijkste bijdrage levert aan de ecologische voetafdruk, en dat de uitstoot aanzienlijk
verminderd zou kunnen worden door de mestopslagsystemen te veranderen.
Deze hoofdstuk-specifieke conclusies worden dan geëxtrapoleerd naar de algemene onder-
zoeksvragen om deze te beantwoorden.
Ten eerste kunnen we drie algemene conclusies trekken over hoe milieubeleid en de wis-
selwerking tussen verschillende instrumenten de markt bëınvloeden. Om te beginnen, wat
betreft milieubeleid en technologische verandering, beschreven in Hoofdstukken 2 en 3,
tonen we aan dat het huidige systeem van groene stroomcertificaten evoluties in elek-
triciteitsmarkt wat betreft technologische veranderingen door flexibele energieproductie
beperkt. Vervolgens blijkt dat de toename in onzekerheid over de kernuitstap uitmondt in
een lager niveau van investering, voornamelijk in hernieuwbare energie. Tenslotte tonen
Hoofdstukken 4 en 5 aan dat de effectiviteit van een mix van beleidsinstrumenten kan
belemmerd worden als deze instrumenten voor uiteenlopende doeleinden worden gebruikt.
Dit kan er dan vervolgens voor zorgen dat het verminderen van één verontreinigend middel
een toename van een ander middel veroorzaakt.
Ten tweede worden twee antwoorden gegeven op de vraag hoe markteffecten kunnen wor-
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den berekend met het oog op de verschillende bestaande marktmodellen en aannames.
Allereerst tonen we aan dat de keuze van het model voornamelijk afhangt van de onder-
zoeksvraag en, belangrijker nog, dat de onderliggende marktveronderstellingen de resul-
taten voor eenzelfde onderzoeksvraag bëınvloeden. Daarenboven, hoewel we geen nieuwe
benaderingen hebben ontwikkeld, ligt de toegevoegde waarde van onze analyse in het
feit dat we, in vergelijking met de conventionele benaderingen, een ‘dynamisch element’
toegevoegd hebben aan de modellen die worden gebruikt om de onderzoeksvragen op te
lossen.
Ten derde stellen wij voor dat het milieubeleid verbeterd kan worden om de hierboven
beschreven effecten te elimineren. Ten eerste, met betrekking tot milieubeleid en technol-
ogische verandering, kunnen we uit Hoofdstuk 3 besluiten dat het huidige groene stroom-
certificaatinstrument flexibeler moet worden gemaakt of dat er een nieuw instrument moet
ontwikkeld worden om deelname aan de flexibele elektriciteitsmarkt te stimuleren. Ten
tweede, wat betreft de impact van beleidsonzekerheid op investeringen, tonen de resultaten
van Hoofdstuk 4 aan dat zekerheid over de kernuitstap de investeringen in hernieuw-
bare energie zal doen toenemen. Daarom is het belangrijk een stabiel investeringskli-
maat te garanderen om zo tijdige en voldoende nieuwe elektriciteitsopwekkingscapaciteit
te voorzien. Ten slotte, met betrekking tot het specifieke geval van de impact van de
kernuitstap en de Nitraatrichtlijn op broeikasgasemissies, adviseren we dat beleidsmakers
op de hoogte moeten worden gebracht van deze negatieve neveneffecten en aanvullende
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